Matthew Trueblood

Image courtesy of © Mark Hoffman/Milwaukee Journal Sentinel / USA TODAY NETWORK via Imagn Images When Sal Frelick homered in his first plate appearance against a left-handed pitcher in the season-opening series against the White Sox, it was easy to dream a bit on another terrific season for the fourth-year right fielder. He had suddenly found his way from virtually no over-the-fence power in 2024 to hitting 12 bombs in 2025, and that was without putting a southpaw in his book at all. A version of Frelick who could maintain what he did so well throughout last year and tap into more thunder against lefties could have become a borderline All-Star—something like the best, long-forgotten version of Andrew Benintendi. So far, though, that dream hasn't been realized. Five weeks in, Frelick is batting .212/.317/.306, and the seeming magic of his game from the best stretches of the last two years—lots of infield hits, unexpected gap-splitters in the biggest possible moments, efficient basestealing—is missing. On one hand, that's very worrisome, because there was some reason to wonder whether that was inevitable. Frelick far outperformed his expected stats last year. The regression monster stood nearby all winter, sharpening its fangs conspicuously. Our Jack Stern wrote about the fear of its bite earlier this spring. Frelick's expected numbers this year are better than the actual results, but not by that much. Certainly, he's not doing what you'd hope to see him do, if you were making a case for some positive regression ahead and a major improvement. On the other hand, Frelick has made some improvements. He's swinging less this year, as a rational response to a shrinking strike zone, and as a result, his walk rate has spiked noticeably. Last year, he walked in 7.9% of his plate appearances. This season, that number is up to 12.5%, which is why he's staying afloat in the OBP department, despite his poor overall production. The power hasn't come. Even the batting average is lagging. He's getting on base at a viable rate, though, and his overall expected output is not much worse (.294 xwOBA) than it was last season (.299). If you believe he does have some real skill for outperforming his xwOBA, which seems fair, it's modestly encouraging that he's maintaining a similar overall process and walking more often. The chances of him getting back to an OBP around .350 seem relatively strong. So, which way should you lean? With reasonable arguments on both sides of the scale, which weighs more heavily? To answer that (although maybe not the way you expect), let's talk about his bat-tracking data, Frelick already had a low average bat speed, according to Statcast, but that number has come down even further this year. It's come down partly because of and in proportion to making contact slightly deeper in the hitting zone and with a slightly lower attack angle. However, it's also come down despite a second straight season of flattening his bat path. A flatter swing leaves less margin for error in terms of both timing and barrel accuracy. Frelick got significant mileage out of flicking line drives to center and left field, over the last two years, and the tilt in his swing helped him find the power for which he hit in 2025. This year, he's hitting more balls on the ground and more straight up in the air, with fewer in the sweet spot in between. That's a common symptom for those who afflict themselves with a flat swing. To visualize the problem, consider this homer from last season: QndhNEJfWGw0TUFRPT1fQVZSV1ZsY0ZWVlFBQUZCUkJ3QUhCVlZUQUZnR1ZBVUFBQUZUQndKVEJBWmRBUUJS.mp4 And compare it to this low lineout, on a similar pitch, this season. MTZOYjNfWGw0TUFRPT1fVXdZQ0FsTUVWd0FBQ0FSUlVBQUhCVmNFQUZsV1ZWVUFBMU1HQkZGVENGRlRDUU1G.mp4 On these two pitches, you can barely see a difference in swing plane in real time. If you freeze on the moment just before contact, though, the slight change gets easier to see. I've set those moments side-by-side below, and highlighted the bat to enhance its visibility. This also makes it easier to see why this matters. A bit less loft in the swing—a slightly flatter slash through the zone—is the difference between hitting the bottom half of the ball and hitting the top half of it. On both pitches, Frelick is a bit early, having timed his swing at first for a fastball and gotten a changeup, but last year, he was early in a good way. This year, that same imperfection of timing has resulted in less valuable contact. All this, though, can be fixed. The change in plane is relatively small; it comes from timing and swing decisions as much as it does from mechanics. The lost bat speed is half-illusory, and relatively minimal. Frelick just isn't on time very often, so far. He was late on the fastball and early on soft stuff for a solid fortnight, That brought his numbers to a nadir about 10 days ago, when his OPS for the year was under .550. Since then, he's batting .333 with one of his two homers, four walks and just one strikeout. Frelick might already be fixed, and if that's not fully true, he certainly looks to have gotten back on time. The rest will take care of itself over time. The Brewers have had to survive a lot of early injuries, and having Frelick struggle in the absence of Jackson Chourio and Andrew Vaughn has been especially damaging. Just as the return of those two players draws near, though, it seems like Frelick is warming up. As ugly as the numbers are, the upside is as high as ever. If nothing else, the small strike zone should keep him trending in the right direction. View full article

Image courtesy of © Lon Horwedel-Imagn Images Just under two weeks ago, I wrote about Chad Patrick, who has found ways to succeed this season by throwing a glove-side sinker. That's an unusual formula, because most pitches are targeted mostly to the side of the plate toward which they move, anyway. Good pitchers find a feel for throwing their pitches to multiple quadrants, but it's hard to consistently land a backdoor curveball or to move that sinker off an opposite-handed batter's front hip and find the inner edge of the zone, without having it drift into the nitro zone. Which direction you're most likely to miss matters. Which miss direction produces a better chance of avoiding damage and/or getting a strike matters. Most of the time, those indicators nudge a pitcher toward throwing (for instance) their sinker to the arm side of the plate (inside on a same-handed batter), and their cutter or breaking ball to the glove side (toward an opposite-handed batter). Patrick's glove-side sinker was proof of his willingness to find those locations, even though it's hard to do. It also helped us understand how he seemed to be getting such harmlesss contact, and therefore putting up a great ERA despite a too-low strikeout rate. Entering his start Tuesday night against the Diamondbacks, nothing has changed. Patrick is still running a strikeout rate straight out of the 1980s, but he has a 2.35 ERA in his 23 innings of work. Entering the season, most of the optimism surrounding Patrick centered on the notion that his new slurve would help him miss more bats. The swings and misses haven't come, but neither have the runs for opposing teams. The glove-side sinker gives us some insight on that, but it feels insufficient to explain it. Can looking at the other side of the dish bridge the gap? Patrick's bread-and-butter is his cutter, and this season, the reason he's getting outs is the way he's learned to bounce from one lane to the next with it. He's lost a few of the cutters he pulled too much last year, like this one: VndNUE1fWGw0TUFRPT1fQmxBRVhGTUVBbE1BREZZRFZnQUhWd0lBQUZnRlVRY0FVMTBCQlZZTkFBRUdVMVJR.mp4 With any pitch one throws with glove-side movement, it's natural to yank it occasionally. When Patrick's target with the pitch was already set toward that first-base side of home plate, it tended to show up in bounced cutters, or ones that forced a lefty batter to take evasive action or wear a bruise on the front of their thigh. When he tried to target the third-base edge with it, the result was often even worse: he would throw an accidental meatball. QXdhMWdfWGw0TUFRPT1fQmdVRlV3QU5Vd2NBV2dRREJRQUhBZ0FGQUFNRVVsY0FCQVlHQUZGVEJBRlZVbGRY.mp4 He got away with the pitch above, to Victor Caratini, but too many of the home runs Patrick gave up as the season wore on were mistakes like that one. Scroll back up and consider that pair of movement plots, though. This year, Patrick has eliminated some of those hard-sweeping cutters in favor of ones with only relative cut, for such a hard and riding pitch. He's developed a version of the pitch he can allow to slightly move to the arm side, while still looking to the hitter like his cutter. It's opened up the arm side of the plate for him with the cutter, marking a neat and confounding pair with his glove-side sinker skills. TUFYMmRfWGw0TUFRPT1fQlFGU0FGVUhWbFFBV1ZjSFVBQUhBMU1DQUFBRVd3TUFDMVFCVkZZSEFWWlZBQU5U.mp4 When he can hit the target that well on either side of the plate, the cutter becomes an out pitch—even, as above, occasionally a strikeout pitch. However, it can also be a sneakily valuable way to get back into at-bats. Here's Patrick working from behind in the count, with a pitch Andrés Giménez was never going to swing at. QndSNnJfWGw0TUFRPT1fQWxNQVVsY0JCd29BRFZJS1h3QUhBd0VGQUZrTlZBTUFBQWNEQkFNR0IxWlRBVkJm.mp4 It's possible to consistently generate a low BABIP and take the sting out of even modern lineups. To do it, though, you have to be able to move the ball east and west and get hitters into a defensive mode. Mixing an unusual set of glove-side sinkers with arm-side cutters has been the secret sauce for Patrick. That doesn't mean he can keep it up, for sure. To feel more confident about that, you'd want to see more strikeouts. However, while his run prevention continues to outpace his peripherals, this dynamic helps us understand how. Few pitchers are willing to make such a significant change to their go-to pitch. Patrick has been unusually flexible with his. He's changed the whole spin profile of his cutter this year, turning it from a pitch that had more glove-side spin to one that often has closer to pure backspin. He gets cut using his low arm angle, seam orientation and the position of his hand at release. Look at the distribution of his pitches by type based on initial spin direction (on the left) and on observed movement (right), and you can see a change in the starting point and in the diversity of directions the cutter can veer this year. Patrick's four-seamer plays better off this version of his cutter, because they look similar a hair longer and the four-seamer can seem to explode on hitters more than its sheer speed or movement would suggest. Again, though, the main benefit is that this tweak to his cutter allows Patrick to work both sides of the plate with it. He hasn't lost the glove side; he's just unlocked the arm side. He still won't live there with that offering. When he needs to go there, though, he can do so with much more confidence this year than last. That does make a real difference. Unlike most pitchers of this era, who live by the power and the sheer traits of their pitches and stick to a small target area for each offering, he's embracing the old-school notion of using the whole zone with his hard stuff. He had better miss more bats, if he wants to keep his ERA under 3.00. For now, though, this new wrinkle makes him a more complete and balanced pitcher, and a fun one to watch. View full article

Image courtesy of © Jeff Hanisch-Imagn Images The pitch-tracking era dates back to the installation of PITCHf/x cameras in every big-league stadium in 2008. It covers less than 20 years of baseball's long history, then, but given all we've learned about sports medicine and performance and all the changes in the game we've seen over that relatively brief span, you can pretty safely say that a velocity record for the pitch-tracking era is a velocity record for all of baseball history. No, Nolan Ryan didn't throw harder than Jacob deGrom. No, Bob Feller's fastball wasn't measured incorrectly. Everyone throws harder now than they did before. When I tell you, then, that Jacob Misiorowski's 21 pitches with a perceived velocity of 102 miles per hour or higher that resulted in non-contact strikes on Saturday is a record, there's no reasonable argument against it. Sure, we can't measure the speed of Ryan's or Kerry Wood's or even Robb Nen's best heaters precisely, but we can be sure they didn't throw as hard as Misiorowski does—and, in the case of Nen and similarly hard-throwing relievers, the sheer volume of Misiorowski's dominance this weekend is out of reach. If I stopped at telling you that that number is a record, though, I'd be underselling what Misiorowski really did to the Pirates. He threw 21 pitches with that perceived speed that went for either called strikes or whiffs; we're not even including foul balls here. The second-highest number of such pitches by any pitcher in a game for which we have the requisite data was by Jordan Hicks, three years ago, almost to the day. Hicks was working in long relief on Apr. 26, 2023, against the Rockies. He got three more called and swinging strikes at 102+ than anyone else had ever had, to that point—with nine. He had nine (9). Later that year, Ben Joyce of the Angels twice got as high as seven (7) such offerings. In 2025, Misiorowski had seven (7) in one start just after the All-Star break, against the Mariners, and he became the first person other than Hicks to get to eight (8) in September, also against the Pirates. Saturday was a whole other thing. Saturday was a massive achievement in power and endurance. Misiorowski blew Oneil Cruz away with a pitch at 102.7 MPH (which, given his near-elite extension, means the perceived speed was north of 104) in the first inning. TUFYMjFfWGw0TUFRPT1fQkZOVFV3QlZWMVFBWGxFS1ZBQUhCMVZRQUZoUkJnTUFVUUZSQ0ZGUUFGVURVd2RV (1).mp4 But we've seen him do that before. Often, especially early this year, Misiorowski would flash extraordinary velocity at the front end of starts, but see that speed tick down after the first inning and never tick back up. On Saturday, it was a very different story. Of the 21 pitches we're talking about, he had: 9 in the 1st inning (tying the previous record in one frame) 3 in the 2nd 2 in the 3rd 1 in the 5th 6 in the 6th He departed the mound by completing his ninth strikeout of the day with a 101.4-MPH (perceived speed: roughly 103.5) heater past Konnor Griffin, his second similarly ferocious pitch of the at-bat. TUFYMjFfWGw0TUFRPT1fRGdRREJRSUVWd01BV2dNRlZBQUhDQU5WQUZnSFZRTUFCUU1DQVFWUVVnSlFBVkVB.mp4 He'd already beaten Jake Mangum, earlier in the inning, with three straight high heaters, each faster than the last. You never, ever see this much velocity from a pitcher pacing themselves for a full-fledged start—except from Misiorowski. There have been 13 appearances in which a pitcher threw at least 50 pitches and had at least five of these non-contact strikes at 102+. deGrom had one, in 2021—cheating a little bit, because he just barely got to five such pitches and one of them came against opposing pitcher Merrill Kelly. The other 12 belong to Misiorowski. Ten of those 12 came last season, and he just barely got to five in his start against the Red Sox early in April. This was a transcendent moment. It was a pitcher already ahead of the pack by a great distance, pushing himself to a new level. Admittedly, part of this story is the Pirates. They're an extremely whiff-prone offense, especially when you take one of their best contact hitters (Mangum) and turn him into a whiff machine. That's part of the point, though. Misiorowski's sheer power was so great that Mangum, who has a delightful knack for opposite-field contact but one of the slowest swings in baseball, turned from a great contact hitter to a hopeless case. Seven of the nine hitters in the Pirates' order suffered at least one of these moments of total overwhelm. There are still rough edges Misiorowski needs to sand off, as he pursues the National League Cy Young Award. He can put his team in better positions to win games by being more consistent within a start. It's notable that the one truly bad inning he had on Saturday (the two-run top of the 4th) was the one wherein he failed to overpower any Pittsburgh batter the way he did in every other inning of the start. The Brewers need to continue working with him to find the best way to utilize his arsenal, especially to survive those innings when some weak contact produces hits or when his command wobbles. The stuff he showed Saturday, though, puts things neatly into perspective. Who is Misiorowski's comp? By whose yardstick can he measured? No one, and no one's. He's broken the scale. He's breaking the game. He just has to ensure that he can get all the way from the first pitch of outings to the last, without breaking in his own right. View full article

I definitely think that's a piece of it. Wrote about something similar with Dansby Swanson yesterday, too. I don't think it's as much accepting that he's never going to hit there, though, as not having to worry about that high pitch as much because it's no longer being called a strike. Pitches 37-42 inches above the ground: 2023-25: Swing rate: 52.1%, -6.6 RV/100 / Take rate: 47.9%, -0.4 RV/100 2026: Swing rate: 32.6%, -10.1 RV/100 / Take rate: 67.4%, 2.7 RV/100 He can safely lay off that pitch that's right where his swing has the biggest hole now. Hugely valuable to him, specifically.

Image courtesy of © Sam Navarro-Imagn Images It's only been 72 plate appearances. On the other hand, Garrett Mitchell made his big-league debut 1,334 days ago, and even with the 72 plate appearances he has this season, he's only amassed a total of 515 in the regular season for the Brewers, so let's not look a gift 72 plate appearances in the mouth. We have to allow ourselves to be pleased that Mitchell isn't hurt, but we can be even more excited about this: In 72 plate appearances, Mitchell is batting .273/.437/.436. That's a strange-looking batting line, because it's still early and the season stays strange into May, no matter how early it begins these days. In fact, it's extra strange this year, because the ABS challenge system has altered the game, in obvious ways—the challenges themselves—and in subtler ones. It's one of the subtler but important impacts of the system's implementation that might just make Mitchell viable for the long haul, in multiple ways. Firstly, as you might guess from the huge gap between his batting average and his OBP, Mitchell is swinging rarely and walking often so far this season. He's only offered at 39.4% of the pitches he's seen, down from a career norm (to whatever extent he's been able to establish a norm, given all the injury disruptions to his career) over 44%. That's allowed him to walk 16 times in 72 trips, an extraordinary 22.2% clip that is (obviously) unsustainable. Even if he walks 13% or 15% of the time, though, he'll be a darn good player. The question is whether he can sustain that lower but still robust kind of rate, and the answer is affected by the presence of the ABS system. It's not just about the ability to challenge, though. Mitchell has only challenged once this year, and he lost that appeal. Instead, the effect here is the fact that the strike zone is smaller now. With the implementation of the computerized zone, there are (perhaps imperfect, but) objective upper and lower boundaries of the zone based on each player's height, rather than idiosyncrasies of their stance or the umpire's interpretation of the rule book's definitions of the hollow of the knee. Starting last year, the league informed umpires they would be graded on a stricter standard as ball-strike callers, and the shrinking of the margin for error produced a slightly smaller zone. This season, that's only been more true; it turns out that this way of structuring the zone compresses it vertically. The plate is still the same width, but the zone is shorter and blockier. That's true in theory; it wouldn't have to be true in practice. In practice, though, umpires are responding to the league's training and feedback by giving the smaller zone now prescribed by altered rules and the input of computers. Mitchell isn't alone in responding to this by swinging less often. Of the 199 batters who had a qualifying number of plate appearances last year and are qualifying so far this year, 123 have either kept their swing rates flat or reduced them. Only 43 batters have increased their swing rate by at least two percentage points; a whopping 86 have reduced it by at least that much. The percentage of pitches marked as being within the strike zone is down this spring. So is the rate at which pitches taken by the batter are called strikes. Throwing out all challenges by either side, the percentage of taken pitches called a strike so far this season is 30.1%. It was 31.7% in both 2023 and 2024, and 31.1% in 2025. That difference sounds small, but around the edges of the zone, it gets big in a hurry. The league, as a whole, is walking 9.9% of the time. The last time the global walk rate was this high in April was in 2009 (9.8%, essentially tied). Except for 2019, the league walked less than 9% of the time each April from 2011 through 2024. Now, it's nearly 10%. The arrival of ABS has made swinging a less valuable thing to do. That brings us back to Mitchell. There are two very good reasons why not swinging as much (and being rewarded for that patience) is good for Mitchell. The first, obviously, is that he whiffs at a calamitous rate, when he does swing. He's seen 325 pitches this year, and swung at 128 of them. Fifty-eight of those swings have resulted in whiffs—an almost unfathomable 45.3% rate. You can't swing and miss that much and be a good hitter, unless you do everything else well as an offensive player. That was obvious and ineluctable before the ABS change. Now, it still feels obvious, but maybe it's a bit more negotiable. If you minimize the number of times you swing and the league rewards that approach because of a small strike zone, that's one step in the direction of permitting production amid a choking cloud of swing-and-miss. Part of doing everything else well is having a swing that produces damage when one does make contact. The good news is, as we get a longer look at the healthy version of Mitchell and his swing, it's increasingly clear that he checks that box. His average bat speed of 76.4 MPH is borderline elite. Add to that one number the fact that he has a relatively short stroke with average-plus tilt and a deep contact point, and the company he keeps gets interesting. We've talked a lot about the interaction of those numbers recently, in the contexts of Brice Turang's successes and Joey Ortiz's failures, so hopefully, it's already becoming clear to you that having a fast, steep swing with a deep contact point is a good thing. If not, though, here's the list of players (besides Mitchell) who have average or better tilt and a contact point at least 1 inch closer to their body than the average, on swings that average 74 MPH or higher. Nick Kurtz Jo Adell Jake Bauers Luis Robert Jr. Mike Trout Shohei Ohtani Yes, this kind of swing usually leads to plenty of whiffs. Mitchell is at the extreme end, even in this cohort. But he also swings considerably faster than the older Trout and Ohtani, and his plate discipline (augmented this year, but always solid) is far better than that of Adell or Robert. He belongs to a group of hitters who blister the ball when they do put the bat on it. He's doing a better job of working uphill and lifting the ball this year. Yes, it's possible to be highly productive with an atrocious whiff rate, if you're a patient hitter in the ABS Era who can also generate elite power. The other reason why a lessened need to swing is good news for Mitchell might sound callous, but it's legitimate: fewer swings means less risk of an injury. Mitchell has twice wrecked his shoulder on wild slides into bases, but some of his injury issues throughout his career stemmed from the violence of his swing and the vulnerability of his hands early in the motion. Swinging less often and being less primed to swing means less chance of an oblique strain or a sports hernia injury. It means less chance of a broken hamate bone. It puts less strain on the back. We've talked endlessly about Mitchell's potential over the years, but also about all the things mitigating it. Would he ever make enough contact to access his talent in full? Could he stay on the field long enough to prove himself either capable or incapable of that? This season, the league is different, and the changes germane to Mitchell's game are all good news for him, on both fronts. That doesn't mean he'll keep hitting this way all season, or that this year will more than double the number of MLB plate appearances he's had in his career. The chances of that kind of thriving, healthy campaign are better than ever, though, because Mitchell is responding correctly to the environmental shifts around him—and because the talent unlocked by those shifts is so loud, in the first place. 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You all should give Hamilton a little more time. I think you're gonna see him split a gap or two soon, and the numbers can come around in a hurry.

Image courtesy of © Sam Navarro-Imagn Images Admittedly, Joey Ortiz hasn't gotten a perfect set of chances in the majors. He was blocked when he was first ready for the big leagues, during his final season with the Orioles organization. He was displaced for a year after being traded to the Brewers, when he slid to third base to play alongside Willy Adames. He's hit at the bottom of the batting order most of the time over the last year-plus, where you often get one fewer plate appearance than players at the top of the card; see the starting pitcher one fewer time; and hit with fewer runners on base in front of you. He's battled a few nagging injuries. Since the start of last August, during which time teammate Brice Turang has over 350 plate appearances across all competitions, Ortiz has just 165. Unfortunately, it's impossible to justify giving him more than that. In fact, he probably ought to have fewer. Ortiz is batting .200/.255/.227 since Aug. 1, 2025, including regular-season, playoff and World Baseball Classic games. He hit one home run during Cactus League play this spring, but that's the only one he's hit since the second game after last year's All-Star break, at any level. Ortiz is, fundamentally, broken. Hitters go through phases during which their timing is badly off, or when the ball doesn't carry for them or during which line drives always seem to find gloves. This is something different, and worse. Ortiz is simply overmatched, in a way no other hitter in the league is. To understand how true this is, you first need to know the following: Ortiz has a relatively flat swing. His swing path tilt has slightly increased in each year of his career, from 27° in 2024 to 29° this season, but the league averages between 32° and 33°. The flatter your swing is, the more important it is for you to catch the ball out in front of your body. Steeper swings can hit the ball sharply even deep in the hitting zone, but a flat one can only produce a ball with a good chance to be a hit (or any chance to be an extra-base hit) if the batter's intercept point—the place where the bat and the ball meet, or would have met, in the case of a whiff—is at least 27 inches in front of a hitter's center of mass. The league's average intercept point is closer to 31 inches in front of the body, and again, a flat swing usually does better in that range or slightly farther in front. Some steep swings can work with a contact point in the mid-20s, but the lower your tilt, the farther out front you must catch the ball to be productive. Ortiz has always let the ball travel pretty deep. Often accused of being passive at the plate, he's trying to be selective and to see the ball well before making a swing decision—but therefore, he lives life on the edge of being late to the hitting zone. He runs one of the lowest attack angles in the league, even when going well, which means that he barely gets through the process of slashing his bat down into the hitting zone before meeting the pitch; he's not working upward with the barrel nearly as much as most hitters are. Since the start of the second half last year, though, this has all gone to an extreme at which having success as a big-league batter is no longer possible. Ortiz's average intercept point, relative to his center of mass, has receded month by month: April 2025: 29.4 in. May 2025: 31.2 June 2025: 28.7 July 2025: 29.6 August 2025: 28.8 September 2025: 26.5 April 2026: 23.7 The ball is, as they say, in Ortiz's kitchen. He's no waterbug, but no one is strong enough to hit the ball hard—especially to the areas of the field where that can pay off best—when catching it that deep. Looking at the intercept point relative to his stance (and relative to the same visual for last year) illustrates the problem tidily: He's tried opening his stride, as the ball gets on top of him, to square his barrel to the pitch earlier in his swing and fight it off. As the numbers tell you, it's not working. Few hitters in the league have an average intercept point deeper than the front edge of home plate, where Ortiz was even last year. No one else in the league has one 9 inches past the front edge, as Ortiz has so far this season. The second-deepest intercept point in the league belongs to the Rays' Chandler Simpson, the slap-hitting super-speedster. Simpson's sheer speed allows him to survive with an intercept point 6.8 inches past the front edge of the plate, but hitting for power is out of the question for him. Right now, it's out of the question for Ortiz, too, even though the Brewers shortstop has about three scouting grades of bat speed on the Tampa outfielder. Simpson offers a good següe to the obvious alternative to Ortiz at shortstop, though, and therein lies (arguably) a dilemma. David Hamilton isn't hitting much better than Ortiz this season—just .178/.339/.178—but the fundamentals of his profile are much stronger. He needs to make some significant adjustments, and he doesn't have Ortiz's bat speed, either, but he can drive the ball a bit and has made much better swing decisions than Ortiz has. His own intercept point is dangerously close to being too deep, but he has a much steeper swing than Ortiz's, and if he wants to create more space to catch the ball out front, he has a simple means of doing so: get deeper in the batter's box. As ugly as the batting average is (and despite the lack of an extra-base hit by either player), there's no question that Hamilton is a better hitter than Ortiz, right now. The question, instead, is whether the Brewers will ever feel comfortable eschewing Ortiz's defensive brilliance in favor of the upside Hamilton provides in the batter's box. That question is complicated, and its answer might simply be 'no'. Pat Murphy and the Brewers coaching staff trust Ortiz at shortstop to a unique degree. They like everything about the way he plays the position, including the ways he's improved since coming to the club. He's sure-handed and smart, in addition to having a quick first step and plus range. He makes all the plays a team can ask a shortstop to make, and he never seems to make a glaring mistake. Hamilton is more spectacular, but less consistent. He has better range than Ortiz, and perhaps a stronger arm. He's creative, and his ceiling at the position might be higher. However, there are occasions on which he speeds up too much in the effort to make a play, leading to bobbles or outright drops of playable grounders. Rushing that way can also lead to bad throws, which are compound errors: they nearly always give a runner an extra base. With the game on the line, the Brewers absolutely (and rightly) trust Ortiz more than they trust Hamilton at short, even though the latter is a better athlete and can make a wider array of plays. So far this year, the magnitude of Ortiz's brokenness at bat has led to Hamilton getting six of the 21 starts at shortstop, but for that raio to flip—for the lefty-batting Hamilton to take on the majority of the playing time at the position—one of a few things will have to change. More stability from third baseman Luis Rengifo would nudge things in that direction; it would mean the team needs Hamilton at third base less. More of Hamilton's offensive skills translating to results would create more momentum for a change, too. Most of all, though, the team needs to see Hamilton make the routine play routinely, even in non-routine moments. If his steadiness with the glove catches up to Ortiz's, he'll become the starting shortstop immediately (if briefly; Cooper Pratt, Jesus Made and more are on the way). For now, though, Ortiz remains a part of the team's daily plans, despite his utter inability to muster any offense. Hamilton needs things to break his way, but he also has a chance to make his own breaks, by slowing down ever so slightly in the field. View full article

For that matter, there was buzz about Garrett Mitchell near the top of the first round early in the 2020 draft cycle.

Image courtesy of © Sam Navarro-Imagn Images Strictly speaking, we've seen Brewers hitters quite a bit hotter than Brice Turang is right now. After 22 games, the second baseman is batting .300/.437/.571, which is mightily impressive, but during his bid to win back-to-back National League MVP Awards, Christian Yelich had stretches of this length during which his OPS eclipsed 1.500. It's not just Yelich (or famously raucous runs like the Linsanity version of Eric Thames), either. Keston Hiura had a stretch this long that was hotter. So did Yasmani Grandal. So did Gerardo Parra, way back in 2015. Try not to let yourself forget that this is still only three and a half weeks of baseball, and that Turang has been great, but human. That said: how long has it been since you felt as good watching a Brewers hitter at bat as you do when watching Turang right now? You probably do have to drift back to the pre-pandemic edition of Yelich. It's not just results, right now. Turang's process feels immaculate, and incorruptible. That's not quite the reality; baseball will always humble you. But that's how it feels. Turang's game has gotten better each year of his career, and this season, the improvements are more pronounced than ever. First, of course, there's the bat path. No hitter in baseball has increased the average tilt of their swing more from 2025 to 2026 than has Turang—who had also increased his average tilt from 2023 to 2024, and from 2024 to 2025. He came into the league as a flat swinger, according to Statcast (29°, against a league average of roughly 32°), but he's now quite steep in his average approach to the ball (36°). It's a subtle-sounding difference, and it can be hard to see from one swing to the next, because hitters naturally adjust their swings based on what they're trying to do; what pitch type they anticipate, and what type they see out of the hand; and where the pitch is. To isolate it, then, let's look at four swings Turang has put on 1-0 four-seam fastballs in the middle vertical band of the zone, from right-handed pitchers with roughly average velocity—one each from 2023 through this year. Here's the 2023 case for study. QVlCenhfWGw0TUFRPT1fVWdZRVVRVUdVMVFBWEFFRFZBQUFCZ0pRQUFOWEFWY0FDMUpYVkZFTUFBcFdWZ1pY.mp4 I picked one of the rare times that Turang let it eat that year. Partially, that's because he didn't see that many pitches that fit these criteria that year, and partially, it's so we can all marvel at what a wandering babe he was back then. This really feels like looking at home movies of your kid, already, doesn't it? That version of Turang got beaten pretty easily by even pedestrian heat; there's a reason he hit .218/.285/.300 that season. Ok, here's 2024. YUs5TkFfWGw0TUFRPT1fRDFRRVZRZFdYbE1BQ2dOUVV3QUFCZ0FDQUZnREFnSUFVMU1NVVFVRVZBWURCQU5U.mp4 This ia a version of Turang that has learned to take an assertive hack without finding himself off-balance, but the limitations on his power are obvious here. He gets a better piece of this pitch, but still fouls off something hittable, in an advantage count. On to 2025. Nnk5ajJfWGw0TUFRPT1fRHdaWEJWRUNBQXNBQUFNQkJ3QUhDVlFIQUFNTld3TUFWZ0VDVWdGV1VGVUJCUVJl.mp4 I hope you can see some differences between those two clips. They're small, to be sure, but they're there. Turang found more bat speed in 2025, and took a more dangerous hack. He still fouled the ball off to the left side, but it was less because he was late and more because he was slashing through the ball, if you will, missing it slightly off the upper and outer side of the barrel. Now, let's look at a similar pitch earlier this year. TkFObmJfWGw0TUFRPT1fRGdrRkFnWlNWMVFBV2dGVUJBQUhCUWNIQUFBQkIxY0FWZ0JVVkFjRkFRRUFWRllE.mp4 Admittedly, choosing a homer for comparison serves my argument well, but it's part of the point I'm making. Turang has gotten much more efficient with the barrel this season, thanks to his improved bat path. At every level of the zone height-wise, his swing is steeper than it was even late last year, when he was starting to generate power. He's making a meaningfully different move to the baseball than he used to. To help you see that better, I've taken still frames of the moment just before his bat gets to the ball on each of the pitches above. I've also highlighted his bat position in each. Notice that the lines get both steeper (more tilt in the swing) and longer (he's getting the barrel out more before the ball arrives) as we move from the past to the present. Turang's raw, Statcast-reported bat speed is not meaningfully up this year, but the fact that it's almost exactly where it's been in the past with a steeper plane amounts to a boost in bat speed. He's not pulling the ball very much this season, but when you swing with a steeper bat path, you leave yourself more ways to make solid contact to the opposite field, if you don't get around the ball and yank it to the pull field. That's especially true for left-handed hitters, and it's something Pat Murphy and Brewers coaches have been nudging Turang toward understanding since this time last year. Selectivity has also paid off for Turang. The strike zone is a bit smaller this year, which has contributed to a drop in the share of pitches he sees being in the zone. Last season, 52.7% of opponents' pitches to Turang were in the zone. This year, that number is down to 46.4%. Accordingly. Turang's swing rate (which was just under 48% in 2023 and 2024) has dropped, from 44.3% in 2025 to 36.7%. Thence come his incredible 17 walks in 88 trips to the plate, with both that total and his walks-inflated .437 OBP ranking second in the National League. Meanwhile, the Brewers are doing exactly what they did last year with their infield defense, funneling as many balls into Turang's sphere of influence as possible, and he's continued to justify their faith. You can pick nits with his game—his speed is slightly diminished, and he's gotten more conservative on the bases; he has yet to utilize the ABS challenge system, missing a few chances to better his position within an at-bat—but it would seem ungrateful to do so. Turang has made a series of adjustments that make him one of the toughest outs in baseball, partially because he's also gotten more dangerous at the plate. Unlike hitters who have been similarly hot in recent memory, though, Turang also delivers baserunning and defensive value. He's carrying the Brewers offense, during a stretch in which the team is missing three of the five hitters on whom they were most relying coming into the season. He had one star turn when he suddenly launched 13 homers after August began last summer. He enjoyed another in the World Baseball Classic. In total, going back to the start of August, Turang is batting .297/.384/.538, in over half a season's worth of playing time. That's giving him credit for his showing in the WBC, but it also folds in his disastrously bad 2025 playoff stats. He's hit like an elite corner outfielder for the last nine months, coming out of an offseason even hotter than he was before it. Concrete changes tell us he's genuinely maturing into that dangerous a hitter, and he's still a plus defender at an up-the-middle position. The Brewers are watching as yet another player blossoms from solidity to stardom on their watch. View full article