It's been a long time since I read it, but my recollection of the Fielder section read something along the lines of "a player so fat even Beane wouldn't draft him, and that's saying a lot." I believe the author ripped the Brewers as a team that always screws up drafts, so it made sense to him that the Brewers would be the ones to draft Prince. Just my opinion, but in the current market, it appears to me that the overvalued category would include "team control." I love prospects, and teams like the Brewers need to have "cheap" players, but when MLB MVP candidates aren't worth a top 10 prospect, they're probably overvalued. Team control seems to be worth more than talent in some cases. Melvin seems to be bucking this trend this year, so we'll see if it works. And seeing as how the A's dont even merit a blip on the radar, was his method of scouting rendered useless because of the books success or was the method an anomaly to begin with? To be able to field a competitive team on Oakland's budget is impressive, but I do wonder how much was methodology and how much was "luck" in getting Mulder, Hudson and Zito all through the system at the same time and how much was steroids with Giambi, Conseco, Tejada, McGwire, etc. Steroids add power, but they don't add plate discipline, so finding guys with good plate discipline played well in the steroids era. That said, the methodology certainly wasn't "rendered useless," as Moneyball exposed Beane's methodology and SABRmetrics to those who previously didn't want to hear it. Statistical study has been around a long time, but Moneyball made it so public that it's now pretty difficult for anyone in baseball to disregard it. I wouldn't say it revolutionized baseball, but it did speed up the revolution. It led to a lot of heated battles, but I believe most teams have now realized the value to utilizing both SABR studies and scouting. And, yes, it's probably caused a lot of GMs to go out of their way to find the market inefficiencies.