Evaluating the MLB Draft: What Constitutes Success?

[Harold Hutchison]

Image courtesy of © Aaron Doster-Imagn Images

The upcoming draft is a time of excitement for Brewers fans. Over the last decade, the Brewers have developed arguably the best minor-league organization in MLB, reflected not only in the talent they've found, but in the ability to develop players without standout pedigree or tools into valuable pieces.

It takes time. One doesn’t know how well a pick really works out for a major-league team for years. First, it takes time for a player to rise through the farm system. Often, it also takes a while for them to finish their development in the bigs, and the final variable in the equation that expresses the value of the pick is what (if anything) the team eventually gets for them when they leave. The final reckoning for the 2014 draft will not come until the end of the 2028 season at the earliest, when Christian Yelich's contract could end. (Second-round pick Monte Harrison and 12th-round pick Jordan Yamamoto were parts of the package Milwaukee sent to Miami in the 2017-2018 offseason to acquire Yelich.)

The ideal path is for the talent to become a reliable contributor to the major-league team. Brice Turang is one of the best examples of the traditional approach—a first-round pick who turns into a cornerstone of the team for multiple years.

Then, there are the non-traditional paths to make a draft pick work out well for the Brewers. One is the late-round steal. They’re not one of the guys who get a huge seven-figure bonus after being picked in the first round. They’re picked later (Brandon Woodruff, an 11th-round pick in the 2014 draft), sometimes way later (Brent Suter, 31st-round pick in the 2012 draft), but these players are where the scouts and the coaches in the organization have really earned their money. Hitting on later picks not only means amassing depth that creates flexibility in trades, but positions a team to extend players who thrive. Clubs have more leverage over lower-round, lower-bonus selections in contract talks later on.

The other, of course, is the return in a trade. This is how some somewhat disappointing prospects can redeem themselves (2014 first-round pick Kodi Medeiros, for instance, was traded for Joakim Soria in 2018). Other times, the blue-chip prospect can turn a season around in a deal (2007 first-rounder Matt LaPorta, who brought CC Sabathia to Milwaukee in 2008). In some cases, a traded prospect can be a force at the MLB level long after the Brewers’ return has faded away (see Michael Brantley, the player to be named later in the Sabathia trade).

It's tempting to put an arbitrary timeline on evaluating a draft, but the timeline can always change, and a grade can change from year to year. Keston Hiura looked like a superb selection after the 2019 season, but his struggles and inconsistency in later years arguably lowered the grade. Tyrone Taylor looked like he wouldn’t pan out, until he did. Seven years after being selected in the 2019 draft out of high school, Darrien Miller is now in Triple-A and could end up with Milwaukee if he continues his hot hitting, which could alter the draft’s grade were he to become a contributor with the Brewers. He'll never be more than a role player, but finding a viable third or fourth catcher for the organization in the ninth round is a win.

In other words, even the 2018 draft’s grade could fluctuate over the next few years. Every class since then has at least as fluid a tag on them. It will likely be a lot of fun finding out, but assessing the draft is so tricky that it's vital to remain circumspect.

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How do you evaluate the success or failure of draft years? Let us know in the comments below!

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[biedergb]

Good points. The mLB draft is always a very difficult one to gauge.  First what constitutes success in the first place- getting several MLB players even if they weren’t all stars or had a lot of statistical “value” like war etc?  Is it getting high end prospects who can turn into trading chips? Is it getting great players drafted even if they don’t sign?  All of these are debated in terms of evaluating classes. If we draft Drew Rasmussen and he has a solid career in TB and we get value for Adames - who gets credit for what?

Would we want a 2014 or 2016 draft where we selected an elite player (Woodruff and Burnes) even if our top picks fizzled?

Do you want a 2011 where you get several players (Jungman, Lopez, Barnes and a few others who had success elsewhere)?

do you get credit for drafting Carlos Rodon - as a scouting standpoint - if you don’t sign him?

obviuosly 2018 drafts where you get Turang and Ashby and Adames (via Rasmussen). And even David Fry and Reece Olson. That is a standout draft.  But 2022 gets us the Miz and right now not much else (obviously the jury is out on Adam’s and O’Rae), is that an amazing draft?

Anyway long rant. I want quantity and quality, but if not both which do you prefer?

and I know I want instant gratification- but some drafts like 2018 take years to truly come to fruition.