gregmag

I'm a little concerned about the site's policy regarding information from paid sources -- like BP subscription content. I bring this up because Brian just shut down a thread where someone asked for a summary of BP's Brewer health report. IMHO, we sometimes go a bit too far in blocking discussions of this sort. If I buy a book, or pay to attend a play or a movie, no legal or ethical principle stops me from summarizing the content as part of a discussion about the content itself, some issue raised by the content, or the state of the world. Why, then, can't a poster here say something like "BP thinks the Brewers do the following six bad things and five good things to keep players healthy," and then discuss the information? I certainly understand that we don't want to undercut paid sites or sources by reprinting large chunks of content verbatim. I'm not a copyright lawyer (and I don't know whether Brian's concern here is legal, ethical, or both), but on my limited understanding, the copyright principle that allows "fair use" of copyrighted material is designed precisely to avoid stifling discussion and critique, as opposed to mere parroting of protected content. If BP, or anyone else, says something interesting about the Brewers, I don't see sharing the essence of the information, and then discussing it, as an assault on BP's property. If I'm wrong about that, then I think our balance of private property vs. communal welfare interests is seriously out of whack. If anyone else cares about this, what do you think? Greg.

Isn't it more likely that, in the "old days," guys who got those injuries would just disappear and never be heard from again? I think the reason we follow injuries more now is that medical advances give guys a chance to come back from them. I don't see any reason to conclude that more injuries actually happen now. Human beings certainly haven't devolved. But maybe some other factor has changed. Greg.

This marks the official 2005 resumption of my Housman pimping hobby. Two innings -- what better basis for such a weird affectation? But I'm telling you, the guy made a deal with the devil or something; if he keeps striking people out, he will not be denied. I don't see why he should keep striking people out, but until somebody explains how the park/league shift from Beloit to Huntsville can turn a guy's K/9 from crap to brilliance, I will continue to believe. Greg.

Thanks to the guys who were there for all the reports. That's very cool. For me, the thing that jumps out, the one thing that I'm even inclined to get a little excited about after just three spring training PAs, is Krynzel's three walks. I've been convinced by the start-him-in-AAA camp, but if he has really grown eyes, he could be useful a lot quicker than we thought. Just a random thought out of the JS: in the item on Davis, he made a point of naming the assistant trainer who is working with him on his back. That's a small but very classy thing to do for a guy who probably has never seen his name in the paper before. Just another reason to like Doug. Greg.

I love Gary Pettis as the AAA hitting coach. Speedster, indeed, but more importantly Pettis was about as much of a walk machine as a crappy hitter can be, never chalking up less than a BB per ten ABs and occasionally approaching one per five. Struck out a ton, too, but whaddayawant -- he was a truly crappy hitter. I don't know whether a player can really learn patience, but if so, Pettis is the perfect guy to be working with Hart and Nelson. Greg.

Oh God. I know I've said this before, but you've said the Cirillo thing before (I think -- or somebody has), so: if Eddie Matthews rises from the grave and rediscovers his power stroke, that's the slugging 3B we need, so let's exhume his body and invite it to spring training. Jeff Cirillo is not actually dead, but I defy you to name another active, physically healthy major leaguer who has done more than Cirillo has to prove that he will never, ever again come within wistful glimpsing distance of his past glory. Sorry to be in your face this morning, DH, but you just happen to have made, in your characteristically articulate fashion, two of my least favorite arguments. Nothing personal. Greg.

Why the hell is Obermuller still starting games? Don't they have somebody else? Wise? Anyone? Greg.

He walked the pitcher. Greg.

My wife, as she did last year, got me tickets to all three games as my anniversary gift, on the condition that she doesn't have to go. So I'll be back later with any fun things I noticed. Greg.

SB -- P. Fielder (9).

Okay, Jim Callis officially rocks. He answered my email last night and answered the big question we were kicking around: "As for the timing of injuries, I also think it would be deceptive to cut it off at age 25. That gives your typical college guy four years to get hurt, while it gives the HS guys seven years to get hurt. But let's take a look: "C arm surgery within four years (age 25): 16 of 50 (32 percent) HS arm surgery within seven years (age 25): 24 of 35 (69 percent) "But see also: "C arm surgery within seven years: 25 of 50 (50 percent) "That's an interesting point. The difference is more significant if you look at it that way. It still wouldn't change my quick one-sentence opinion: I would lean toward college righthanders (or to make it broader, players) in the draft, because you have a bigger track record, they pay off quicker and they are safer, but the difference compared to high school righthanders (or players) isn't significant enough for me to just exclude that entire demographic out of hand. Regardless of how you sift the injury data, in the long run, the college righthanders aren't that much better than the high school righthanders to just give up on them." I think this information is very helpful, although the small sample size caveat remains in effect. I don't see it as a slam-dunk for my side of this argument, but I think it provides significant support. If we trust this data, there seem to be two interesting things to argue about. First, Callis makes the point about what's "fair" in sifting the data. I think reasonable people can disagree about that. My perspective is that, whenever pitchers get drafted, they're going to have a useful lifespan based on age (as a group; Orosco caveat duly noted). For that reason, the age-based comparison makes more sense to me than the "years after draft"-based comparison. If you focus on the age-based comparison, the numbers suggest a stark difference in injury risk for HS and college arms. Second, Callis concludes that the difference in injury risk isn't great enough to rule out a whole demographic. Again, I think reasonable people can disagree about this. I'm inclined to take a somewhat opposed view, and here's where the Moneyball philosophy comes into play. Ignoring a whole demographic -- say, HS arms -- makes perfect sense even if there's nothing wrong with that demographic, because scouting resources are limited. The Braves put their resources disproportionately into the South. That severly limits them elsewhere, but they get better info than any other team about that region, so they end up with good players. The info we have, as I read it, tells us that HS pitchers are a demographic with which there is something wrong. If you ignored HS pitchers altogether and put those resources into scouting collegians, you'd increase your comparative advantage in that area. I wouldn't go that far, in part because I'm not certain you could find enough college arms that other teams missed to offset completely the loss of HS arms. What I would do is strategize to ignore HS arms in the first 5-10 rounds (leaving some flexibility). The most consistent knock on HS pitchers, injuries aside, is developmental unpredictability -- so take your fliers on the unknown quantities in the later rounds. BTW, I also asked Callis some questions about the numbers on HS and college arms that (a) reach the majors and (b) become average or better. He didn't have time to get to those, although he did make this valid point (in response to my thought that more college arms may end up providing that value to the teams that drafted them: "One other aspect that's hard to measure in a study is trade value. Because so many trades are financially motivated, it's difficult to break down how much trade value (versus the other team saving money) a player has. But almost all of these guys, even the Todd Van Poppels of the world, had huge trade value for a long time. Had the A's chosen to cash him in while he was in the minors, they could have gotten a potentially much higher return than he gave them." True dat -- but the thing is, teams never do it. That's a strategic innovation for GMs to consider: get Mike Jones and cash him in as soon as he has burned up A-ball. Maybe he becomes Kerry Wood, and you end up losing the gamble -- but the odds are better that he helps you most as trade bait. Greg.

Wow -- you can do that? Use a guy's email address to communicate with him, rather than just guess what he'd say about something? I really am a technoklutz. Thanks for suggesting that, Robert. I just sent him an email. I asked him about the injury window thing and also some other questions about the percentages that reach the majors and become average or better. At the end, I politely (I hope) encouraged him to keep updating the study as he gets more data. It would be really cool if he responded. My note was long, but maybe he'll address part of it. Greg.

That's an interesting point. I suppose the same could be true in HS -- does anyone have insights about whether HS or college coaches are relatively more careful with pitchers? Unless there's a demonstrable difference, I'd tend to focus on the difference (if any) in how MLB organizations treat pitchers of different ages in their first seasons. You may have been getting at something else, which is also worth considering: HS pitchers just haven't been pitching as long as college pitchers; the college guys have had more opportunities for wear and tear. What strikes me about these possibilities is that post-draft injury stats (like the ones in the BP study) should account for them. In other words, everything that happens to a pitcher before he gets drafted contributes to his propensity for injury, which we then measure by counting injuries going forward. Greg.

On the injury thing, my ultimate point is that, if we buy the 25 barrier, then (a) the similarity of the percentages you cited shouldn't surprise us, because we're comparing two groups of pitchers during a period where both groups are still facing substantial injury risk, and (b) because the HS draftees have additional time under the higher injury risk, they remain, as a group, substantially riskier investments. In other words, if the 25 barrier is legit, the stat you cite isn't conclusive at all; exactly as you said, you'd need to compare both groups of draftees up to age 25. So is the 25 barrier legit? As far as I can tell from quick research, the answer is yes, with caveats. The age 25 number comes from Craig Wright in "The Diamond Appraised," which included a study through 1987. A more recent article discussing the phenomenon and Wright's analysis is here: www.rotojunkie.com/corner/012104.html Baseball Prospectus did a study that has injury risk dramatically decreasing between 20 and 24, with a gradual upward slope starting at 25: www.baseballprospectus.co...cleid=1658 The BP study provides some support for the position I was suggesting: a straight five-year window comparison misses the important fact that college pitching draftees as a group are "out of the woods" after that window, whereas HS pitching draftees are not. On the other hand, the study presents a problem for my hypothesis: Injury risk doesn't just drop from "high" to "low" after age 24. Rather, injury risk occurs on a curve, with a downward slope through age 24. Thus, in the aggregate, more pitchers should get hurt in the 18-22 window than in the 20-24 window, and Callis' numbers suggest that isn't happening. One factor that may skew the data, however, is the tendency of teams not to push HS pitchers in their initial seasons. They won't draft a guy if he's hurt, and if they don't pitch him a lot right after he's drafted, his injury risk at 18 is dramatically reduced. But that's just a guess, and I don't know how long the premise (that teams baby HS pitching draftees at first) has even been true. All of this persuades me that the issue is complicated (duh) and that the Callis study, while on the right track, is inadequate, both in sample size and in design, to prove anything. What we need is a larger variation on the Callis study that compares HS and college pitching draftees up to age 25 (or beyond, for that matter), breaking down injury percentages at each point on the age curve from 18 to 25. That would tell us something meaningful about whether injury risk generically distinguishes HS and college arms as draft risks. Good analysis on the "best player" philosophy; thanks. This gets back to that argument you had with the Mets fan before the draft, but I guess I'm just dubious about taking a HS guy who throws 97 over a college guy who throws 92 but has more polish. Leaving aside the injury issue for a moment, the college guy is a lot farther along in his development as a pitcher; you know what you're getting. The HS kid could fail to make the necessary adjustments against better competition, or he could just lose velocity, a la Mike Jones (it would help to know if that's common or unusual). Of course, he could also turn into Doc Gooden at 19, but the point is that you have a lot less certainty, and I'm inclined to put a premium on certainty in the high rounds. I don't think the same analysis applies to hitters, although I have to confess I haven't worked that view out in my mind. I guess I just don't think hitting is as complex, and thus unpredictable, as pitching. As for defense, there's really no such thing as "tougher competitoin"; the ball is the ball, right? So you've made me think a lot harder about the college vs. HS pitching thing, but you haven't changed my conclusion based on the info I have. I'd still like to see the Brewers take more college arms, fewer HS arms, and a few more HS as opposed to college bats. Greg.

Colby, something just struck me when you once again quoted the similarity in the percentages of HS and college pitchers that get hurt "within five years of being drafted." Something other than the small sample size. I've read several times over the years that pitchers, as a group, become less susceptible to injury after about age 25. Whether or not that's true is very important for the implications of the Callis study you cite. If a typical 18 year-old HS pitching draftee doesn't get hurt within five years of being drafted, that still leaves him with two years in the "injury window." If a 20 year-old college pitcher doesn't get hurt within five years, he's out of the statistical woods. If there is an "age-injury window" for pitchers, then the Callis stat you quoted is missing a very important piece of the story. That leads back to Al's point, that a college arm is safer in the long run because the guy has come farther without getting hurt. On the "pick the best player available" point . . . how do you compare? How do you determine whether an 18 year-old Maine HS pitcher is "better" than a 20 year-old D1 college pitcher? Do you go purely on visual assessment of stuff? Is there a good way to factor in strength of competition, unpredictability of physical development, etc.? Are some attributes of good players comparable across contexts and others not? The "best player available" logic always has a lot to recommend it, but in this context I wonder whether there's any such thing, at least measurably. Any thoughts? Greg.

Right on, TN. Ned, I think, has a quote in tomorrow's J-S to the effect of, "It was the same story; he [Obermuller] made it through the lineup once and then got shelled." Gee, I wonder why that happened. Remember that Simpsons episode where Homer bangs his head, says "ow," and then just keeps on banging his head, saying "ow" each time? We may not be geniuses here, but this one seems pretty bloody obvious to me. Greg.

Do we have any updates, maybe from on-the-scene observers, about Matt Ford's health? I assume he's still on a pitch count and working off the rust; are we optimistic? Sollman appears to have left the Helena game after one AB. Anybody know if there's any reason for concern? Greg.

The Cubs' vaunted lineup scored two runs in three games while we got what we needed against on three of the best-regarded pitchers in all of baseball. How could it get better than this? What an amazing series. Mike Maddux is the new Dave Duncan. Greg.

I meant "out for the 8th," and EZ Board has revoked my editing privileges. Sorry. Greg.

Has anybody explained why Davis went out for the 7th having thrown 111 pitches already? Does it strike anybody else as odd to run the starter's pitch count to 124 in the 8th inning of a 4-0 game? Did we trade managers or something? Greg.

Dear Keith and Ben, Thanks for paying attention to when we're defending you here on the site and timing your clutch performances accordingly. Sincerely, Your Pimps at Brewerfan.net

Squarepusher or Other Appropriate Power-That-Be: I just noticed that, in a post I made earlier tonight, I got bleeped. I used the offending word as a verb in a context in which it means, according to Webster, "to turn, tip, or stick up" or, relatedly, "to set a trigger for firing." I was pretty obviously NOT connoting either of the other familiar senses of the same word, which are, among other distinctions from my intended meaning, nouns, and only one of which has nothing to do with poultry. Reset the filter. Stop the madness. Greg.

Mothership: Real gangsta-ass pitchas don't talk much All ya hear is the black from the fastball And real gangsta-ass pitchas don't run for s__t Cuz real gangsta-ass pitchas can't hit at all. Greg.

Thanks, Bill; love the cork idea. I just read through this thread, and it reminded me of a few more things: Viz was filthy in the 8th; this outing proves why he deserves his role. If the defense had backed him up, he would have been out of the inning clean. He was throwing gas and controlling the strike zone like a master. Somebody mentioned Moeller's blocks . . . he was amazing. Sheets bounced at least four curveballs up there, and I think Viz had at least one adventure pitch. Moeller smothered everything so well that he didn't even have to pick up the ball and @#%$ his arm threateningly. I would never, ever overgeneralize, but Cubs fans are, by and large, ignorant morons. Some overheard remarks: "Why are they taking [sheets] out? He hasn't thrown that many pitches!" (In all fairness, I guess watching Dusty will do that to you.) "Who's this guy?" (On NL All-Star Dan Kolb). "That was a strike, ref!" (after every friggin' pitch by Matt "wild man" Clement, and yes, they said "ref"). Chris Magruder was on deck in the 8th to pinch hit for Viz (in the fith slot) had Overbay reached. Finally, we just saw a game in which the only scoring came on a Craig Counsell home run; Geoff Jenkins stole a base; and Dan Kolb struck out two men in an inning. The world is a strange and wonderful place. Greg.

I never get to do this, and I won't have another chance until the Brewers come to Philly next month, so here's what I noticed from the best seats I will ever have at Miller Park (because they were the only ones my dad could get when I and some family friends firmed up our plans to come to town): Sheets was actually better than his line, in that Sosa's "walk" came on strike three and two of the Cubs' so-called hits could easily have been ruled errors. At the same time, amazingly enough, Ben wasn't absolutely on top of his game. He labored a bit, threw a lot of pitches, and got behind some guys. But man -- he can dial it up almost at will. After Barrett's so-called double (how is that not, at most, a single and an error that allows the runner to advance?), he just got pissed. The Cubs never saw first base again. His curve was erratic early, and I noticed him throwing nothing but hooks during his warmups before the third inning. It seemed to help. The Brewers didn't hit for squat, but they worked the count brilliantly, no one better than Grieve. For all the times people advocate having an otherwise marginal player in the lineup because his speed on the bases messes up a pitcher's concentration, how about an argument that Grieve should play for no other reason than he tortures the pitcher? Absolutely he shouldn't be hitting in a "clear the table" position -- although Ginter deserves more blame for making outs in RBI situations than Grieve does for deferring to Ginter with the walks -- but he is very valuable as a table setter. Jenkins just looked lost at the plate. He didn't go up there with any kind of plan. Helms looked even worse; at least Jenkins wasn't flailing at balls three feet out of the strike zone. For that matter, Overbay wasn't exactly locked in. Maybe the hitters are just trying to spur Sheets on to the next level; it seems to be working. Grieve and Helms both looked helpless in the field early on, but each made a sweet play later -- Grieve on Walker's sinking liner in the fifth, Helms on Barrett's grounder off Kolb's hand in the ninth. They try, for sure, and sometimes they come up with the play. On a personal note: Best. Game. Ever. The sun came out on a cool summer day, the Brewers won a thriller behind their two newly minted all-stars, the Cubs' fans went home in tears, I sat in the third row behind home plate, Dusty Baker autographed my scorecard (before his untimely death at the hands of Jose Macias), and the father of a friend of mine turned out to be an insider who got, and gave me out of the blue, a ball that Sheets had used to strike out Sosa. It don't get any better than that. Greg.