Jake McKibbin

Apologies, I thought you were talking strict platoon! I do think form will come into this, and either can force their way into more starting time, but I'd agree that your split is more likely to be where they'll at least start the season from a time-share standpoint

I think this may mean a little into sunk cost fallacy, in that if you spend the money you have to use them, when in reality whoever is performing better (and likely to perform better) should get the role. It's one of the advantages the Brewers have, chopping and changing players who aren't working which you can't do with large contracts as easily I would ask a question (as Devil's advocate, I believe the Brewers will want both in 2026 for depth as much as anything, as both have been streaky even in 2025): If Bauers is likely to take more of the playing time, should they tender Vaughn a contract of that size?

Image courtesy of © Mark Hoffman/Milwaukee Journal Sentinel / USA TODAY NETWORK via Imagn Images Major League Baseball's revenue-sharing model was created to level the platform all teams play from, without completely removing the incentive for some clubs to seek stronger financial positions and revenue sources. The idea is that the Dodgers and Yankees need a sturdy competitive landscape to exist, in order to bring in the massive sums of money they accumulate. The problem is that, at present, two large loopholes exist in the league's revenue-sharing plan: Some teams have managed to avoid paying what they should owe; and The revenues shared are then distributed equally, rather than on a meritocratic basis. That disincentivizes some teams from trying to win and improve the on-field product. Tax Avoidance Let's start with the first, and perhaps the most obvious culprit: the Los Angeles Dodgers. Way back in 2012, with the team facing imminent bankruptcy after Frank McCourt siphoned funds from the club to finance his divorce, MLB awarded the Dodgers a favorable deal to pull themselves out of a hole. The following season, they would be permitted to treat their media revenue as a maximum of $84 million for revenue-sharing purposes, a figure that would increase by 4% each year thereafter. This deal would continue for the following 25 years. (Note: yes, that is a ludicrous period of time for this kind of deal.) In 2017, MLB realized the folly of their ways and adjusted the initial starting point to $130 million, but even that has proven to be an insufficient change. The Dodgers' TV Deal with Spectrum far exceeds that; it's valued at $8.35 billion over 25 years, or $334 million per year. Here's how that looks over the course of the 25-year period, with all values below in millions: Year Real Local TV Revenue Revenue Sharing Due Adjusted Local TV Revenue Adjusted Revenue Sharing Due Annual Savings Cumulative Savings 2014 $334.00 $113.60 $130.00 $44.20 $69.40 $69.40 2015 $334.00 $113.60 $135.20 $45.97 $67.63 $137.03 2016 $334.00 $113.60 $140.60 $47.80 $65.80 $202.83 2017 $334.00 $160.30 $146.20 $70.18 $90.12 $292.95 2018 $334.00 $160.30 $152.10 $73.01 $87.29 $380.24 2019 $334.00 $160.30 $158.20 $75.94 $84.36 $464.61 2020 $334.00 $160.30 $164.80 $79.10 $81.20 $545.80 2021 $334.00 $160.30 $171.10 $82.13 $78.17 $623.98 2022 $334.00 $160.30 $177.90 $85.39 $74.91 $698.88 2023 $334.00 $160.30 $185.00 $88.80 $71.50 $770.38 2024 $334.00 $160.30 $192.40 $92.35 $67.95 $838.33 2025 $334.00 $160.30 $200.10 $96.05 $64.25 $902.58 2026 $334.00 $160.30 $208.10 $99.89 $60.41 $963.00 2027 $334.00 $160.30 $216.50 $103.92 $56.38 $1,019.38 2028 $334.00 ? $225.10 ? 2029 $334.00 ? $234.10 ? 2030 $334.00 ? $243.50 ? 2031 $334.00 ? $253.20 ? 2032 $334.00 ? $263.40 ? 2033 $334.00 ? $273.90 ? 2034 $334.00 ? $284.80 ? 2035 $334.00 ? $296.20 ? 2036 $334.00 ? $308.10 ? 2037 $334.00 ? $320.40 ? 2038 $334.00 ? $333.20 ? With 48% of all teams' local revenues being shared, the Dodgers are saving over $60 million per year even now, halfway through this slow walk back to paying full freight. In the first year of Shohei Ohtani's contract, they saved the entire salary ($68 million) they deferred to after the end of Ohtani's deal in revenue-sharing avoidance alone. They were required to put that much into escrow, and they could easily do so, because they had all that extra cash they didn't have to pay into the league's shared pool. If the next CBA changes nothing about the fundamental revenue-sharing structure, the Dodgers will surpass $1 billion in cumulative savings in the first year of the new deal. Another loophole in Major League Baseball’s revenue-sharing system involves local media deals, more generally. Clubs can manipulate revenue figures by acquiring partial ownership of the broadcasters that air their games. While revenue from local TV rights is subject to sharing across the league, profits generated through ownership stakes in the broadcasting networks are not. Instead, they are treated as a subsidiary/investment earning. The most prominent example is the New York Yankees, who own a significant share of the YES Network. The network reportedly generates around $500 million annually, yet only about $200 million is included in the revenue-sharing calculations. Other teams employing similar strategies include: Chicago Cubs – Marquee Sports Network Boston Red Sox – New England Sports Network Chicago White Sox – CHSN Atlanta Braves – Bally Sports South/Southeast Detroit Tigers – Bally Sports Detroit St. Louis Cardinals – Bally Sports Midwest Houston Astros – AT&T SportsNet Southwest Miami Marlins – Bally Sports Florida Ownership stakes vary among these teams. For instance, the Marlins have a much smaller share in Bally Sports Florida, compared to the Cubs’ stake in Marquee. Additionally, the financial instability of Bally Sports and its parent company, Sinclair Group, introduces risk. However, in larger markets, the risks are lower and the financial rewards greater, enabling teams like the Yankees, Cubs, and Red Sox to significantly reduce their revenue-sharing obligations—at least relative to the spirit of the revenue-sharing rules. The core issue with these loopholes isn’t the modest additional income small-market clubs would receive—less than $10 million annually per team, most years—but the missed opportunity to limit the spending power of big-market franchises. This perpetuates a concentration of top-tier talent among the wealthiest teams, increasing monopolization within the league. Addressing these loopholes would be a meaningful step toward greater competitive balance in Major League Baseball. The league could go a long way to addressing competitive balance by implementing changes to address these two methods by which big-market teams reserve large portions of their revenue, which may handicap some in a meaningful way. The impact to the Dodgers of changing their revenue-sharing agreement would be substantial, but it's shrinking every year. The league already adjusted this once and could do so again. On top of this, the shares in local network's to avoid treating them as local revenue earnings is a clear workaround—the type that, were it a tax avoidance scheme, would be closed quickly. It's particularly important the league do so, given that some of the ownership groups mentioned above (the Red Sox and the Cubs, most notably) do not appear to be investing as they are capable of. They're pulling that money out of the game's circulation entirely. This all invites the question: Do small-market teams deserve a greater share of revenues? Problem Number Two - This Isn't A Meritocracy Some small-market teams take being competitive very seriously. The Brewers, Rays, and Guardians all take pride in their on-field product, trying to compete year after year. They have shown themselves to be capable of standing with, and beating, the bigger-payroll teams within their divisions. Over the last five years, the Brewers have four division titles; the Guardians have three; and the Rays have reached the postseason three times, with one division title and a 100-win season to boot. The point of revenue sharing is to maintain a strong, competitive sport. These teams have certainly done that. Others have certainly not. Bob Nutting of the Pirates has invested almost nothing into his team, despite the increased draw of Paul Skenes and a phenomenal rotation behind him that's crying out for some offensive support. The Cincinnati Reds haven't been quite so poor, but they certainly haven't done much around Elly De La Cruz. The Chicago White Sox have been a dumpster fire, while the Rockies have shown minimal interest in doing anything that will actually help them win (though they have spent money; we'll blame this one on ineptitude). Finally, the Minnesota Twins' recent culling is a poor look for the sport and their fan base. Some of these teams tanked in 2025, and will probably do so again in 2026. Some have done it on such a consistent basis that it should be questioned whether they deserve the additional revenue at all. Just as the Cubs should have extra revenues wrested from them if they're not rolling them back into the team, small-market teams with no intention of spending should be denied extra funds. It's hard to argue against the Brewers, Rays and Guardians receiving more funds than the Pirates or Rockies from revenue sharing. They're advancing the sport, performing well within their markets, and playing some unique brands of baseball that allow them to win on the margins. With clear statements of intent, it seems as though these teams should be better rewarded. Teams with winning records could receive larger shares of revenue-sharing funds the following year, while teams who lose more than 100 games or spend less than a certain amount could be barred from receiving their full allotments the next year. Perhaps such a ploy would better incentivize small-market teams to compete with more urgency, addressing the competitive balance issue in MLB. Can you see any of the changes mentioned above coming into MLB in the next CBA? Would either make a difference? Let us know your thoughts in the comments below! View full article

Wouldn't that mean, with the majority of pitchers being right handed, that Bauers would face more as the strong side of a platoon?

An additional item that I've just gotten into digging up. Of all players with 100+ competitive swings in each of 2024 and 2025, Jake Bauers ranked 5th in average bat speed increase, a category led by Brice Turang (IYKYK: pivot tables are fun) Unlike Brice Turang, whose swing lengthened on average by 0.75 ft per swing to gain that extra 4.48mph bat speed, a co-efficient of 0.17 ft per extra mph of bat speed. Jake Bauers' swing length only increased by 0.25 ft, a co-efficient of 0.09 ft in swing length per extra mph of bat speed, suggesting he's leaning less on a longer swing to generate that additional power and is perhaps less likely to incur additional penalties in the swing and miss department

Image courtesy of © Kiyoshi Mio-Imagn Images Jake Bauers's hitting profile has always been a fascinating one. Bat-tracking models love him for how he can do damage on pitches on which he connects. He generates steep, dangerous attack angles and above-average bat speed. He consistently elevated the ball with hard contact to the outfield, but he never made enough of that contact to take advantage of that swing, especially inside the strike zone. In 2025, he came in with a different approach, sacrificing some of those pulled fly balls for a little more contact inside the strike zone. He succeeded, as you can see above, lowering his swing-and-miss substantially against all pitches inside the zone. Even better, these continued to improve as the season went on, finishing September with just a 14% whiff rate against fastball variations and a 16.7% whiff rate against offspeed pitches, either in or out of the strike zone. His zone contact in September against all pitches was 91.2%, and it was 85% in October, against some of the best pitching the game has to offer. Bauers did see a reduction in his pulled balls, taking a more all-fields approach while also coming up with a few more ground balls. The exchange worked, but how did he do it? Well, first of all, he changed his stance in 2025, becoming more closed and slightly closing the gap between his feet. That being said, his actual stance at the point of contact was consistent year to year, as you can see below (2024 vs 2025): The key change is the way in which he gets there. Bauers no longer requires as much effort in his setup. He's coiling his hips a little bit less into his backside, creating a simpler motion forward within which it's easier to maintain balance and seems to be easier for him to time up the pitch. On top of that, he's unlocked serious bat speed: Above are Jake Bauers in 2024 compared to 2025. He found ideal attack angles on the baseball 50% of the time in 2025 (and 77% of the time in September), while seeing his average bat speed jump from 73.8 mph to 76.5 mph—a monumental difference. He's swinging harder, making more contact on both fastballs and off-speed pitches, and making the most of that contact by "squaring it up" more consistently. Some might question how important that bat speed is. Justin Sartori put it through a model at Driveline and came to this conclusion in regard to Junior Caminero: If you need further evidence, a crude Baseball Savant overview may help win you over. You can see how Bauers's exit velocities, expected slugging and expected weighted on-base average (xwOBA) are considerably higher. The strikeout and whiff rates still don't look pretty, but both are considerably improved, and would look even more promising if you isolated the form he showed in September/October (18.6% strikeout rate in September, 21.4% in October). Bauers also swung less this season, which is part of how he achieved better results when he did swing. A more selective and intelligent approach boosted his walk rate to elite territory, and locking in on specific locations let him use a flatter swing and achieve that increased bat speed. An improved approach unlocked some of his improved physical indices, which only buttresses the argument that he can sustain the production he managed in 2025. The upside with Bauers is why the Brewers traded for him in 2023, and why (after initially cutting him) they brought him back last winter. It might finally be here. He's produced in small samples before, and it's not clear whether he could carry over what he did in 2025 if burdened with a larger role and a tougher overall array of matchups, but the underlying signs suggest that Bauers is going to be a real handful next season. His quality of contact has usually been electric. If he's making more of that contact and drawing more walks, to boot, you have an incredibly potent bat in the Brewers lineup on a part-time basis. It would seem, at least, as though the Crew has an easier call to retain Bauers this fall than they had last year. View full article

What if they only offered Ohtani without the deferred money being paid?

Jeferson Quero with another bomb to his total, a rocket to dead center He's now hitting .313 with a 1.139 OPS in the Venezuelan winter league

Dylan O'Rae has hit two balls over 100 mph so far, one a 104.2 mph single and the other a 102.7 mph double

So is this four years, $70m plus another basically $10m buyout and some extensions to payments deadlines? An interesting addition to this, which Ryan Topp of the MKE tailgate podcast alerted me too, is that deferred sums have to be put in escrow, reducing the boost given by later timed payouts (one reason why mutual options are popular in that they don't fall into this bracket, and the franchise can make a return elsewhere via investments in markets or other players). Basically deferred payments aren't as advantageous as we think from a cash flow perspective

Image courtesy of © Mark Hoffman/Milwaukee Journal Sentinel / USA TODAY NETWORK via Imagn Images Brandon Woodruff encapsulates the Milwaukee Brewers in many ways. He's shown the adaptability, fierce competitiveness and aggressiveness that typify this franchise. He adds as much off the field as he does on it. However, questions remain about his on-field production. Can he remain healthy over a full season, for the first time since 2022? Can he regain his former fastball velocity? Most importantly, what will his market value look like? Can Brandon Woodruff stay healthy? The first question is the most difficult to answer, and perhaps the hardest about which to be optimistic. Pitchers can pick up long-term injuries at any time, a matter Woodruff has become well-acquainted with after untimely injuries both in 2023 and in 2025—each time, within days of what would have been a playoff start, and with a free-agent payday in sight. He hasn't been injury-prone his whole career. Woodruff was one of the team's trusted starting pitching trio from 2019 through 2022, before beginning to falter in 2023. That season, he dealt with a strained lat, ankle tendinitis and (finally) the shoulder capsule injury that held him out for almost 20 months. Upon returning to the mound in July, Woodruff looked healthy, but he wore down as the season neared its conclusion, eventually succumbing to another lat strain that he referred to as a "ticking time bomb" following his shoulder rehab. The question, now, is with how much of a role he can be trusted heading into 2026. Though it came as a reliever, Aaron Ashby's workload this season gives some hope that Woodruff's shoulder can hold up next season, but you never quite know when these things will rear their ugly heads again. Woodruff will be 33 by the start of spring training, which makes questions of durability harder to shake and figures to limit him to relatively short-term offers this winter. Whether it be a recurrence of the same trouble he's had for the last two years or something wholly new, something is likely to stop Woodruff from making 32 starts in 2026. Workload management will be needed. Can Brandon Woodruff pitch like a top-of-the-rotation arm once more? Woodruff showed immense development in the depth of his arsenal in 2025, with pinpoint command allowing him to mow down hitters despite a substantial drop in velocity across the board. Woodruff is optimistic about that velocity returning in the future, and the case of Aaron Ashby after a similar surgery is proof that there is a chance. The first chart is from Aaron Ashby's first four months at Triple A in 2024, as a starter; the second is from his outings in long relief throughout 2025. Ashby's velocity is up almost four miles per hour on his primary fastball. Ditto for his slider, curveball and changeup. His spin rates have also significantly increased. With a clean offseason, there's a chance Woodruff may rediscover his raw stuff from 2023. Even if not, perhaps with an even more well-rounded arsenal, he can end up becoming a more complete pitcher. He may find more wiggle room to mitigate mistakes, after a career-high home run rate in 2025. The difference isn't as extreme for Woodruff as it was for Ashby. There are several ticks missing from his fastball, and the lower spin rates across the board are notable, too. What Will Brandon Woodruff Command On The Open Market? Woodruff will almost certainly decline his side of the $20-million mutual option on his contract for 2026. Due to the $10-million buyout, it would effectively mean that Woodruff is returning for only $10 million on a one-year deal, which is significantly below market value for a pitcher who's showcased his ability to dominate with his best stuff and compete with diminished velocity. Woodruff is also likely to seek future security with a multi-year deal, given his history and age. This fall's season-ending injury deprived Woodruff of a platform in the playoffs to really gain some momentum entering free agency. The Brewers could stack things in their favor by extending a qualifying offer, which Woodruff could accept to lock up a small raise but which would not commit Milwaukee beyond 2026. That way, if he signed elsewhere, the Crew would get a draft pick to compensate them. With Woodruff's upside, there's no such thing as a bad one year deal. If he declines, that would mean any potential suitor would be penalized, depending on a few factors: If a team exceeded the luxury tax threshold in 2025 (as have the Dodgers, Yankees and others), they would lose $1 million in international bonus pool money and their second- and fifth-round picks for the 2026 MLB Draft A team that receives revenue sharing (like the Rays) would lose its third-round pick A team meeting neither of these qualifications will lose their second-round pick and $500,000 in international bonus pool money If the Brewers believe Woodruff is searching for a longer-term deal in the $50 million range across three years, this could be an intelligent gamble with limited downside. The penalties are harsh enough to give some teams pause, so attaching hte QO would deflate Woodruff's market. Jack Flaherty, of the Tigers, could end up being a relevant comp to Woodruff at this stage of the veteran's career. Though they're different pitchers who have traced different arcs, they end up being fair facsimiles of one another as free-agent cases. Flaherty signed a two-year deal with Detroit last winter that guaranteed him $35 million, with the chance to see that rise to $45 million if he stayed healthy in 2025—as he then did. Now, Flaherty can opt for free agency or stick around to finish off that deal in 2026. Woddruff could sign a similarly flexible and incentive-laden deal with the Crew. One other factor in this. There has been a lot of chatter about how the Brewers would be loathe to let him go, and they worked incredibly hard to retain him during his last free agency period. in actual fact, Woodruff commented that the Brewers hadn't been in touch, and he'd been about to sign with another organization (the Red Sox, or perhaps the Cubs) when they finally reached out with a superior offer. There's a clear affinity between team and player, but no sense of inevitability in their staying together. There's a very real chance that Woodruff will return to the Brewers this offseason. It almost definitely will not be by accepting his side of the option, though. The most likely outcome is that Woodruff wants a long-term deal, and a guaranteed sum of money that truly sets him and his family up for life. Three years and $50 million may be the mark to pass. Would you make that offer, as the Brewers front office? Or do you think he'll get more elsewhere? Let us know your thoughts in the comments below! View full article

If he agrees. Remember Harold, it's a mutual option and the expectation is that Woodruff would get more than a $10m deal for one year. With his injury past, he's likely wanting his next contract to guarantee that lifetime security, and probably for multiple years. There's a possibility more velocity returns in the off season as well, but health is a question mark. Still , his performance in 2025 was far above expectation and I think he'll get a multi year deal somewhere

Image courtesy of © Mike De Sisti / Milwaukee Journal Sentinel / USA TODAY NETWORK via Imagn Images The Brewers had one of their lowest payrolls of the 2020s this season. Their year-end 40-man roster payroll was around $115 million, according to Cot's Contracts. That was the lowest mark since 2021, when they spent $105 million, and their ranking (23rd in the league) was lower than it's been since 2017. They had a high number of pre-arbitration salaries, combined with deferred salaries and likely-to-be-declined mutual options that have been pushed onto 2026, as the team always tries to maximize their liquidity and the utility of their money within the revenue cycle of the sport. Here's an early roster projection, based on last year's salaries and MLB Trade Rumors arbitration estimates: Player 2025 Base Salary ($m) 2026 Base Salary ($m) Catcher William Contreras 6.00 11.00 Jeferson Quero 0.00 0.82 Infielders Andrew Vaughn 5.85 7.85 Jake Bauers 1.40 2.00 Brice Turang 0.78 4.40 Caleb Durbin 0.76 0.82 Joey Ortiz 0.78 0.82 Andruw Monasterio 0.76 0.82 Outfielders Garrett Mitchell 0.76 1.00 Blake Perkins 0.80 0.82 Sal Frelick 0.76 0.82 Jackson Chourio 4.25 7.25 Christian Yelich 22.00 22.00 Starting Pitchers Freddy Peralta 8.10 8.00 Jacob Misiorowski 0.76 0.76 Chad Patrick 0.76 0.76 Quinn Priester 0.76 0.76 Logan Henderson 0.76 0.76 Relief Pitchers Trevor Megill 1.94 4.20 Abner Uribe 0.76 0.82 Jared Koenig 0.78 0.82 DL Hall 0.77 0.82 Aaron Ashby 3.45 5.50 Grant Anderson 0.80 0.82 Tobias Myers 0.76 0.82 Nick Mears 0.96 1.60 Total Active Payroll 86.86 Deferred/Option Declined Contracts Brandon Woodruff (Buyout on mutual option) 10.00 Danny Jansen (Buyout on mutual option) Rhys Hoskins (Buyout on mutual option) 0.50 4.00 Ryan Braun 1.80 Jose Quintana (Buyout on mutual option) 2.00 Lorenzo Cain 1.00 William Contreras (Buyout on club option, sending him to arbitration) 0.10 Total Declined Options/Deferred 19.40 Total Cash Payroll 2026 106.26 The team is always spinning plates and kicking cans down the road, but there are a few more plates in motion and a bit more litter on the path than usual this offseason. The deferred salary still being paid to long-retired stars Ryan Braun and Lorenzo Cain is no big deal. Most teams have such line items; the payments are just bills coming due for things that saved the club money in the past; and Christian Yelich's $4-million deferral (which will be paid out in 2037 and 2038) offsets that money anyway. (That deferral is why, though his official salary is $26 million, Yelich is only listed at $22 million above.) The buyouts the team owes to Brandon Woodruff, Rhys Hoskins and Jose Quintana, however, add up to real money. They won't really think of those as part of next year's budget, and the money they made in reaching the NLCS this fall will cushion the pain of paying those buyouts this winter, but they're still there. How Much Revenue Do the Brewers Have to Spend? In the wake of the postseason exit, a lot of graphics went around about the percentage of total revenue teams spend on payroll, but this isn't exactly a fair fight. For one thing, player payroll is only the most visible (and, admittedly, the most expensive) of several ways to invest in the team. It doesn't include money spent on coaching staffs, analytics departments, facilities, the farm system, or other ancillary supports. For another, some teams' costs are more elastic than others'. Ditto for revenue. The Brewers' revenue depends much more heavily on their on-field success, for instance, than does the Dodgers'. Still, there's a trend to observe. Generally, teams spend something like $160 million less on their roster than they took in the previous year. (Note: Forbes's revenue estimates, while better than nothing, are likely far from perfect. Spotrac, used by the creator of this content to estimate payroll, is not especially good at capturing the dynamics of payroll in baseball, so consider that estimate of spending even rougher than Forbes's shot at revenues. Again, though, it's better than nothing.) There are some exceptions, but for instance, the Dodgers had $203 million left after their on-field payroll, compared to the Brewers' $198 million. It could be worse, if you're someone who worries that Mark Attanasio isn't spending freely enough; the Chicago Cubs have $371 million remaining. In short, what I'm saying here is that if we can estimate the Brewers' total revenue for 2025 and deduct around $200 million, we could have an upper limit for their 2026 payroll. How Much Revenue Did the Brewers Make In 2025? First of all, the Brewers' total attendance in 2025 was higher than they managed in 2024. With 2.65 million fans crossing the turnstiles (up around 112,000, or something like 1,400 per game), they'll have created additional revenue from ticket sales, concessions and merchandise. The merchandise is more variable, but if we prudently estimate the gross revenue as somewhere around $12 per person for concessions and the average cost of a ticket in 2024 being $57 (per Gametime; another imperfect source that beats wild shooting in the dark), the Brewers have added an additional $7-8 million in revenue. On top of that is the playoff success @Matthew Trueblood covered on Sunday. Reaching the NLCS has serious financial implications for the Brewers, adding around $15 million by Matt's estimate. All things considered, a conservative estimate might be that the team made $22 million more this season than last. They may want to retain some of this as insurance against a potential lockout in 2027, when the CBA is re-negotiated, but they do have more to spend than they've had even very recently. The Brewers have also been one of the heaviest spenders in revamping their minor-league structure, an effort that has been undertaken heavily in recent years—and will continue in 2026 with the relocation of the Carolina Mudcats to form the Wilson Warbirds with brand-new, state-of-the-art facilities. The Brewers partially own that affiliate, so they do factor some of the costs associated with their move into their own finances. Prior success is no guarantee of future profits. The Brewers cannot afford to say that, because they made an additional $20-25 million in 2025 and have lots of money to spend relative to what they invested this season, they can splurge on a 10-year, $300-million contract. Nor would they be likely to do so, anyway. This is a team with major reinforcements on the way in positions of need throughout their minor-league system, from Cooper Pratt and Jesus Made at shortstop to Blake Burke, Brock Wilken and Luke Adams as infielders with some thump. It does, however, give the front office some breathing room, should they choose a two- or three-year deal with a manageable average annual value, similar to the Hoskins and Woodruff ones. They may have even more than that to spend. There should be some room for a steady veteran upgrade this offseason, perhaps someone like Ha-Seong Kim. Perhaps they'll decide to go large, if they can get a short-term, high-AAV deal for someone like Trevor Story or Alex Bregman. Will the Brewers make those moves? Or will they, as in 2021, be cautious with their spending, as TV uncertainty and the CBA negotiations loom large? They certainly have additional funds and some budget space, if they choose to be aggressive. View full article

Ask and ye shall receive Very interesting shapes here, that arm angle usually creates more horizontal break on a fastball, this is essentially a 95 mph cutter with 15" IVB, and that curveballs looks tasty Maybe needs to be in zone a bit more with both as he goes up the levels, but he's got some stuff

Image courtesy of © Benny Sieu-Imagn Images The Freddy Peralta trade rumors came quickly, but not unexpectedly. Entering the final year of his contract with the Brewers, Peralta has a club option for $8 million. That will surely get picked up. A very team-friendly deal, this makes Peralta an attractive option to retain for the financially challenged Crew, but it also lures other teams towards him—especially those also operating in smaller markets and who have strong farm systems. Peralta is just short of being a true ace, with a tendency to get bogged down in his efforts to put away hitters and (too often, sometimes) to walk them in the process. However, his raw stuff and his intelligent approach are good enough to keep him consistently better than average. Perhaps his most valuable trait is his ability to post day in and day out, making 30 starts or more in each of the last three seasons while continuing to round out his arsenal. We know Peralta is also valuable to this Brewers team as a clubhouse leader, and has been a rock around which they built their rotation and their team culture over the last two seasons. That being said, purely because of the environment in which they operate, the Brewers organization cannot afford not to at least listen to offers. The Valuations The first consideration is what an organization is willing to give up for a starting pitcher with one year of control remaining. From the Brewers' perspective, the bar to clear is the one-year on-field value of Peralta's pitching, plus that of a pick just after the first round in 2027—because, should the team keep him. they'll certainly extend him a qualifying offer and receive such a pick if and when he signs elsewhere after next year. Secondly (if you'll allow some math nerdiness), the $8-million contract value is a huge boon to whoever is receiving Peralta—whether it be a team lingering around the competitive-balance tax threshold, or those with tighter budgets. Peralta's performance in 2025 would be closer to a value of $30 million, meaning there's around $22 million of excess value the Brewers would be looking for in return, plus the compensation pick. Looking at the Corbin Burnes trade (who commanded more, as a Cy Young winner, but who was also due considerably more money in his final year of arbitration eligibility than Peralta will make next year), we have some basis for comparison. In that deal, the Brewers received two fringe top-100 prospects in Joey Ortiz and DL Hall, plus a competitive-balance pick that allowed the Brewers to select Blake Burke in the 2024 MLB Draft. One of the biggest considerations for pitchers is that they're always at risk of a long-term, season-ending injury. Burnes's elbow went out this year, as did Gerrit Cole's. Both pitchers had workloads in excess of 500 innings throughout the three prior seasons, as has Peralta from 2023-2025. Here are the pitchers from 2022 through 2024 to breach that 500-inning mark, with a fastball velocity over 94 mph. Of them, only Kevin Gausman, Framber Valdez, Luis Castillo and Mitch Keller pitched over 170 innings in 2025. That's not to say Peralta will get injured, but we saw Burnes get injured in Year One of his long-term deal with Arizona. In this day and age, nearly every pitcher has a long-term injury at some point, and it's a ticking time bomb. The value for one year of Peralta is likely somewhere in the range of two top-100-ranked prospects (per the Brewers model; they were higher on both Hall and Ortiz than the consensus public rankings) and no competitive-balance selection. Alternatively, they could look for three players, with one fringe top-100 player and two higher-upside, lower-ranked players. It certainly won't be the type of package that's franchise-altering, despite the likelihood that Peralta gets a meaningful number of Cy Young votes this year. Are the Brewers Higher on Peralta Than Most Teams? Peralta's value in the Brewers clubhouse in mentoring young pitchers—and especially his impact on Latin American players—is no small thing, either. In that sense, perhaps the Brewers will see Peralta as more important than Burnes, who had public beef with the Brewers in the wake of his arbitration proceedings. It's an intangible benefit the Brewers hold dear as a reason for their success over the last eight years, and with a young core coming through and some questions around their depth entering 2026 (certainly the kind of depth that is ready and capable of making 30 starts in a season), Peralta holds a lot of additional value that the Brewers organization will prize more dearly than their counterparts, and that may require an offer far beyond somple, rational valuation. Peralta also showed tangible improvements on the field in 2025. Yes, he did outperform his peripheral numbers, which were more in line with the higher ERAs produced in 2023 and 2024, but he managed to lower his "air pull" rate, which is one of the biggest indicators in home runs conceded. In tandem with that, the increased usage of his changeup added significantly to his profile, both in neutralizing opposite-handed hitters and even allowing him to tunnel in under the hands of right-handers. Peralta is the Brewers' best starter, but he hasn't yet demonstrated the combination of dominance and consistency to rate as one of the league's elite starters. His 2025 was a step in the right direction, but whether teams think they can unlock that final step will play a big role in any negotiations. If He's So Valuable, Why Would The Brewers Trade Him? The important note here is that the Brewers aren't definitively trading him. All we have so far is a speculative report from an out-of-town national writer, saying they're expected to listen to offers. Mark Attanasio has said previously that, due to the Brewers' market potential, they can never afford to ignore a call. Hyperbole though this is, it makes sense. If the Tigers were willing to offer Tarik Skubal for Freddy Peralta, you would have to jump at the deal. That won't happen, but it illustrates the broader point. The Brewers may be seeing some prospects with that type of upside who can help not just in 2026, but in the long term. If a team is willing to overpay, the Brewers won't push them away. (See the Athletics' overpay in their determination to acquire *checks notes* Esteury Ruiz.) With one year remaining on his deal, there is a possibility that Peralta gets moved. It's the nature of the business, with no room for compassion—at least in Milwaukee. The Brewers won't be actively shopping him. They'll want a team to get desperate and overpay for the lone stalwart in their rotation, and if nothing comes through, they'll be very happy proceeding into 2026 with Peralta on board. View full article

Image courtesy of © Kirby Lee-Imagn Images There were considerable questions on whether Jacob Misiorowski would even make the Brewers' NLDS roster after some dramatically poor outings since the All-Star break. In the second half, he had a 5.36 earned run average (ERA) while hitters were getting on base at a .354 clip. Given that this is far and away the most Misiorowski has pitched in a season, both by innings and pitch count, it seemed unlikely that he would be a difference maker in October. And yet... Without the young fireballer, it's fair to say the Brewers may not have survived the NLDS matchup against the Cubs, playing key roles as a bulk pitcher in games two and five. Game two featured some of his liveliest stuff, hitting 104 mph repeatedly on his fastball, and using that raw stuff to navigate some of the wildness that had typified his profile. His two outings, however, were anything but wild, combining pitchability, a varied arsenal, and still regularly hitting over 100 (if not quite the 104 mark). Misiorowski has leaned heavily on his slider and curveball to startling effect. I wrote earlier in September how Misiorowski's slider is the weakest of his four pitches and has proved the most hittable in his arsenal. He would consistently catch too much of the strike zone with it, and, despite being a poor swing and miss offering, he was using it heavily in two-strike counts to finish hitters off. It just wasn't working. Combining that with his issues under pressure with men on base, it all seemed like, despite the raw talent, Misiorowski had a lot of learning to undergo before he could be considered a top-of-the-line starter. Fast forward to his last two October appearances, and Misiorowski has thrown more sliders than ever. I'm ready to eat humble pie, but there is one big difference: The slider/cutter is the pitch he feels most comfortable locating in the strike zone; he has better control of it than his other offerings. It's a pitch ideally suited to getting ahead, and if hitters make contact, they'll still struggle to square it up and can produce some cheap, quick outs early in the count. That, at least, was the profile in the regular season, but one thing has changed: he's now using it against left-handed hitters. Previously, his usage chart looked something like the chart below for left-handers (from the article in September). Not the incredibly heavy four-seam usage on the first pitch and when the batter got ahead of left-handed hitters, in dramatic contrast to those two situations above. He's destroyed the predictability of how left-handed hitters faced him, and they've really struggled as a result. Left-handers slugged over .500 against fastballs and cutters against Misiorowski across August and September (.462 in August, .571 in September). That number is at .067 in October with just a single base hit given up to a left-hander this postseason. He's finding the zone consistently with his slider/cutter, and one very interesting thing pops out from a stuff perspective, too: Looking at the above chart comparing Misiorowski in August/September vs October, and you'll see his slider grades out impressively higher from a stuff perspective. The characteristics haven't changed a whole lot, with more spin and perhaps a slightly lower arm slot (often associated with some fatigue, and completely normal). However, the fastball being up a couple of ticks has a big effect, and that velocity separation being greater means that hitters can't sing at the fastball and hope that, if they're wrong, they can still catch the slider out in front. Instead, those swings are turning into whiffs, and the pitch has been almost impossible to square up this October. I'll hold my hands up: I was wrong about the slider and its usage in September. That being said, a couple of things stand out as to the sustainability of this. The first is that Misiorowski has had a bump in velocity from the postseason adrenaline, and it remains to be seen whether he will consistently sit 100-101 throughout a full season. Secondly, he was helped somewhat by the shadows at Dodger Stadium, which made picking up any form of spin nigh on impossible. It was a perfect situation for him, but even so, he answered every question posed until fatigue began to kick in. There are more answers to come in 2026 for the phenom. That being said, his calmness, poise, and competitive instincts have shown huge strides, and the way he's bounced back from adversity was perhaps his biggest sticking point this season. That has now been put to bed. View full article

Image courtesy of © Michael McLoone-Imagn Images With a 2-0 series lead heading to Wrigley Field, there was a real hope that the Brewers could put the Cubs to bed in ruthless fashion. That hasn't happened, with the Cubs slugging the Brewers to death in Game 4 while the Milwaukee team couldn't get the big hits to drop. In some ways, this portion of the series encapsulated what many thought could be the difference between the sides. The Chicago Cubs have hit eight home runs in four games. They've struck out a lot, but they've slugged, and that's been the difference in Chicago. They've had Nico Hoerner playing like an MVP, hitting .471 in the series so far with almost a 50% line drive rate. In all likelihood, this final game is a crapshoot, knowing that any team in baseball can win any game on any given day. The Cubs have momentum, but momentum isn't statistically a big thing in baseball. That being said, the Brewers are going to have a few advantages going into Saturday's elimination game. First of those is the way the game is likely to begin, with a bullpen game for the Brewers against Shota Imanaga (or perhaps Colin Rea) for the Cubs. The Cubs are going to want some length from someone to cover at least three innings, before turning the ball over to their five main men: Caleb Thielbar, Andrew Kittredge, Drew Pomeranz, Daniel Palencia and Brad Keller. They'll want to avoid Ben Brown or Aaron Civale in a game such as this. That gives the Brewers (probably) one time through the order against the home run-prone Imanaga. To finish the regular season, Imanaga averaged over two home runs per nine innings, while also struggling to generate the strikeouts that have been so prominent for him through his first season and a half with the Cubs. In Game 2, the Brewers had a definitive attack plan for Imanaga (discussed thoroughly by Matthew Trueblood here), and they didn't miss on the pitches they wanted. The key question is whether they stick or twist—stay the course, or alter their approach against the Cubs' number-two starter, who is likely to adjust accordingly. He's also unlikely to see the Brewers a second time through, with a quicker pull should he find trouble. Then we come to the bullpen, where the Brewers have managed to use a wider variety of arms than the Cubs; that brings some distinct advantages: We noted this penalty last season, in particular, when teams saw Emmanuel Clase for a third time in a series, as well as Devin Williams facing the same part of the order two days running against the Mets. (Sigh.) Relievers were often dominant early in a series, before regressing later as teams saw them multiple times in a short span. So far in the division series, the Brewers have faced the Cubs' 'A' bullpen multiple times, and without a lot of fortune with their contact quality: Games Innings SIERA Earned Runs Drew Pomeranz 3 3 0.23 0 Daniel Palencia 3 3.1 5.13 3 Caleb Thielbar 2 1.2 3.09 0 Brad Keller 2 2.1 6.21 0 Andrew Kittredge 1 1 3.29 1 Of these, only Pomeranz has been truly dominan. Both Palencia and Keller have been fortunate not to give up more than they have, while Kittredge and Thielbar have been good but not exceptional. Still, only two home runs have created any sort of offense against the Cubs bullpen, making it imperative the Brewers either find a way to take advantage of their burgeoning familiarity or jump on Imanaga to begin the game. For your reference, here are the key Brewers batters and the number of times they've already faced each of Chicago's Big Five during this set. Pitcher/Batter Yelich Chourio Turang Contreras Vaughn Frelick Durbin Perkins Bauers Ortiz Collins Keller XX X X X X X X Palencia XX X XX XX XX XXX X X Pomeranz XX X XX X X X X Thielbar XX X X X X Kittredge X X X X X Finally, 'TBD' may be the Brewers' best starter in this postseason. It's highly likely they go with a bullpen game, with either a lefty to counteract some of the threat from Michael Busch to start the game or even an arm like Chad Patrick, whose new slurve has been causing fits. He has a 1.14 FIP in his three appearances so far, and yes, the times seen in a series penalty could apply to him as well here, but he's one of the relievers who has really risen to the challenge of postseason baseball. Regardless, it's more likely they open with Aaron Ashby once more. The beauty of this for the Brewers is that they have enough length available (between Quinn Priester and Jacob Misiorowski) that they can afford quick pulls where and when they need them. If Ashby has one out and two on in the first while struggling to command his breaking ball again, you can pull him. If Misiorowski can't find the zone, pull him. They can mix and match depending on the situation, with no regard for any future following Saturday's game. That suits the all-around strength of the Brewers. Their bullpen has thrown 22 innings of 1.23 ERA ball so far in this Division Series. It's win-or-go-home time. The Milwaukee Brewers have the advantage of home field, their home crowd, and the relentless approach that's served them so well this season. They can plan for what's to come intensely, know who will pitch (and probably when) for the Chicago Cubs, who have been far more predictable than the Brewers thus far. That being said, this is a shootout in which an umpire's call, some BABIP fortune or a timely home run can make all the difference. This is what baseball is all about—those moments where everything is on the line, emotions high for all involved. Can the Brewers finally have their moment? Do you think they even have the advantage coming back to Uecker Field? Let us know your thoughts in the comments below! View full article

Beating the Cubbies in three games doesn't hurt enough. Give them a taste, then blow em away