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Unlike some of his teammates, Jakob Junis uses his sinker away to right-handed batters instead of busting them inside. The glove-side sinker remained a point of emphasis in his outing on Sunday. Image courtesy of © Mark J. Rebilas-USA TODAY Sports The Brewers hope that what they saw from Jakob Junis on Sunday was a preview of what they can expect in the regular season. Junis worked four hitless innings against the Colorado Rockies. The pitch mix he used to get there mirrored the game plan he deployed as a San Francisco Giant last year. Sliders and sinkers accounted for 50 of Junis’ 56 pitches. The former did much of the heavy lifting, as he turned to it 57% of the time. That’s not far removed from his 62% slider usage rate from last season. In an age when pitchers are throwing hard breaking balls at increasingly higher rates, Junis remains an outlier by using his sweeping slider as his primary offering. It’s an approach that makes sense for him; the slider grades out as his best pitch by far, and using it more helps compensate for a sinker that was blasted last season for -9 runs relative to average, according to Statcast. However, Junis still sees a role for the sinker in his arsenal. His vision for that role is another feature that sets him apart from other pitchers. Many sinkerballers will attempt to bust same-handed hitters inside with the pitch. The goal is to jam the hitter and produce weak contact. Bryse Wilson and Joel Payamps are hurlers who used this strategy to an extreme in 2023. Junis, meanwhile, focuses more on the opposite side of the plate. Last year, the majority of sinkers he threw to righties were of the back-door variety on the outside corner. Junis continued his intentional emphasis on the glove-side sinker on Sunday. One of his goals for 2024 is improved execution of the pitch. “Anybody that throws sinkers, it’s a lot easier to get it to run arm-side. I think it’s much harder to pick your lane glove-side down and away and stick it and get the ball to come back and stay there without leaking over the plate.” Junis’ sinker was hit hard when it leaked over the plate. Opponents feasted on sinkers across the strike zone, but he did find (fleeting) success when tucking it into the outside corner of the plate. Pitches don’t exist in a vacuum, though. Part of the cat-and-mouse game between pitcher and hitter is creating deception and keeping hitters from sitting on pitch types and locations. “It just opens up everything for me,” Junis said of the glove-side sinker, which he believes fulfills those aforementioned purposes in a couple of ways. First, it means hitters have to think about hard stuff on both sides of the plate rather than waiting him out until they get an arm-side sinker. “I can choose to go in [to righties]. I’m not forced to go in because that’s the only place I can throw it.” Second, it plays well off his slider, which Junis typically locates further away from his glove side. “I think it’s harder for them to guess what’s coming,” he said, keeping hitters off balance with the pairing. “You’re making X’s. One’s going this way; one’s going that way. As much as I can move the ball, the better.” Barring improvements to the shape of the pitch, Junis’ sinker is unlikely to be a valuable pitch on its own. However, if it’s a roughly average pitch in isolation that makes his slider better, that bodes well for his production on the mound. The Brewers will hope that’s the case in 2024. In 2022, the sinker graded out at a palatable -1 run value. The expected opponent wOBA on the pitch last year (.364) was much closer to that of 2022 (.348) than the actual .493 mark opponents posted against it. That implies Junis’ sinker was closer to average than awful based on the kind of swings and contact it induced. Pat Murphy remained coy about Junis's specific role, instead focusing on his value as a stretched-out arm who can start or cover the middle innings. Regardless of when Junis delivers bulk outs in games, those outs will be a key piece in Murphy’s puzzle of filling innings this year. For Junis, the glove-side sinker will be part of that process. View full article
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Jakob Junis Aims for Unpredictability by Emphasizing Glove-Side Sinkers
Jack Stern posted an article in Brewers
The Brewers hope that what they saw from Jakob Junis on Sunday was a preview of what they can expect in the regular season. Junis worked four hitless innings against the Colorado Rockies. The pitch mix he used to get there mirrored the game plan he deployed as a San Francisco Giant last year. Sliders and sinkers accounted for 50 of Junis’ 56 pitches. The former did much of the heavy lifting, as he turned to it 57% of the time. That’s not far removed from his 62% slider usage rate from last season. In an age when pitchers are throwing hard breaking balls at increasingly higher rates, Junis remains an outlier by using his sweeping slider as his primary offering. It’s an approach that makes sense for him; the slider grades out as his best pitch by far, and using it more helps compensate for a sinker that was blasted last season for -9 runs relative to average, according to Statcast. However, Junis still sees a role for the sinker in his arsenal. His vision for that role is another feature that sets him apart from other pitchers. Many sinkerballers will attempt to bust same-handed hitters inside with the pitch. The goal is to jam the hitter and produce weak contact. Bryse Wilson and Joel Payamps are hurlers who used this strategy to an extreme in 2023. Junis, meanwhile, focuses more on the opposite side of the plate. Last year, the majority of sinkers he threw to righties were of the back-door variety on the outside corner. Junis continued his intentional emphasis on the glove-side sinker on Sunday. One of his goals for 2024 is improved execution of the pitch. “Anybody that throws sinkers, it’s a lot easier to get it to run arm-side. I think it’s much harder to pick your lane glove-side down and away and stick it and get the ball to come back and stay there without leaking over the plate.” Junis’ sinker was hit hard when it leaked over the plate. Opponents feasted on sinkers across the strike zone, but he did find (fleeting) success when tucking it into the outside corner of the plate. Pitches don’t exist in a vacuum, though. Part of the cat-and-mouse game between pitcher and hitter is creating deception and keeping hitters from sitting on pitch types and locations. “It just opens up everything for me,” Junis said of the glove-side sinker, which he believes fulfills those aforementioned purposes in a couple of ways. First, it means hitters have to think about hard stuff on both sides of the plate rather than waiting him out until they get an arm-side sinker. “I can choose to go in [to righties]. I’m not forced to go in because that’s the only place I can throw it.” Second, it plays well off his slider, which Junis typically locates further away from his glove side. “I think it’s harder for them to guess what’s coming,” he said, keeping hitters off balance with the pairing. “You’re making X’s. One’s going this way; one’s going that way. As much as I can move the ball, the better.” Barring improvements to the shape of the pitch, Junis’ sinker is unlikely to be a valuable pitch on its own. However, if it’s a roughly average pitch in isolation that makes his slider better, that bodes well for his production on the mound. The Brewers will hope that’s the case in 2024. In 2022, the sinker graded out at a palatable -1 run value. The expected opponent wOBA on the pitch last year (.364) was much closer to that of 2022 (.348) than the actual .493 mark opponents posted against it. That implies Junis’ sinker was closer to average than awful based on the kind of swings and contact it induced. Pat Murphy remained coy about Junis's specific role, instead focusing on his value as a stretched-out arm who can start or cover the middle innings. Regardless of when Junis delivers bulk outs in games, those outs will be a key piece in Murphy’s puzzle of filling innings this year. For Junis, the glove-side sinker will be part of that process. -
Why Sal Frelick's Infield Experiment Could End in the Regular Season
Jack Stern posted an article in Brewers
Since the Brewers revealed at the beginning of spring training that Sal Frelick would receive reps as an infielder in exhibition play, there’s been more and more evidence suggesting the club wants him to be a legitimate option at third base--rather than an in-case-of-emergency choice. Frelick has appeared in five games at third base this spring, and made his third Cactus League start at the hot corner on Wednesday. Our own Matthew Trueblood reported last week that Frelick is working diligently at third base, with the apparent goal of being a trustworthy option, not someone who can stand there in a pinch. He wouldn’t get this many reps there unless the club was at least somewhat serious about the move. The preferred plan for the position player mix seems to involve Frelick playing a decent amount of third base. Whether it comes to fruition in the regular season is a different matter. Things rarely unfold throughout a 162-game season the way players, coaches, and executives draw them up beforehand. The Brewers have been one of the best teams in the National League over the last decade, largely because they plan for this. By building deep and versatile rosters, the club has kept chugging along when circumstances force them to deviate from the original vision. The emphasis on versatility is partially why the Brewers are grooming Frelick as a part-time third baseman. However, things playing out differently from the preferred plan is more likely to keep Frelick out of the infield than force him onto the dirt. In a perfect world, the Brewers receive strong production throughout their crowded collection of outfielders, leaving Pat Murphy with more reliable players than available playing time. Shifting Frelick to the infield would alleviate that logjam and give the Brewers their best offensive lineup. However, it’s far more likely that the club receives capable offense from half its outfielders than from all of them. The outfield is deep but filled with offensive question marks. As I discussed earlier this week, Garrett Mitchell’s swing has holes that leave him vulnerable to elevated velocity. Joey Wiemer made substantial improvements to his setup and swing over the winter, but must prove he can wait back on breaking pitches. Jackson Chourio figures to start in center field on Opening Day, but has 24 regular-season plate appearances above Double-A. Frelick’s lack of home run power gives him a lower ceiling than his teammates, but he has a higher floor. In addition to his excellent speed and defense, he boasts superb plate discipline and bat-to-ball skills. He projects as one of Milwaukee’s most reliable outfielders in 2024. The other key variable, of course, is the team's mix of infielders. There, too, there is considerable uncertainty, but a bevy of viable options. If Joey Ortiz, Brice Turang, and Oliver Dunn each continue to impress Pat Murphy and perform well, the need for infield reinforcement might not be nearly as great as seemed possible when we first learned of this experiment. That's to say nothing of Andruw Monasterio, Owen Miller, or Tyler Black. Things could break the other way, but right now, that group feels as crowded as the outfield does. As one examines the construction of this Brewers roster, it becomes clear that Frelick’s best fit remains in the outfield. Barring several injuries in the infield, don’t expect to see him defending on the dirt with any regularity. -
The Brewers seem serious about making Sal Frelick a part-time infielder, but that doesn’t mean it will become a regular-season reality. Image courtesy of © Rick Scuteri-USA TODAY Sports Since the Brewers revealed at the beginning of spring training that Sal Frelick would receive reps as an infielder in exhibition play, there’s been more and more evidence suggesting the club wants him to be a legitimate option at third base--rather than an in-case-of-emergency choice. Frelick has appeared in five games at third base this spring, and made his third Cactus League start at the hot corner on Wednesday. Our own Matthew Trueblood reported last week that Frelick is working diligently at third base, with the apparent goal of being a trustworthy option, not someone who can stand there in a pinch. He wouldn’t get this many reps there unless the club was at least somewhat serious about the move. The preferred plan for the position player mix seems to involve Frelick playing a decent amount of third base. Whether it comes to fruition in the regular season is a different matter. Things rarely unfold throughout a 162-game season the way players, coaches, and executives draw them up beforehand. The Brewers have been one of the best teams in the National League over the last decade, largely because they plan for this. By building deep and versatile rosters, the club has kept chugging along when circumstances force them to deviate from the original vision. The emphasis on versatility is partially why the Brewers are grooming Frelick as a part-time third baseman. However, things playing out differently from the preferred plan is more likely to keep Frelick out of the infield than force him onto the dirt. In a perfect world, the Brewers receive strong production throughout their crowded collection of outfielders, leaving Pat Murphy with more reliable players than available playing time. Shifting Frelick to the infield would alleviate that logjam and give the Brewers their best offensive lineup. However, it’s far more likely that the club receives capable offense from half its outfielders than from all of them. The outfield is deep but filled with offensive question marks. As I discussed earlier this week, Garrett Mitchell’s swing has holes that leave him vulnerable to elevated velocity. Joey Wiemer made substantial improvements to his setup and swing over the winter, but must prove he can wait back on breaking pitches. Jackson Chourio figures to start in center field on Opening Day, but has 24 regular-season plate appearances above Double-A. Frelick’s lack of home run power gives him a lower ceiling than his teammates, but he has a higher floor. In addition to his excellent speed and defense, he boasts superb plate discipline and bat-to-ball skills. He projects as one of Milwaukee’s most reliable outfielders in 2024. The other key variable, of course, is the team's mix of infielders. There, too, there is considerable uncertainty, but a bevy of viable options. If Joey Ortiz, Brice Turang, and Oliver Dunn each continue to impress Pat Murphy and perform well, the need for infield reinforcement might not be nearly as great as seemed possible when we first learned of this experiment. That's to say nothing of Andruw Monasterio, Owen Miller, or Tyler Black. Things could break the other way, but right now, that group feels as crowded as the outfield does. As one examines the construction of this Brewers roster, it becomes clear that Frelick’s best fit remains in the outfield. Barring several injuries in the infield, don’t expect to see him defending on the dirt with any regularity. View full article
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Baseball Prospectus’s PECOTA projections have been out for several weeks. Among the most notable Brewers forecasts is the one for Garrett Mitchell. The former first-rounder has started his big-league career by slashing a solid .278/.343/.452 (119 wRC+), albeit in just 141 plate appearances. PECOTA’s expectations are bearish: a .207/.284/.333 and 72 DRC+ (Deserved Runs Created Plus, BP's all-encompassing offensive measurement, which is scaled to 100 and in which higher is better). It’s easy to be disdainful of that forecast. Mitchell has produced above-average offense at every stop of his professional career, so how did the model come up with such ugly numbers? The answer is that PECOTA doesn’t care about Mitchell’s box score results. Whereas stats like OPS and wRC+ are derived from plate appearance outcomes, Baseball Prospectus’s line of projections and metrics strips things back to what a hitter shows on a per-pitch basis. That’s where things get hairy for Mitchell. No one is questioning Mitchell’s athleticism. His average sprint speed of nearly 30 feet per second makes him one of the fastest runners in baseball. He’s an excellent defensive center fielder, with ample strength in his 6-foot-3 frame. Mitchell’s process at the plate has also looked promising. He’s made mostly wise swing decisions as a big leaguer, posting a lower-than-average chase rate and an average swing rate on pitches in the zone. As someone who can make hard contact, Mitchell has attacked inside pitches most aggressively in a justified effort to pull the ball. What causes concern is Mitchell’s swing path. Scouts have long worried that it leaves him vulnerable to velocity up in the strike zone and prevents him from elevating the ball on contact. Mitchell has done little to ease those doubts. Buried beneath his solid slash lines are high strikeout and ground ball rates. Mitchell punched out at a 25.5% clip in his minor-league career, while hitting 61.8% of his batted balls on the ground. His big-league showing has been even more alarming on a per-swing basis, creating more red flags for a projection system like PECOTA. Mitchell has whiffed on 33.5% of his swings against fastballs. Most of those whiffs come on elevated heaters, where Mitchell’s contact rate drops significantly. Notice the shift once he sees a fastball above the belt. It’s not hard to find productive hitters with high strikeout rates in the modern game, but not all strikeout-heavy bats are equal. Driving the ball and doing damage is a common overarching goal at the plate. For some, strikeouts are an accepted side effect of such an approach. For others, the swing-and-miss reaches an unintentionally extreme level and prevents them from doing damage. Mitchell falls into the latter camp. While his whiff rates have been high across all pitch groups, his inability to make contact with fastballs is especially troublesome for his outlook. Only one qualified hitter (MJ Melendez) whiffed on fastballs in 2023 as frequently as Mitchell has in the majors. Mitchell has looked better on the quality of contact front since reaching the majors, posting a 40.5% ground-ball rate and 28.7% line-drive rate. Statcast says he’s found the “sweet spot” of the bat (producing launch angles between 8 and 32 degrees) on 40.5% of batted balls. Still, that’s not enough to sustainably compensate for Mitchell’s lack of consistent contact. He’s been incredibly fortunate on balls in play, enjoying a .441 BABIP and .537 wOBA on contact. Even hitters with a world-class ability to “guide the ball” (think Luis Arráez) cannot maintain such a success rate on batted balls, let alone one like Mitchell, who has not demonstrated plus bat control. Based on his quantity and quality of contact, Statcast assigned Mitchell an expected .207/.279/.342 line and .276 xwOBA for his big-league work to date. Baseball Prospectus thinks he deserved a .197/.277/.326 slash and 64 DRC+. His 2024 projection is similar. Without improvements to his swing, Mitchell is at risk of ceding playing time in a Brewers outfield filled with young talent. Given that depth, Mitchell’s full set of minor-league options, and his need for more development, there isn’t much pressure to roster him. While a demotion back to Triple-A might surprise some fans, it could be a plausible possibility in the near future. Research assistance provided by TruMedia.
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PECOTA has a harsh 2024 projection for Garrett Mitchell. What is it seeing, and could it point toward Mitchell ceding playing time in a crowded outfield? Image courtesy of © Michael McLoone-USA TODAY Sports Baseball Prospectus’s PECOTA projections have been out for several weeks. Among the most notable Brewers forecasts is the one for Garrett Mitchell. The former first-rounder has started his big-league career by slashing a solid .278/.343/.452 (119 wRC+), albeit in just 141 plate appearances. PECOTA’s expectations are bearish: a .207/.284/.333 and 72 DRC+ (Deserved Runs Created Plus, BP's all-encompassing offensive measurement, which is scaled to 100 and in which higher is better). It’s easy to be disdainful of that forecast. Mitchell has produced above-average offense at every stop of his professional career, so how did the model come up with such ugly numbers? The answer is that PECOTA doesn’t care about Mitchell’s box score results. Whereas stats like OPS and wRC+ are derived from plate appearance outcomes, Baseball Prospectus’s line of projections and metrics strips things back to what a hitter shows on a per-pitch basis. That’s where things get hairy for Mitchell. No one is questioning Mitchell’s athleticism. His average sprint speed of nearly 30 feet per second makes him one of the fastest runners in baseball. He’s an excellent defensive center fielder, with ample strength in his 6-foot-3 frame. Mitchell’s process at the plate has also looked promising. He’s made mostly wise swing decisions as a big leaguer, posting a lower-than-average chase rate and an average swing rate on pitches in the zone. As someone who can make hard contact, Mitchell has attacked inside pitches most aggressively in a justified effort to pull the ball. What causes concern is Mitchell’s swing path. Scouts have long worried that it leaves him vulnerable to velocity up in the strike zone and prevents him from elevating the ball on contact. Mitchell has done little to ease those doubts. Buried beneath his solid slash lines are high strikeout and ground ball rates. Mitchell punched out at a 25.5% clip in his minor-league career, while hitting 61.8% of his batted balls on the ground. His big-league showing has been even more alarming on a per-swing basis, creating more red flags for a projection system like PECOTA. Mitchell has whiffed on 33.5% of his swings against fastballs. Most of those whiffs come on elevated heaters, where Mitchell’s contact rate drops significantly. Notice the shift once he sees a fastball above the belt. It’s not hard to find productive hitters with high strikeout rates in the modern game, but not all strikeout-heavy bats are equal. Driving the ball and doing damage is a common overarching goal at the plate. For some, strikeouts are an accepted side effect of such an approach. For others, the swing-and-miss reaches an unintentionally extreme level and prevents them from doing damage. Mitchell falls into the latter camp. While his whiff rates have been high across all pitch groups, his inability to make contact with fastballs is especially troublesome for his outlook. Only one qualified hitter (MJ Melendez) whiffed on fastballs in 2023 as frequently as Mitchell has in the majors. Mitchell has looked better on the quality of contact front since reaching the majors, posting a 40.5% ground-ball rate and 28.7% line-drive rate. Statcast says he’s found the “sweet spot” of the bat (producing launch angles between 8 and 32 degrees) on 40.5% of batted balls. Still, that’s not enough to sustainably compensate for Mitchell’s lack of consistent contact. He’s been incredibly fortunate on balls in play, enjoying a .441 BABIP and .537 wOBA on contact. Even hitters with a world-class ability to “guide the ball” (think Luis Arráez) cannot maintain such a success rate on batted balls, let alone one like Mitchell, who has not demonstrated plus bat control. Based on his quantity and quality of contact, Statcast assigned Mitchell an expected .207/.279/.342 line and .276 xwOBA for his big-league work to date. Baseball Prospectus thinks he deserved a .197/.277/.326 slash and 64 DRC+. His 2024 projection is similar. Without improvements to his swing, Mitchell is at risk of ceding playing time in a Brewers outfield filled with young talent. Given that depth, Mitchell’s full set of minor-league options, and his need for more development, there isn’t much pressure to roster him. While a demotion back to Triple-A might surprise some fans, it could be a plausible possibility in the near future. Research assistance provided by TruMedia. View full article
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Matt Arnold Effectively Managed Resources in an Eventful Offseason
Jack Stern posted an article in Brewers
After a swift dismissal in the National League Wild Card Series in October, the focus in Milwaukee immediately shifted to an offseason of change. It became apparent that manager Craig Counsell would test free agency, instead of signing an extension. Corbin Burnes, Brandon Woodruff, and Willy Adames’s contracts were each set to expire after the 2024 season, sparking passionate debates about potential trades and extensions. The widespread thinking was that an organization in the Brewers’ position had two paths forward: go all-in for one last ride or tear it down. Either way, an end to a competitive window was approaching. That belief solidified after Counsell shockingly crossed state lines to manage the Chicago Cubs and the Brewers non-tendered Woodruff in the wake of his shoulder surgery. Owner Mark Attanasio and General Manager Matt Arnold faced difficult decisions that would have serious implications for the franchise. Arnold indeed made many tough decisions in a very active winter, but the final product of his moves did not fit the expectations of many observers. The club kicked things off by trading Mark Canha to the Detroit Tigers instead of picking up his club option. It won the Rhys Hoskins sweepstakes in late January, only for Arnold to trade Burnes to the Baltimore Orioles less than a week later. The Brewers held onto Adames, signed Jakob Junis and Gary Sánchez to one-year deals, and re-signed Woodruff last week to a two-year contract covering his rehab and return. National pundits and portions of the fan base grew increasingly confused with each twist. They perceived the Hoskins signing as a signal that the Brewers chose the all-in path. When Burnes became an Oriole days later, they questioned the prompt U-turn toward the fire sale approach. Trying to put the Brewers’ competitive approach into one of those two boxes is a futile exercise. The organization has been transparent about its process over the past couple of years. Anyone who listened to the messaging shouldn’t be surprised by anything the club has done over the last few months. Despite the poor reception when David Stearns characterized it as taking “bites of the apple,” the Brewers’ organizational philosophy has not changed. They reject the notion that there are only two effective paths toward a World Series title, nor do they think in terms of strict competitive windows tied to specific players. Instead, the Brewers believe the best path to a championship in baseball’s smallest market is to make the playoffs as many years as possible. Competing every year requires excellent player development, the right balance of moves that address short- and long-term, and excellent management of organizational resources. Arnold was especially tasked with the latter two objectives this winter, and did a phenomenal job. Power was the Brewers’ top need. Hoskins and Sánchez are perfect fits. While the former’s deal carries some risk if he struggles after returning from ACL reconstruction, neither player will handcuff the team financially on short-term deals. Decisions on pending free agents require carefully weighing long-term gain against short-term loss. The Brewers played that pro-and-con game in deciding on the futures of Burnes and Adames. Burnes was not going to take a discounted extension to remain with the Brewers, nor was offering him a market value deal wise for the team after they had already received what could be the best seasons of his career. While the Brewers will not be able to backfill the entirety of Burnes’ value in the rotation, they are well-equipped to survive without him as one of baseball’s best pitching development organizations. The long-term benefit of trading Burnes outweighed the potential short-term hit. It made the most sense to deal him, and Arnold found a satisfactory package of Joey Ortiz, DL Hall, and a compensatory pick. Adames’s situation is different. Milwaukee’s hitting development appears to have made strides in recent years, but the results have yet to reach the big leagues. The organization also lacks long-term shortstop options to replace Adames, particularly after Brice Turang looked overpowered by MLB fastballs as a rookie. Furthermore, Adames is at the heart of the clubhouse culture and has spoken openly about his desire to remain in Milwaukee on a new contract. In this instance, one could argue that the shockwaves resulting from an Adames trade would outweigh the value of the return. The balance would swing out of the competitive zone. It seems the Brewers agree, as Adames remains with the team. Arnold’s balancing act extends beyond the big-league roster. He has also dipped into the organization’s minor-league depth, trading away redundant prospects for players with more immediate MLB upside. Arnold traded for second baseman Oliver Dunn, first baseman Jake Bauers, and relievers Bryan Hudson and Taylor Clarke. He parted with prospects Hendry Mendez, Robert Moore, Jace Avina, Brian Sanchez, Justin Chambers, Cam Devanney, and Ryan Brady. Mendez and Moore struggled in High A in 2023. Avina has impressive power but has struck out at alarming rates in the low minors. Chambers has yet to throw a professional pitch and is recovering from Tommy John surgery. Devanney is blocked at every position around the infield and took a step back offensively in Triple A last year. These prospects were low on the organizational depth chart, but the players the Brewers got in return could all help in 2024 and beyond. Dunn and Bauers flashed incredible power last year and could join Hoskins and Sánchez in boosting the Brewers in that category. Hudson ran high strikeout and ground ball rates in Triple-A last year, and Clarke has excellent breaking stuff. The cantilevered approach the Brewers have chosen is difficult to execute, but Arnold pulled it off this winter. He opportunistically added power bats on short-term deals, struck a delicate balance between trading away and retaining pending free agents, and used expendable prospects to add upside players to the 40-man roster. The resulting roster lacks the elite starting rotation of past seasons, and many projection systems believe it will cost the Brewers a handful of wins. However, the club will be more balanced in 2024 than in the last couple of campaigns. The offense is deeper, gained some needed firepower, and the defense and bullpen remain strong. Unlike the 2023 team that featured one of baseball’s worst lineups, this year’s squad should be competent or better in every facet of the game. Entering an offseason under such uncertain circumstances and emerging with that improved outlook is impressive. Arnold and the entire front office deserve credit for it.- 19 comments
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The Milwaukee Brewers’ offseason moves left many observers scratching their heads, but the club always had a defined objective. General Manager Matt Arnold balanced several moving pieces throughout the organization and executed the vision exceptionally well. Image courtesy of © Stephanie Amador / The Tennessean / USA TODAY NETWORK After a swift dismissal in the National League Wild Card Series in October, the focus in Milwaukee immediately shifted to an offseason of change. It became apparent that manager Craig Counsell would test free agency, instead of signing an extension. Corbin Burnes, Brandon Woodruff, and Willy Adames’s contracts were each set to expire after the 2024 season, sparking passionate debates about potential trades and extensions. The widespread thinking was that an organization in the Brewers’ position had two paths forward: go all-in for one last ride or tear it down. Either way, an end to a competitive window was approaching. That belief solidified after Counsell shockingly crossed state lines to manage the Chicago Cubs and the Brewers non-tendered Woodruff in the wake of his shoulder surgery. Owner Mark Attanasio and General Manager Matt Arnold faced difficult decisions that would have serious implications for the franchise. Arnold indeed made many tough decisions in a very active winter, but the final product of his moves did not fit the expectations of many observers. The club kicked things off by trading Mark Canha to the Detroit Tigers instead of picking up his club option. It won the Rhys Hoskins sweepstakes in late January, only for Arnold to trade Burnes to the Baltimore Orioles less than a week later. The Brewers held onto Adames, signed Jakob Junis and Gary Sánchez to one-year deals, and re-signed Woodruff last week to a two-year contract covering his rehab and return. National pundits and portions of the fan base grew increasingly confused with each twist. They perceived the Hoskins signing as a signal that the Brewers chose the all-in path. When Burnes became an Oriole days later, they questioned the prompt U-turn toward the fire sale approach. Trying to put the Brewers’ competitive approach into one of those two boxes is a futile exercise. The organization has been transparent about its process over the past couple of years. Anyone who listened to the messaging shouldn’t be surprised by anything the club has done over the last few months. Despite the poor reception when David Stearns characterized it as taking “bites of the apple,” the Brewers’ organizational philosophy has not changed. They reject the notion that there are only two effective paths toward a World Series title, nor do they think in terms of strict competitive windows tied to specific players. Instead, the Brewers believe the best path to a championship in baseball’s smallest market is to make the playoffs as many years as possible. Competing every year requires excellent player development, the right balance of moves that address short- and long-term, and excellent management of organizational resources. Arnold was especially tasked with the latter two objectives this winter, and did a phenomenal job. Power was the Brewers’ top need. Hoskins and Sánchez are perfect fits. While the former’s deal carries some risk if he struggles after returning from ACL reconstruction, neither player will handcuff the team financially on short-term deals. Decisions on pending free agents require carefully weighing long-term gain against short-term loss. The Brewers played that pro-and-con game in deciding on the futures of Burnes and Adames. Burnes was not going to take a discounted extension to remain with the Brewers, nor was offering him a market value deal wise for the team after they had already received what could be the best seasons of his career. While the Brewers will not be able to backfill the entirety of Burnes’ value in the rotation, they are well-equipped to survive without him as one of baseball’s best pitching development organizations. The long-term benefit of trading Burnes outweighed the potential short-term hit. It made the most sense to deal him, and Arnold found a satisfactory package of Joey Ortiz, DL Hall, and a compensatory pick. Adames’s situation is different. Milwaukee’s hitting development appears to have made strides in recent years, but the results have yet to reach the big leagues. The organization also lacks long-term shortstop options to replace Adames, particularly after Brice Turang looked overpowered by MLB fastballs as a rookie. Furthermore, Adames is at the heart of the clubhouse culture and has spoken openly about his desire to remain in Milwaukee on a new contract. In this instance, one could argue that the shockwaves resulting from an Adames trade would outweigh the value of the return. The balance would swing out of the competitive zone. It seems the Brewers agree, as Adames remains with the team. Arnold’s balancing act extends beyond the big-league roster. He has also dipped into the organization’s minor-league depth, trading away redundant prospects for players with more immediate MLB upside. Arnold traded for second baseman Oliver Dunn, first baseman Jake Bauers, and relievers Bryan Hudson and Taylor Clarke. He parted with prospects Hendry Mendez, Robert Moore, Jace Avina, Brian Sanchez, Justin Chambers, Cam Devanney, and Ryan Brady. Mendez and Moore struggled in High A in 2023. Avina has impressive power but has struck out at alarming rates in the low minors. Chambers has yet to throw a professional pitch and is recovering from Tommy John surgery. Devanney is blocked at every position around the infield and took a step back offensively in Triple A last year. These prospects were low on the organizational depth chart, but the players the Brewers got in return could all help in 2024 and beyond. Dunn and Bauers flashed incredible power last year and could join Hoskins and Sánchez in boosting the Brewers in that category. Hudson ran high strikeout and ground ball rates in Triple-A last year, and Clarke has excellent breaking stuff. The cantilevered approach the Brewers have chosen is difficult to execute, but Arnold pulled it off this winter. He opportunistically added power bats on short-term deals, struck a delicate balance between trading away and retaining pending free agents, and used expendable prospects to add upside players to the 40-man roster. The resulting roster lacks the elite starting rotation of past seasons, and many projection systems believe it will cost the Brewers a handful of wins. However, the club will be more balanced in 2024 than in the last couple of campaigns. The offense is deeper, gained some needed firepower, and the defense and bullpen remain strong. Unlike the 2023 team that featured one of baseball’s worst lineups, this year’s squad should be competent or better in every facet of the game. Entering an offseason under such uncertain circumstances and emerging with that improved outlook is impressive. Arnold and the entire front office deserve credit for it. View full article
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