Is There Any Hope Left for Joey Ortiz's Offense?

Joey Ortiz still plays defense well enough to justify meaningful innings in Milwaukee’s infield. His hands remain quick, his versatility still carries value, and there are managers who would live for years with a light bat if the glove compensates for it at a premium position.

The problem for the Brewers is that Ortiz’s bat is no longer merely light. It's entering an offensive zone where virtually his entire profile depends on flared liners, bloopers, and perfectly-placed ground balls. And in modern baseball, surviving solely on that is like trying to live on pretzels. Pretzels are nice, but as a full diet, they leave much to be desired.

Worst of all, perhaps, this isn't new. Ortiz's results have been volatile, but his expected stats—the numbers beneath the numbers—have been persistently brutal for the last year. Here are his actual and expected weighted on-base averages by month for his big-league career.

In only one month since the middle of 2024 (last August) has Ortiz put up an expected wOBA above .292; the league average is .316. Since last summer, the Brewers have used him increasingly judiciously. Not since last June has he reached 80 plate appearances in a month, and though he's putting up slightly better numbers this month, that's in only 39 trips to the plate.

Ortiz finished April with the worst xwOBA of his career at just .222, surpassing his previous collapse of .224 in August 2024. That pattern matters, because it helps explain something fundamental: Ortiz’s initial collapse did not necessarily begin as a hitter incapable of generating competitive contact. It began as a hitter whose offensive margin became so thin that any combination of mediocre contact, low BABIP, and lack of power ended up sinking his entire offensive line. And over time, that offensive pressure also transformed the quality of his swings.

When we dive into the full evolution of his numbers, what emerges is not a conventional slump. There is no single broken indicator explaining the decline. What appears, instead, is the progressive deterioration of nearly every component that supported his offensive production in 2024, the only season in which he truly looked like he had built a stable offensive identity in the major leagues.

That year, Ortiz was not an intimidating hitter, but he was a functionally uncomfortable one for opponents. He posted a .159 ISO, a .347 xSLG, hit 16 barrels, and maintained a relatively balanced contact profile. His production did not depend on raw power, but on generating line drives, using the gaps, and creating enough quality contact to force pitchers to respect the strike zone.

Today, that aspect has almost completely disappeared. The drop in contact quality is far too consistent to ignore. His average exit velocity fell from 87.8 mph in 2024 to 84.9 in 2025. His Hard-Hit% dropped from 38.4% to 31.7%. His barrel rate fell to just 3.7%, well below league average. And perhaps the statistic that best captures the problem: only three barrels in 82 batted balls this season. That does not describe an unlucky hitter. It describes a hitter whose contact has lost its explosiveness.

But there is an even more revealing number, one that probably explains better than any other why the damage disappeared from his offensive game: the collapse of his Sweet Spot%. In 2023, Ortiz placed 40% of his batted balls within the ideal launch-angle window. Even in 2024, he still maintained enough balance in his swing plane to sustain productive rallies and dangerous contact. Today, that number has fallen to just 18.3%.

For a hitter with limited power, Sweet Spot% is practically a lifeline. Ortiz does not possess the physical margin to survive while producing mediocre contact. He needs to consistently find the correct angle to be a good hitter. Once that percentage collapses, the entire offensive structure begins falling apart at the same time. That's exactly what his numbers show.

In 2024, Ortiz still built healthy offensive at-bats because line drives sat at the center of his profile. He hit .618 on line drives, produced 19 doubles and six triples on that type of contact, and registered an absurd 1.118 slugging percentage whenever he found that swing plane. That was his offense. He did not need to be a 30-home-run hitter, because he created rallies through frequent, clean contact.

The problem is that contact has almost completely evaporated. His line-drive rate has fallen from 24% in 2023 to just 13.4% in 2026. And when a hitter with limited natural power stops producing line drives, there is usually not much left behind to sustain the rest of the offensive profile. That explains why his fly balls have turned into harmless outs.

In 2024, even though he hit only .150 on fly balls, 10 of his 15 hits on fly balls went for extra bases. There was hidden damage there. Pitchers knew that if the ball carried, there was real danger. Two years later, that threat has disappeared completely. His slugging percentage on fly balls fell from .480 to .230 in 2025 and sits at just .250 this year. His HR/FB% collapsed from 15.5% to 5.9%. The balls that once found the gap or scraped the fence now simply die in the outfield.

This is where the metrics become brutal, because the expected numbers do not suggest bad luck. The decline is legitimate. His xwOBA fell from .329 in 2024 to .275 in 2025 and .282 this year. His xSLG dropped from .347 to .279. His xISO cratered to .064. His wOBACON has fallen nearly one hundred points from its peak.

There is not much separation between the results and the actual quality of contact. Ortiz is producing exactly the kind of offense his current swings suggest.

Perhaps the most revealing detail of the entire transformation appears in the distribution of his contact. At his offensive best, Ortiz used the entire field naturally. There were line drives to the opposite field, firm contact into both gaps, and enough variety to keep defenses uncomfortable. Today, the profile looks far more limited: nearly all of his contact travels toward center field, while his opposite-field usage has dropped to just 12.2%.

That does not necessarily describe a hitter who is late on swings, but it does describe one who is less dynamic and far more dependent on simply putting the ball in play. And when that version of the swing also comes with less sweet-spot contact, fewer line drives, and less authority in the air, the result becomes exactly what the numbers show: softer ground balls, harmless fly balls, and far less overall damage.

Even so, Milwaukee still finds one small reason not to completely give up on him. The collapse has not come with an explosion in swing-and-miss, and when Ortiz does manage to hit line drives, the production still appears. The real challenge for the Brewers is not recovering elite contact strength, because Joey Ortiz has never been that type of hitter. What they need to recover is the swing that once produced dynamic contact and enough damage to punish mistakes in the strike zone—and make pitchers just a little more uncomfortable.