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Jake McKibbin
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Blog Entries posted by Jake McKibbin
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The highest vote by Sunday will be the winner!
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Mike Brosseau is a very interesting player, particularly with the barnstorming ST he's currently having. In four seasons he has accumulated 3.6 bWAR over just 509 plate appearances, including 22 homers, the equivalent to some of a full season. He had one bad season in 2021 (his BABIP dropped almost 100 points), yet every other year has had a BA over .250 and an OPS of over .750. So why does he struggle to garner more playing time? Let’s take a look;
The Bat
If you asked the everyday fan what Brosseau brings to the table, it’s the ability to crush left handed pitching, something the Brewers are greatly in need of. Over his career, he has a .651 OPS against right handed pitching, and a standout .823 OPS against left handers, with 67% of his extra base hits coming against lefties.
A couple of other interesting split based statistics
- Brosseau has a .919 OPS against “finesse pitchers”, compared to a .547 OPS against high strikeout guys
- He has an OPS of around .700 for No outs, or One Out, but when his team have Two outs, he hits for an .868 OPS
- When he swings first pitch, he has a 1.024 OPS
- He remains consistent hitting wise regardless of whether he’s in a low, medium or high leverage situation
So where does the worry come with Brosseau? Well, with someone who has such a compact short swing, he strikes out a hell of a lot, to a 28% clip against lefties and a 33% clip against right handed pitching. He doesn’t produce upper level exit velocities (his max EV last season was just 104.1mph), but very consistently avoids weak contact. Take a look at how fangraphs views his contact profile:
Such low soft contact rates show he has the potential to be a very consistent contributor, but the strikeout rate needs to come down for him to garner more playing time. As you can see below, he swings and misses a lot up in the zone, something exploited by pitches this season who started throwing him a ton more fastballs (57.6% up from 50% in 2021). The up and away zone appears a particular weakness, but the interesting caveat to how much he waves in that area, is that when he makes contact, he averages a 98.4mph exit velocity with a 29 degree launch angle. Plenty of deep fly’s if he could just make contact, but alas, that seems like a tall order. You can also see that he appears to notice this weakness and attempts to take pitches where possible in this area of the zone.
The other standout is that it’s unsustainable to be whiffing 24% of the time on meatballs, certainly over the course of a longer season against pitchers who aren’t to his liking (ie high spin, high velocity four seamers).
The other thing that really stand out as a weakness in his profile is, despite his short swing, he really struggles to make decent contact when he gets pitched inside. When pitched down and in (in zone) he has a 75% ground ball rate to go with this, almost guaranteeing an out when paired with his low exit velocities. Have a look at his expected BA and regular BA below:
As you can see, for such a happy pull hitter, he’d much prefer to have the ball in the middle and outer half of the plate, whilst it’s also intriguing to note he isn’t particularly good at smashing meatballs. I should point out he has had xBA considerably below his actual BA in every season bar 2021, so it doesn’t seem to be the best metric for evaluating him but even so, it paints a solid picture of his zones, and given his struggles to make contact at the top of the zone, and inside, you can see why the high velocity fastballs would be a bit of kryptonite for him.
The Glove
Last season, using outs above average as the go to metric, Brosseau had his worst season by far at the hot corner, a 65% success rate on his plays at third base being 45 below average, recording -5 OAA. There wasn’t one particular movement he struggled with either, posting negative scores for moving in, moving left and moving to his right.
His arm strength was poor, averaging 81.9mph on his throws compared to a league average from 3B of 85.7mph. To put that in a comparison with current Brewers, Brian Anderson averaged 88.9mph on his throws from 3B (not including the OF where he ranked even higher).
He seems a sub-optimal defensive presence, without any real injuries or reasons for his declining performance, other than, if you were really stretching, the lack of regular playing time there (albeit he’s never really been a regular throughout his career).
Conclusion
Brosseau based over his career numbers is a solid bat, and a really strong player for pulling lefties (he could even be a benefactor of the shift rules this season). He doesn’t always make sense given the consistency of his batted ball profile compared with his strikeout rates, his struggles to pull the ball well on the inner part of the plate with a short swing, but he does produce consistently good walk rates and do damage against lefties. He’s not the sort of player you want in an everyday position at third, even if his strikeout rate did drop considerably (unlikely at this point), but to pinch hit him against left handers, or start him against the slower fastball pitchers could show some positive value throughout the season. I think he should be on the 26 man opening day roster given how the Brewers as a team struggled last season against lefties, and save Contreras, not a lot of their signings have addressed this, as well as trading off Renfroe.
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Offense - Strengths
So again, I’ll start with something slightly out of the blue... despite producing only three stolen bases in 2022, Taylor had 1.2 run value added for his base running, a significant improvement on previous seasons, perhaps indicating a real intelligence on going first to third, avoiding Double plays, but I think given the speed he possesses, he could be an under the radar candidate to steal a few more bases this year. I can’t find data to indicate if it’s his reads, or something else, but given the quality of his initial burst and reaction time in the outfield, it’s not unreasonable to expect that this could translate to the base paths.
As mentioned earlier, he has a real ability to a) elevate the ball, and b) pull the ball with authority. His average exit velocity down over the heart of the plate is 97.9mph, translating to him absolutely feasting on sinkers last season to the tune of a BA/SLG of .287/.575. If pitchers try and pitch him below the zone, and miss, he can make them pay for it.
He does struggle with the elevated pitches to create consistent launch angles and high velocities, but he can punish mistakes handsomely if you miss your spot, a prime reason for his streaky hitting throughout the season.
https://www.mlb.com/video/hunter-greene-in-play-run-s-to-tyrone-taylor
Home runs like this kind of defy the stats above, leading to him being coined a “high fastball hitter”, but as impressive as it is, it’s important to recognise the high fastball is really not his strength, and he could be maximised this year by throwing him out more against sinker ballers.
His 25.2% strikeout rate, and 5.4% walk rate last season were both career highs, potentially as a result of playing in centre field almost every day. The Brewers didn’t trust Jonathon Davis overly in the batting line-up, and until Mitchell came up, there weren’t many players to spell him defensively. Coincidentally, or maybe not, when the crew started giving Mitchell more time in centre in the last month of the season, Taylor’s productivity shot up, hitting .290/.333/.583 over this period.
One further and final point is his ability with RISP. With men on base, Taylor hit .260, and with RISP this rose again to .311 last season. As with Willy Adames, he really thrives under the bigger moments, and is one of the reasons why the Crew were so effective last season when they had men on base.
Conclusion
Taylor was at the very least, an important contributor to the Brewers last season, with high value in centre field, and an ability to hit the long ball. As a base for a centre fielder, a lot of playoff teams would have taken that, you look at the struggles LA had with Bellinger, Grisham with San Diego, the Phillies, Yankees, etc. So in that context, he’s a valuable commodity, but with the talent the Brewers have coming through he may soon be relegated to more of a fourth outfielder role by the start of next season, or even be a trade option when he hit arbitration.
He does need to develop a means of shortening up on two strikes and at least get wood on the ball when chasing pitches, but I do think that his energy levels were sapped a bit by how often he played centre this season with his frame. If he can lay off pitches more efficiently, potentially look to do more damage in the 3 Ball counts, and take advantage of the new shift rules, we could see a 110 OPS+ hitter with an ability to play above average centre field. Who wouldn’t want that on their team?
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Despite his injury, I thought I'd take a glance as to why we can look forward to Taylor's return. So without further ado;
Taylor, despite being at times one of the top Brewers prospects, has always come across as a bit of a “meh” player, and understandably so. He has a bunch of tools that are league average or just below league average coming into 2022, with a little additional power when pulling the ball. Primarily seen as a below league average right fielder, he surpassed all expectations with his quality defense in centre, and above average offensive output compared to most centre fielders, posting a 2.1 fWAR mostly centred around his defensive contributions. Anyway enough preamble, let’s get down to business and see what we could expect from Taylor going forward.
Defense
We’ll start with his primary WAR contribution; Taylor surprised everyone with his defensive metrics in 2022, where we didn’t think he would have the speed to provide above average coverage of the outfield grass in centre. This may be a misnomer however given he simply doesn’t show this on the base paths, but was in the 80th percentile for sprint speed, 86th percentile for outfield jumps, and 92nd percentile for out above average last season. He was particularly adept in his lateral movements, creating 6 OAA, while being around average in moving forward and backwards. He also added 2 OAAA in left field in only 29 fielding attempts, with a 97% success rate. Given the effect that a good route has on vertical movements, it’s quite possible that Taylor could improve defensively moving forward and backwards simply with more experience in the role. Have a look below and you’ll see that, despite high marks for his acceleration and reactions, his routes are slightly below average.
Offense - Weaknesses
Last season, Taylor’s offensive numbers are intriguing. He hit .233/.286/.442, really struggling to get on base, yet producing quite solid power numbers with his 17 home runs coming despite being in the 33rd percentile in average exit velocity and 34th percentile in hard hit percentage. Looking slightly further into things and you can see where the power came from. Although he didn’t actually time the ball that well last season, with below average quality of contact, when he did, he produced quality loft angles, resulting in a high scoring output from the contact he made. He averaged 16.9 degrees of loft angle last season, and was in the 68th percentile for barrels per plate appearance.
His other big issue is how little he walks, with his low batting average last season contributing to a comfortably sub .300 OBP, something which isn’t sustainable in the big leagues. Looking at some background stats, it’s quite clear pitchers heavily went down and away against him, but he did a relatively decent job of not chasing these pitches as you can see:
However it’s the way in which he regularly chases pitches in all areas out of the zone that create such a poor profile for him, with 27th percentile in chase rate. Combine this with his 38th percentile whiff rate (almost entirely arising due to how bad he is at hitting any pitch outside the zone) and you can see that he isn’t particularly adept at even fouling these pitches off. When he does chase, he misses far too often, as you can see below:
In terms of his OBP improving, one under the radar effort might be found in a recent MLB article about those most likely to profit from banning the shift. When he put the ball on the ground, 63% of balls were pulled, most of which were in and around where the third basemen will have to cover on his own rather than with a shortstop to assist. Taylor only hit 20% of his balls in play to opposite field last season, and his WOBA with the shift was .287, without the shift it rose to .337. MLB estimated an extra ten potential hits gained if the shift laws were in place last season. He also had a very low BABIP last season against the shift of .236 contrasted to a .319 BABIP without the shift in place, so it’s reasonable to expect an uptick in his batting average next season.
One final mention is his weakness both up and in, and up and away (in zone). In both areas, he hits for a BABIP below .100, with 38 degree launch angles average. He creates a lot of soft fly balls and popups in these zones, and could be served by avoiding these pitches, particularly early in the count. That being said, when you look at how her performs in each count, its’ quite interesting. He almost solely looks for walks when he get to a 3-0 or 3-1 count, taking the pitch the majority of the time. He didn’t produce a single hit in these counts across the course of the season. He actually does most of his damage in a 1-0, 1-1 or 2-1 count.
Stay Tuned for Part 2!
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Garrett Mitchell, due to his high strikeout profile, high speed and his potential raw power is a very difficult player to compare, as most players would fail in the big leagues with this skill set. However the speed he has allows him to beat the infield with regularity, steal bases and provide such quality defense in centre field that it considerably improves his floor, and his ceiling could be similar to a Keston Hiura that can play defense. Given the thorn in the side Harrison Bader has been for the Brewers, a player who thrives on big moments, electric in the field and on the base paths, it could be a very similar player to what we have in Mitchell.
Harrison Bader
In Bader's first full season with the Cardinals, and produced a slash line of .264/.334/.422 for an OPS of .756, along with a BABIP of .358 and a strikeout rate of almost 30%. Due to his outstanding defense, he produced 4.1 fWAR in 2018, which may not be as unreasonable an expectation for Mitchell as it sounds. The following season, the height of the juiced ball era, he brought just a .680 OPS and still almost reach two WAR in 400 PA's.
Looking back to 2018 and his review on prospects1500.com, he was given the following detail:
Speaking of incredibly fast ascents through the minors, Bader made his MLB debut last year just 25 months after appearing in a minor league game for the first time. On the surface, he looks like a tantalizing fantasy commodity — a guy who can hit 20 home runs in a season to go with 15 stolen bases. He has plus speed that should keep him in centerfield and bat speed that helps him get to his pull-side power.
But if you watched him during his 92 plate appearances in the majors, you’ll note how pitchers picked up his inability to hit breaking balls away. His over aggressiveness was exploited (5.4 BB%) and his strikeouts climbed (26.1 K%). Unless he learns to handle those away pitches and go the other way, expect low OBP years from the righty that could severely limit his upside and potentially land him in a platoon.
As you can see, even in season with a WRC+ in the 80's, and with less than everyday players PA's, he's still provided enough value in terms of WAR to the team through high defense, and when he hits roughly league average, his fWAR loiters around three.
He also picks up his fair share of injuries, part of the reason he has limited PA's, and something Garrett Mitchell is likely to also have to contend with in the coming years.
He does however have very low exit velocities, just 83.4mph on average last season, and walk rates around 5-7% which is something Mitchell seems to do much better.
Garrett Mitchell
When drafted, Mitchell was considered a steal for the Brewers due to his raw power, his electric speed and defense, only dropping down because teams were concerned about his type 1 diabetes and the effect that may have on him as a professional.
He hasn't spent a whole lot of time in the minor leagues, through injuries and the missed 2020 season, in fact only having 472 PA's among Milwaukee's affiliate teams. He did develop as he moved up, with a low of 21.2% strikeout rate at AAA. He's got plus power when he gets the ball elevated but his swing does seem geared towards a more ground ball oriented profile. As a left hander, this might not be ideal, even with his speed, but he hit predominantly up the middle and to opposite field in his short stint in the majors last year, and can beat out infield throws with some regularity. I don't think anyone expects him to repeat his slash line from 2022, but it's very likely that as he adjusts to major league pitching, or even just professional baseball, his strikeout rate should drop significantly.
He likely has less of a hit tool than Bader does, but his speed both to 1st and on the base paths is a lot more obvious. He stole 8 bases in 68 PA's last season, whereas Bader has at most managed 17 in a season (last year with the Yankees). Mitchell recorded the fastest home to first time last year at just 4.01 seconds, and a regular ability to turn easy singles into doubles, and I can see his base running being a prolific weapon, especially with the new rules coming into force regarding pickoffs. For comparative purposes, Esteury Ruiz had a sprint speed of 29.8 ft/sec.
Combined with his power when he can elevate the ball, Mitchell has the ability to be a 20 HR/50 SB type player, but in all likelihood, I think in the coming season he's more likely to be 12-14 home runs and 40 stolen bases, still considerable numbers, and something that could make a big big impact on the brewers offense. He's currently projected by ZIPS for a .250/.320/.378 slash line and 98WRC+, which could make him a 3 WAR player given his skills outside the batter's box.
in conclusion, Mitchell seems a slightly more unpredictable version of Bader, with more speed, slightly better defense (in part as a result of this, and his plus arm), yet more swing and miss in his profile, and both of them have remarkably similar ground ball percentages. Both are electric and exciting to watch, with highlight reel efforts and energy that can draw in the crowds. I can't wait to see what 2023 has in store for Mitchell. He's picked up quite well in spring training (not that that's usually an indication) but appears to be lofting the ball with more regularity.
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As I am sure few would argue, Christian Yelich has demonstrated one of the highest ceilings in franchise history. However, despite the disappointment of the last few years, it's important to pick out why he's been struggling.
First off, let's dive into what the stats say has changed for Yelich since that infamous knee injury, first looking at the 2020 season, why it wasn't as bad as we thought, and then the following years where the back has possibly played up a little more.
2020
In 2020, he had a career-high average exit velocity of 94.0 mph, a hard hit rate of 55.6%, and a walk rate of 18.6%, which doesn't scream the "declining peripherals" of someone whose knee injury has demolished him. His launch angle on average was 7.1 degrees, which, to give context for him personally, his average launch angle was just 5 degrees in his 2018 MVP year.
So why did 2020 feel like a down year for Yelich? Well, there's a straightforward answer: he started to whiff on fastballs, but with secondary pitches too. In 2018 and 2019, Yelich had no weaknesses for any pitch, hitting well across all areas of the strike zone. Yet in 2020, he couldn't hit anything other than a four-seam fastball and a slider. Every other pitch had a batting average below the Mendoza line and a slugging % below .370. Even with his better pitches, his whiff rate increased massively; in 2018, Yelich's whiff rates on fastballs and sinkers were 12.6% and 11.2%, respectively; in 2020, this increased to 26.9% and 22.2%.
2021
In 2021, Yelich had some back issues during the season, but his swing started to regain some control over fastballs again, dropping to a whiff rate of 18.8% and 10.6%, respectively, for four-seam fastballs and sinkers. However, the power wasn't there, particularly against breaking balls hitting .228/.246 in PAs finishing on the slider and hitting .105/.158 in PAs that finished with a curve. At times, it's looked as though his timing could have been better, able to foul off the fastballs but not barrelling them up. To back up the eye test, his most considerable power output has come against the change-up in the last two seasons, hitting to the tune of .274/.581 against it in 2021.
2021/2022 Pitch Breakdown
2022
In 2022, his whiff rate stayed below 20% on both four-seam and two-seam fastballs, but he increased his batting average and xBA by over .030 points, recording a .307/.469 against the four-seam version and a +12 run differential. He also took a big step forward against the slider, hitting .250/.398 but struggled with the curveball at .125/.188 and took a step back against the changeup, albeit with power as he hit .224/.466 against the pitch. His ground ball rate was 59.1% and had been increasing each of the last two years, with a particular propensity for contact classified as "weak" or "topped," a lot of which have come against breaking balls (backed up by his 2021 xBA against them of .210, xSLG of .211). However, in 2022 he did take a step forward in launch angle against breaking balls, allowing him to create a bit of power when he did make quality contact against them.
To look deeper into the curveball issues, from watching the past few years, he has an issue picking up the curve when it's thrown to him, regularly chasing it as it drops well below the strike zone. It's an area pitchers are targeting, with 31.8% of a pitcher being thrown at him outside the zone in the lower half. He creates a lot of line drives and hard contact, with five of the nine zones producing average exit velocities over 95mph, and in the middle/upper half of the strike zone, he creates a high number of line drives. The issue is pitching in the bottom third or below, where his highest line drive percentage is 15%, yet contrast this with a few inches above that, where he manages 36% line drives. Below the zone, he whiffs 71% & 61% of the time vs. his ability to foul off pitches above the zone, to whiff rates at 36% and 25%, and a pattern begins to emerge. A vast, glaring weakness that he's facing, and one the curveball perfectly exploits, also is a leading cause in his ground ball rate. On pitches down and middle or down and away (In zone), the launch angle averages at -5 degrees, and this only worsens as the pitches drop out of the strike zone.
2022 K%/Whiff %
He has the same swing that could cover every pitch, so it's possible that either through overthinking his approach, or the back injury in 2021, he's gone back to an approach that's been more engrained in him from his days with the Marlins. One big difference is in the 2019 vs. 2022 comparison; his whiff rate on curveballs (45.6% vs. 37.6%), sliders (46.6% vs. 32.7%), and changeups (39.1% vs. 33.9%) tell us that Yelich is potentially swinging more conservatively and taking less of a cut at pitches to maintain maybe a longer/higher quality AB, and would go a way to explain his decrease in average exit velocity from 94 mph to 91mph. However, for comparison's sake, it's also important to note that O'Neil Cruz had a similar average exit velocity at 91.9mph last season.
In terms of his "run value" from his swing/take decisions, specifically focusing on the heart of the plate, look at the comparison between 2018/19 vs 2020-2022. A more aggressive approach in terms of what he swings at seems to pay massive dividends in results for him:
His line drive rate in the lower part of the zone appears to be an area of weakness that has only sometimes been there, and it may be a timing issue rather than back-related. However, back injuries can have an impact in a variety of ways. If he can get a handle on even picking and laying off those low curveballs and pitches below the zone, we could see a dramatic improvement in his production this year.
It's important to stress that it's a small area, targeted heavily, having the most significant impact on Yelich's performance, and it's not an all-encompassing weakness across the board. His ground ball rate is a product of pitchers targeting the weakness down in the zone, and the question for 2023 is - can he neutralize them?
Should Yelich embrace a bit of swing and miss to utilize his power more often?
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This time around, let's take a quick dive into William Contreras, his historical hitting, and how he has the potential to be a premier hitter for the Brewers.
Development
The blockbuster trade to acquire Contreras has undoubtedly been the Brewers' biggest move this off-season due to his All-Star production at the plate of .278/.354/.506 and the Brewers' recent history of markedly developing their catchers' defensive capabilities, particularly their receiving skills. However, Contreras hasn't always looked like the power bat he is today, taking six years to get past High A ball, and his power not really showing up between 2015-2020, with ISO numbers below .100 in three of those seven seasons. However, looking at his history in the minors, he had a relatively consistent strikeout percentage, capping out at 21.3% in 2019 but regularly in the 17-21% range. After getting his first taste of the majors the following year, his power numbers spiked, recording ISO's of .228 in 2021 AAA, .184 in 2021 MLB, and .228 in 2022 MLB, a huge increase that also coincided with an increased strikeout rate and walk rate, while also producing a much better batting average. The Braves reportedly worked very hard on simplifying his swing to allow his raw power ability to manifest, and in 2021 the organization was split on which of Langeliers and Contreras was the better prospect.
Strengths
Contreras ranked in the bottom 6% of the league last year in Whiff Rate yet was in the 90th percentile for batting average and expected slugging, suggesting that although he may swing and miss a lot when he gets his pitch, he makes the most of it. His heat map indicates he can swing a little too much at balls just above the strike zone but doesn't chase a ton elsewhere, with a chase rate in the 54th percentile last year, and his favorite pitch by far is the sinker, which he took for a plus eight-run differential last year in 299 AB's. He hits most pitches well but struggles a little more with the slider, according to the run differentials. He faced more sliders than any other pitch last year (413) with a .191 Average and .266 Slugging, whereas for all other meaningful pitches he faced, he had a BA/Slugging of:
Sinker - .358/.672
4 Seamer - .301/.614
Curveball - .306/.444
Changeup - .292/.583
Cutter - .292/.687
While he appears like a slugger who can't hit for average due to his underlying whiff rate, pitches up in the zone being swung on and missed, and his strikeout rate, he can barrel the ball regularly to all fields (his spray chart is spread very evenly). This should give him a high floor regarding his on-base percentage, particularly given he has consistently developed as a hitter over the last three seasons, improving his power output, batting average, and maintaining steady walk rates. He also, despite a tendency to swing and miss, has relatively consistent xOBP for all parts of the zone, showing a propensity for quality contact when he does connect.
Reviewing the comparisons in his StatCast numbers from 2021 vs. 2022 (and he did outperform these slightly in 2022), some notable differences include:
- His Hard Hit rate, Barrel rate, and Sweet Spot % all jumped 2-3%
- His xSLG jumped from .419 in 2021 to .479 in 2022
- His WOBA jumped by 0.67 points
- He dropped his SO and Whiff % by ~ 2%
- He destroys middle middle pitches. His xSLG was 1.048 in this area of the zone last year, xBA was .470
Weaknesses
In terms of his weaknesses, Contreras had one particularly troublesome foe: the slider.
As you can see above, he swings a lot at pitches down and away (although he does have an ability to make quality contact when he connects even diving out over the plate). The Strikeout and whiff percentage are something he will have to tighten up on in order to become less streaky at the plate. He expected stats of .169/.279 for a minus four run differential against the slider, the only negative score posted against any pitch last season, and a strikeout rate of almost 40%.
Defense
With league average pop time (mostly from his strong arm behind the plate, and some technical work to do on his transition and release), his bigger issue defensively is framing. He registered minus three framing runs in both 2021 & 2022, but it's something the Brewers have really specialised in developing, the most recent case being Omar Narvaez who was the worst in the league before he came to Milwaukee. To emphasize the difference this provides, he had a called strike rate on the edge of the zone of 45.1%, whereas league leader Jose Trevino had a 53.8% rate. Where Contreras particularly struggles is below the zone, as you can see below in a table created by Jason Wang of Brewer Fanatics (left hand side is Contreras, right is Trevino)
Hope you guys enjoyed!
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This is a big statement, I know, but hear me out on this one, and you might find the two are a lot more similar that you’d originally think.
In terms profile of the player profiles, they are remarkably similar, both very tall players with access to huge raw power, a surprisingly advanced hit tool, the speed to play centre field if needed, and absolute cannons for throwing arms. One could argue that Judge has access to more power given the size of his frame, and Weimer has access to more speed, but they are relatively similar in a lot of aspects.
Take a look at their performance lines from each of their first two seasons in the minors:
Level
Avg
OBP
SLG
OPS
SO %
HR
SB
Aaron Judge
A/A+
.308
.419
.486
.905
23.3%
17
1
Joey Weimer
A/A+
.296
.403
.556
.958
22.2%
27
30
Aaron Judge
AA/AAA
.255
.330
.448
.777
26.7%
20
0
Joey Weimer
AA/AAA
.256
.336
.465
.801
26.8%
21
31
As you can see, the entire second season is eerily similar for the two players as they made their way to the upper levels of the minors. The real standout is the strikeout rate, which is actually lower for Weimer despite scouts preferring Judge’s ability to cover the plate as a prospect.
Judge had an injury or two to deal with in his second year in the minors, but finished on a hot streak in AAA, was called up to the majors, and produced a .608 OPS in 95 plate appearances. He didn’t really take off until the following year where he mashed 52 home runs and a 1.049 OPS after adjusting to major league pitching. However he did struggle initially in his first call-up to AAA, with an adjustment period needed before finding his swing at the plate.
Joey Weimer, having won the Brewers pipeline prospect of the year honours in 2021 for his outstanding first season, picked up a wrist injury in the middle of his second season, resulting in a dramatic fall in output. He hit just for an OPS of .687 in June and .442 in July, before returning to reduce his strikeout rate, his contact and his power numbers to a level on par with his first season, even despite the rapid promotions. He finished the season in September with 15 walks vs 10 strikeouts, 8 XBH in 63 AB’s and a slash line of .302/.425/.476, tantalising us with a glimpse of better plate coverage and what that could mean for him this coming season.
Judge has also been ranked higher on most prospect lists, due to a combination of his draft position and his college numbers, whereas Weimer didn’t start tapping into his power until he hit professional baseball. He hadn’t managed more than 6 homers in a spring period, which could explain the difference in hype. Judge would also be regarded as having a better hit tool, and more raw power due to his sizeable frame, and it was generally considered that he had quite a short swing to the ball, not fully utilising the power in his 125kg frame. Weimer, on the other hand has a more chaotic swing, with huge bat speed and hand speed, creating most of his power from this, but is more susceptible as a result of struggling with major league pitching. Eric Longenhangen spoke about his tendency to swing inside pitches on the outer part of the strike zone, something he will need to tighten up on before he can be successful in the majors. Where did Judge struggle when he first came up to the majors? Take a look:
The other interesting area in which Weimer and Judge would separate themselves is their speed. Weimer would be a faster athlete, more mobile and able to cover the outfield grass better, but this really shows up on the base paths. With 61 steals in the minors across two seasons, he’s a real threat to opposing teams, even more so given he was only caught 9 times, an 87% success rate!
Weimer’s reduced strikeout rate of 19.5% at AAA, his “calmer” swing since joining the Brewers (including ditching his leg kick for a toe tap) give a real optimism about what Milwaukee could have in their system. Keith Law referred to him as having “stupid power” and that even hitting .220-.230 he could be a plus major league asset, with his defense, speed and quality of contact providing a higher floor than you would usually have with this type of prospect. And in regards to his ceiling, well… that’s probably a guy who just hit 62 home runs last season.
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For the second instalment in this series, let's delve a little into Willy Adames underlying numbers, to try and see where he's been developing, and where there is growth still to come:
2021
When he first joined the Brewers in 2021, Adames posted a .285/.366/.521 for an .887 OPS, crushing fastballs all over American Family Field, but we should keep in mind that he had far lower expected stats with an xBA of .236 and an xSLG of .435, which would lead to an expected OPS of something more in the .750 range.
His biggest issue was that, despite being 72nd percentile for hard hit balls, and a median chase rate at the MLB level, he was in the ninth percentile for whiffing, swinging and missing on 32.6% of pitches. The slider caused him the most trouble (he was heavily targeted with the fastball-slider combination) with which he missed a whopping 41.3% of the pitches, including a lot of pitches down and away (21% to be specific). He also seemed to struggle with pitches that cramped him for room, struggling to barrel the ball when pulling the hands in, creating a lot of low exit velocities, with only four barrelled balls all year in the inner part of the plate. Pitches up and in are statistically his weakest going by average exit velocity, with a mere 78.9mph, mostly as soft popups, but even pitches down and in resulted in a heavy ground ball rate.
On the plus side, he was exceptional at getting the ball in the air through the middle and upper parts of the strike zone, with average launch angles between 20-25 degrees in each of these 6 zones. In all three zones over the middle of the plate, middle-away, and up-and-away, he averages a hard hit ball with exit velocities of 95+ mph. He hit 18 of his 25 homers in the middle-middle, and middle away zones alone, as well as having high xSLG and BACON numbers for the up-and-middle/up-and-away zones.
To summarise, Adames had areas of the zone where if he got his pitch, he would be able to impose himself on the pitcher, areas where he could elevate the ball nicely into the outfield. Yet in other zones he just couldn't find the barrel of the ball, combined with a propensity to whiff at any pitch that wasn't at his belt buckle.
2022
How did Adames try and address this in 2022? Given he was in the 9th percentile of whiff rate in 2021, he did manage to boost it to the 24th percentile in 2022. He was targeted down and away even more often, 24% of the time in fact, however he did reduced his whiff rate in this zone from 66% to 51%, a sizeable difference, and a large reason why his run differential vs the slider increased by 19 points. His BA against the slider did improve slightly, in part because when he connected on this pitch, he hit it hard, with a slugging percentage of .525. His biggest issue was that he started whiffing more around the upper part of the zone, much more consistently. This would go some way to showing why his run value on the fastball came down by 10 points, as well as his xBA and his xSLG each by .030 points.
In each major league season, Adames has increased his barrel rate, to the point that last year, at 13%, he was in the 90th percentile of MLB, and his average launch angle of 18.9 degrees follows the same trend, demonstrating a real talent for getting the ball in the air consistently with hard contact. He had the 15th best barrel rate in MLB last year! He managed this more through an ability to loft the ball more, making use of his harder contact to find the outfield on a more consistent basis.
2023
Adames has some obvious weaknesses it seems, from his vulnerability at the top of the zone in 2022, to his enduring struggles with picking and laying off the slider. So how can he try and make that next step?
Well for starters, Adames doesn't do a great job of laying off the slider down and away, and he could be more selective with this pitch. He barrels up balls middle-away, and down over the heart of the plate quite regularly, so if he can be more selective in picking the slider, and even trying to avoid the low and away section inside the strike zone in the early counts, we could see him reach deeper counts, get ahead in counts a little more often, and apply pressure to the breaking pitches.
The other way is a psychological one. Adames is a player who thrives on energy, enthusiasm, and the big moment. His focus and performance seem to step up dramatically when there's a big moment, or a chance to drive in runs. When you've got 600+ plate appearances in a year, it's difficult to be fully in the moment for each one of them. Have a look at these stats from 2021 and 2022:
There is too much data in the above to deny that Adames feels better in the bigger moments of the game, in both his eye at the plate, to his power numbers, and the Brewers need to find a way to tap into this more often. Corbin Burnes often talks about having his process when he walks up to the mound of making each pitch a solitary event, developing a set process and reviewing his efforts based on his execution. Adames could work with a psychologist to find a method of sharpening his focus in each occasion at which he reaches the batter's box, as well as potentially moving him slightly down the order in the hope he'll have more men on base in front of him when he comes up to hit.
The Brewers as a more "three true outcome" oriented team last season probably didn't help this, but with a hope that Winker with his high OBP, Yelich with his high OBP, and potentially Frelick too, could set the tone at the top of the order and give Adames those RBI opportunities, we may see a spike in Adames plate discipline and performance this coming season.
Let me know what you guys think!
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Luis Urias has been a polarising figure for many Brewers fans, probably due to a differentiation in what people expect from the hot corner (a fact made worse with Nolan Arenado in the same division) and what is regularly produced by the position It should be noted that fangraphs estimates his value over the last two seasons to be in the $17-18 million range. Let's take a deeper look into what Urias has been developing, and where he can look to improve.
Defense
In Luis Urias first full season with the Brewers, he struggled massively with throwing the ball, particularly when he had time to overthink the process. The botching of a lot of the simpler plays led to a perception that he was a poor defender, but that isn't entirely the case. It's true that, per baseball savant, he was worth -11 outs above average in 2021, but over half of this was comprised of excessive playing time at shortstop. In 2021. he was worth -4 OAA at shortstop, and +4 OAA in a similar number of plays at second base. He is a largely league average defender in 2022 at third base (-1 OAA). His arm strength is in and around the 30th percentile, another reason why he shouldn't be played too often on the left hand side of the infield, but he has a high quality glove and great reaction times. He cut his errors down from 24 in 2021 to 14 in 2022, and he produces markedly less mistakes when playing on the right hand side of the infield, with just one mistake in 46 games. In other words, he's a high quality defender at second base, but a merely passable one at third, and should be kept well away from shortstop. This seems to be something the Brewers have worked to create, with the likes of Toro & Miller as suitable defenders at third base, and Turang's impending arrival.
Hitting
Urias took a big step forward offensively from his production with San Diego. His barrel rate went from a previous high of 4.4% in 2019, to 9.3% in 2021, and developing his hard hit rate too. He has maintained this throughout 2022, albeit a slight drop off, but his biggest weakness currently is not quite so obvious. He's very good at covering the majority of the zone well, even controlling his whiff rates outside the zone. the issue with this is how often he generates weak contact and an easy out from this position, and anything on the inner third of the plate;
As you can see, Urias really struggles to generate quality exit velocities from these positions, and has allowed him to be targeted repeatedly, and successfully, high and inside by the four seam fastball. The danger for pitchers comes if they leak that fastball further away from him, at which point he's very good at creating hard contact and elevating the ball; he managed to average 14.2 degrees of elevation in 2021 and further increased that to an 18 degree launch angle in 2022. If the ball is belt high, he hits fly balls almost 50% of the time, as well as strong elevation rates in the upper half of the strike zone too when he isn't cramped for room.
An interesting point of development for Urias is how much stronger he's become in doing damage when he gets ahead in the count. He receives off-speed in these counts around ten percent of the time, so it's more negligible, but the quality of contact on both breaking pitches and fastballs has skyrocketed.
It's breaking balls in particular that draw the eye here, with a significant jump in both exit velocity and expected slugging. However he faced far fewer favourable counts in 2022, due largely to a change in approach. Despite facing 62% of first pitch strikes, he swung on the first pitch only 21% of the time, down from 30% in 2021. This could be for a number of reasons, but during the course of the season we know that he was struggling with his wrist, and a change in approach to grind out the AB's instead of looking to do damage may have caused him to create lower exit velocities than expected. in addition, he was regarded as a plus player when it comes to his swing/take decisions, in 2021 having a +17 run differential. Yet in 2022, this significantly as a result of a -15 score for pitches taken over the heart of the plate. A lot of people in the Brewers camp were raving about his physical development last off season and the additional power he was impacting the ball with, yet we didn't really see that throughout 2022. I think a tweak in his approach could allow us to see more damage from his bat in 2023.
Regarding the wrist injury mentioned above, a loot at his splits throughout the year highlight this quite well. He maintained very strong walk rates for the most part when he was struggling at the plate, topping out at 13% in August. Yet when he developed through the issue you could see a marked improvement, hitting .328/.415/.507 in September/October, stepping up when Brewers needed him most and giving a glimpse of what he could do if he can remain healthy throughout 2023.
Conclusion
If playing predominantly at second base in the coming season, Urias could quite possibly be a 4-5 WAR player should he tap into his offensive capabilities. We need to see if he can replicate his performance at the end of last year, as well as tightening up on those inside pitches, doing a better job of pulling his hands in and muscling the ball into the outfield with more authority on these pitches. If he can manage these, he can show himself off as one of the premier second basemen in the league.
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According to a recent poll conducted by MLB, the Dodgers have one of the top three farm systems in all of baseball, and honestly that should be a shock given the picks they've been getting (and perhaps a relief that they haven't had the top of the draft picks to work with, or we would maybe see multiple phenoms in this organization).
Obviously the draft is a little bit of a crapshoot, and it's tough project for injuries, development, and I think the mental approach of the player combined with work ethic is as important as physical characteristics. Baseball does build a strong sense of character but to go from being the guy to just a guy is not easy, and takes some getting used to. Potential alone doesn't get paid big money, and its why I think teams with less scouting resources maybe don't draft as well, because they don't see the player dealing with adversity, what he does in the dugout, how he conducts himself as a leader. A great example is the life and soul Willy Adames brings to the Brewers, and how there's that real comfort in him in high leverage situations (as there should be, the guy hit .301/.370/.571 with RISP last year). It makes the player not just the guy if they pan out, but he becomes "our guy", and when the inevitable downs of the season hit, you need these guys to step up and drag the team forward. Dodger scouts are actively told to prioritize players who they think can mentally adapt and thrive to big league ball, and trust them to develop their skillset more effectively with that basis
One standout for the Dodgers is the amount they invest in player acquisition, scouting, coaches, coordinators, and analysts is huge, and they use their sizable streams of income to do so. They do have a high degree of turnover with staff being poached for higher positions, but they identify talent and ability in these areas to make sure they not only identify the best players available to them, but more importantly create an environment that's perfect for the growth of these players.
Coaching is at its purest form when players have development ahead of them, rather than just tweaks, and the Dodgers seem to be far and away the best at taking their talent pool and making the most of it. The Brewers are actually replicating their drafting model currently, of using the most projectable stat (plate discipline , walk rate, strikeout rate) and adding power to it from there. Seager, Bellinger, Gavin Lux and many more were all hit first players who developed power.
However, the coaching part is designed to be as major league-like as possible, with most coaches being encouraged to adopt a laidback attitude to transferring advice rather than overloading prospects with information. Walker Buehler commented “How laid back and egoless most of our coaches are, it really helps. I always talk about summer ball coaches or high school coaches or college coaches trying to put their stamp on you. I don’t think many guys do that here, and I think it leads to a really collaborative effort.” This, along with their model of really encouraging the Rookies to be open, outspoken and themselves (which not all clubs do), translates to prospects making the transition from upper minors to the major leagues much smoother than most. They also put a lot more onus on the player with this approach to seek ways that take them from good players to great players, difference makers at the major league level, and this approach, from my personal sporting experiences, enhances the self confidence in your ability to adapt and become better, and also creates a drive to further learn and develop. The act of challenging oneself is far more satisfying than a response to the challenges of others
The coaching ticket translates to an appeal at the major league level too. Noah Syndegaard actively took a lower deal than he could have to go to LA and develop as a pitcher, and they have a high track record of pitchers outperforming their recent seasons (Andrew Heaney and Anderson last year are good examples). Part of this is the quality of the defense the Dodgers put out which helps most pitchers do better than their FIP and expected stats suggest, but also their developmental abilities with pitchers. The pure number of quality pitchers and hitters at the upper levels of their farm is crazy,
Andrew Heaney - 31. ERA, 3.39 xERA, 3.75 FIP
Tyler Anderson - 2.57 ERA, 3.1 xERA, 4.1 xFIP
In their farm at the moment they have:
1. Diego Cartaya - International prospect with a big bonus so less under the radar
2. Bobby Miller - Nearly all his pitches ar at least + (70 fB, 60 CH, 60 Sl, 55 Curve) and taken 29th in the 1st round of the draft
3. Miguel Vargas - Picked up for 300,000 internationally, so not a first round, or even second round equivalent pick, won a batting title in 2021, and took no steps back at AAA in 2022
7. Gavin Stone - A 1.48 ERA across the minors, including a 1.16 ERA in AAA, taken in the 5th round. What on earth
6. Ryan Pepiot - 3rd Round (Pick 102) had a 3.47 ERA in 36 innings last year, and although occasionally struggled with walks, he had a 200 BAA
It's not just the single talents they're producing, in fact it's the quantity as well as the quality, seeming to maximize the vast majority of the talent in their system, in a way others can only dream of.
Regarding the Brewers system, Stearns was famous for not being overly amused with a large scouting department but I think they're invaluable to the organization, and that can be seen from the Brewer networks in the international draft where they have signed very well in recent history - unlike the Dodgers, actually.
I also think that improving upon the dietary advice and food provided to prospects as well as lodgings, could go some way to fostering better development, as well as prevention of injuries. Sleep and nutrition are so vital for our body to retain information and develop at all parts of our life, and in the minors this isn't seen as a priority for most teams.
Finally, fostering that similarity in approach and coaching from majors to the minors can really help to ease the transition, and maybe reduce the talent that is considered AAAA. A player who is confident and feels at home upon reach the bigs will likely outperform those who don't. These players aren't robots, and in one of the biggest moments of their careers, that comfort factor makes all the difference. The slightest bit of tension can throw off someones swing or throwing arm, and in a game of small margins, it can be the difference.
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Based on many recent comments about Steven Kwan being similar to Sal Frelick and him being a five WAR player last year, I decided to look into how comparable the two are as prospects.
Steven Kwan's 2022 Season
The most obvious reason for this comparison is that Frelick and Kwan are exceptionally good at avoiding the strikeout. Kwan was in the 100th percentile for both whiff rate and strikeout rate in the majors last year and the 96th percentile for chase rate. His whiff rate on two strikes is 6% against fastballs, 4.9% against off-speed pitches, and a "whopping" 13% against breaking balls, an expert level of contact. That being said, he is also in the first percentile for barrel rate, hard-hit rate, and the third percentile for average exit velocity, with his spray chart showing a lot of balls dropping in the shallow outfield. His power output mostly came from pulling pitches on the inner part of the plate, with four of his six home runs from this region of the strike zone. Despite this, he produced 25 doubles and seven triples last season, using awkwardly placed balls in play and his 60-grade speed to make the most of his hits and stealing 19 bases last season.
Kwan was also a recipient of a Gold Glove in his rookie season, with 96th percentile outs above average in left field, mostly from his quality jump rather than explosive speed. All in all, this is exactly the type of player the Brewers missed last year. The Brewers hit just .207 as a team in the first inning in 2022, so to have a player like Kwan leading off with a tough AB, getting on base, and setting the tone for the game could make a noticeable difference to the team.
Frelick vs. Kwan in the minor leagues
Kwan spent much more time than Frelick on his way through the Guardians system, and it's important to note the progression made by Frelick even as he moved up each level in 2022. He hit .291/.391/.456 in High A Wisconsin over 21 games with a 15.2% strikeout rate at the start of the year, only to finish in AAA hitting .365/.435/.508 with a 7.4% strikeout rate over 46 games. Due to it being such a small sample size, his limited time in college baseball due to ill-timed injuries and bad luck, and allowing for him to develop as a hitter in his first full professional season, I'm going to focus more on his statistical output at the end of the season.
Frelick was also a player who won defensive player of the year honors at Boston College for his work in CF (in his first season playing the outfield); he is a 60-grade runner, capable of flashing his speed both in the field and on the base paths, with nine stolen bases in 46 games at AAA and potentially more to come if the Brewers can develop his instincts when on base a little more (again similar to Kwan). You could expect someone with his speed, on the base paths at the clip he was in 2022, to steal more than 24 bases in the minors across all levels and be caught stealing eight times (a 75% success rate). Scouts also say he has a bit of work to do in terms of his defensive reads and routes if he is to stay in center field, hopefully working on these areas throughout the offseason and the beginning of this season.
Frelick accesses much more of his power on the pull side but has demonstrated an ability in the minors to hit one out to the opposite field. He did have a higher BABIP than at previous levels. Still, his hit tool, ability to cover the shadow area around the strike zone, and the scouting reviews around the regularity with which he barrelled the ball should stand him in good stead. In other words, Frelick didn't just make contact; he made quality contact regularly. In college, he was recorded as having an exit velocity of 108mph, surpassing anything Kwan produced in the majors last year.
In his last season between AA and AAA, Steven Kwan hit .328/.407/.527 with a 9.1% strikeout rate but an ISO of .200, roughly .50 points higher than Frelick produced. However, as mentioned in the first section, higher quality pitching can easily subjugate his power. His previous seasons loitered in the ISO range of .83 - .102, and he embraced pulling the ball more and improved his launch angle in 2021, hence the sudden development in his game.
Kwan stole just six bases in his final season in the minors, caught stealing twice; not a great return for someone also given 60-grade speed, clearly developing on this when he reached the majors. Defensively he was said to have "the speed and ability to stay in CF, or play plus defense in the corner OF spots," which bore fruit by his performance in left field last year. His hitting ability involves more grinding than Frelick, with slightly more pitches per plate appearance, and he swung and missed at just 2.6% of pitches in the minors in 2021. That is, quite frankly, outrageous.
Frelick has a better hit tool than Kwan by a small margin. Both have a very strong command of their strike zone with a willingness to grind out ABs (both approached four pitches per plate appearance in the minors), but maybe have a little work to do in terms of maximizing his approach on the base paths and his value in defense, both of which can likely be developed simply through more playing time and experience. It could be more optimistic to predict further progress from Frelick, given how little professional baseball he has played and the extent of the improvements he made in his first full season.
Kwan would have the edge on Frelick regarding his plate coverage, though as one of the toughest outs in baseball, that's not derogatory in any way for the Brewers prospect. Also, when Kwan reached the majors, he reverted to an ISO of .100, seeming to lose the power differential he found in his final season of the minors. You can't project Frelick to be as tough to strike out as Kwan, but he will likely maintain his low strikeout rate and stronger power output. Keith Law was asked about the comparison, to which he responded, "No, Frelick's faster, a better defender, and I think he's going to make harder contact too."
What do the Brewer fanatics think?
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The Quest for an .800+ OPS Hitter Part Two - Jesse Winker
By Jake McKibbin,
The Quest for an .800 OPS HitterFor part two of this series, I'm going to focus a little on Jesse Winker, particularly his injury history.
Historically, despite regular injuries throughout his carer, Jesse Winker has a career slash line of .270/.374/.463, with several healthier seasons comfortably above .900 OPS. He has struggled through shoulder dislocation, abdominal strains, intercostal issues, and knee issues.
To focus on his two most recent injuries, I've looked in a little more depth to see the return timelines.
Starting with the neck, Winker first suffered a neck strain in September 2019 and missed the last month of the season because of it, and the following year he came back with his first .900 OPS season (albeit in shortened 2020). It wouldn't have been as severe as the bulging disc he had surgery on, but perhaps an underlying weakness that caused the issue. In 2019, Brandon Nimmo had a bulging disc, although he healed naturally due to it not being ruptured. Nimmo never seemed to have any issues with the bat after that, regularly finishing the seasons with a .800+ OPS, even though at the time of the injury, he had batted .171/.312/.224 before going on the IL, showing the size of the short-term impact the injury can have on your swing. The neck injury likely doesn't take any real adjustment/recovery time when back in the batter's box.
Meniscus clear-out in the knee is a much simpler surgery than most associated with this area of the body. It's a repair of the cartilage between the femur and the joint to prevent friction which causes pain while moving. It is a minimally invasive surgery, very common in high-impact athletes (i.e., those running and moving on harder surfaces, less common on grass surfaces). It can often, several years later, require more serious surgery as the joint is more likely to be unstable; however, in the near future, it is a quick and relatively seamless recovery. Brandon Belt had the same surgery in 2015 and hit 275 with 17 home runs the following year, playing 156 games. It can be much harder to recover from as you get older, but many players, such as Jazz Chisholm and Luke Voit, have returned and recovered well at the plate.
The underlying issue with Winker is likely to be less about his injuries from last season and more about what injuries he'll be dealing with this season. He played through them last year for 136 games, and his previous high was 113 for the Reds. Suppose the Brewers get 120 games out of him with relatively minor health issues, and the DH hopefully removes some of the strain on his body in terms of the wear and tear of the knee and other joints or impact dives in the outfield. In that case, they could expect at a baseline an OPS of over .800 and potentially be hopeful of their first .900 OPS bat since 2019.
His record at American Family Field is bonkers, with a 1.032 OPS in 32 games; he regularly demolishes sinker ballers (I remember he had a real fondness for Adrian Houser in one specific game). We'll see a little extra focus from him in his contract season to get that bag. And even if he doesn't hit with the power we're used to seeing from, his eye at the plate provides a reasonably high floor from which to project that he'll be comfortably better than Andrew McCutchen as DH, even on his worst day.
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The Quest for an .800+ OPS hitter Part One - Rowdy Tellez
By Jake McKibbin,
The Quest for an .800 OPS HitterSo I was thinking recently about the number of quality batters required by teams who succeed in the playoffs, and how the Brewers compare and had a brief look into the stats. Taking an .800+ OPS as a good barometer, the Brewers had one hitter last year who passed this mark (Hunter Renfroe, now gone).
The Astros had four qualified hitters breaching this mark, including Altuve with .900+ and Alvarez with over 1.000.
The Phillies had Bryce Harper (included as he did have 370 PA's), Kyle Schwarber & JT Realmuto.
The Dodgers had Trea Turner, Will Smith, Mookie Betts and then Freddie Freeman with a .900+ OPS.
Yankees had Aaron Judge with 1.100 OPS (almost counts double) and Anthony Rizzo.
In other words, a team seems to need at least two, and probably three comfortably above average hitters to be successful.
This brings me to Tellez.... if I told you going into 2022 that his walk rate would jump 3% and ISO would go from .170 to .240 you'd be thinking "come to daddy". However his final slash line didn't quite bear fruit, with a .219/.306/.461, and in particular the average - he hit for .247 Career average in 850 AB's, and had an xBA of .252 last season.
I actually lost count of how many times, especially in the first few months, he was roping balls just short of the wall, and by the end of May, he was top three in expected slugging percentage.
He's never really going to be a high average guy, with a launch angle of around 15 degrees (also moved up last season by 2 degrees), he is a definite slugger, and although the reduced shift may help a little, it's unlikely to make a huge difference for him. That being said, projections have him expectedly batting around .245-.250 range, and I think he even has the ability to be a .260-.270 hitter based on the quality of contact he produces with average exit velo's in the 91-92 range.
His expected slugging was higher than Mookie Betts, Vlad Guerrero Jr, J Rod, and just below Kyle Tucker/Goldschmidt, and just ten points below Pete Alonso.
Projecting these stats out, and with his slugging ability, I think it's actually quite possible that an .800 OPS is his baseline for next year, and I think he has the potential for even an 850+ season.
I think last season, despite the 35 HR's was actually a down season for him in many ways. A bounce back to the mean could mean the difference between 80 RBIs and 100 RBIs, particularly if his home runs come with men on base. Pete Alonso had 15 solo shots out of 40 HRs (37.5%), whereas Rowdy has 19 out of 35 (54.2%).
The other real standout for me is that he's projected to half his number of GiDP outs from 20 to ten next season, whether this is shift-based or not I'm not sure but again could make a small yet noticeable difference to the offense.
As such, Tellez is one of the players I can see being a five hole hitter who can really take this offense to the next level if he can regress to his career norms in terms of BA while maintaining the improvements he made in ISO and walk rate last year, and if the brewers can put men on base in front of him a little more often.
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