Jason Wang

Image courtesy of © Michael McLoone-Imagn Images Heading into last year’s trade deadline, I wrote an article about the areas in which I thought the Brewers needed to upgrade. One of the things I pointed out was that at the time, Milwaukee ranked near the bottom of MLB for OPS and Defensive Runs Saved from shortstop. I went on to write that based on this figure, Joey Ortiz’s defensive abilities had slipped, a statement which was met with quite a bit of pushback from commenters. One reader pointed out that -7 DRS didn’t match the eye test, and others generally agreed that the figure didn’t seem to be an accurate representation. In an effort to save what little journalistic reputation I currently have, I tried my best to explain what was going on, but to be honest, I was starting to get as confused as everyone else. His numbers at the end of the season only made things worse. After playing 1,217 ⅔ innings at shortstop in 2025, Ortiz ended with 12 Outs Above Average (5th among shortstops) and -2 Defensive Runs Saved (14th among qualified shortstops). So how is it that these numbers, which should theoretically give us a quick idea of whether someone is a good, great, or bad defender, are telling two different stories? Interestingly enough, he wasn’t even the only Brewer for whom this was true. I wrote another article about Brice Turang’s diverging defensive narratives in August. So, since I wasn’t the only one who was confused by exactly what these numbers meant and how to interpret them, I figured a deeper dive into each was necessary. Defensive Runs Saved (DRS) In the beginning, the main way to assess a player’s defensive abilities was fielding percentage. It was a simple formula (putouts divided by total chances), but it was far too basic to capture any of the nuance of fielding. A great example is Nick Castellanos, who had a perfect 1.000 fielding percentage in 2022, 2023, and 2025 as a starting outfielder, but is also a notoriously bad defender. The DRS framework was first introduced in 2009 by John Dewan and Bill James, who had used data from Sports Info Solutions dating back to 2003 to consider more variables in the field. In their modern forms, these are: ART (Airballs, Range, and Throwing) Runs Saved (All Fielders) Good Plays/Defensive Misplays and Errors Runs Saved (All Fielders) Bunt Runs Saved (Corner Infielders, Catchers, Pitchers) Double Play Runs Saved (Middle Infielders and Corner Infielders) Outfielder Arm Runs Saved (Outfielders) Pitcher Stolen Base Runs Saved (Pitchers) Catcher Stolen Base Runs Saved (Catchers) Strike Zone Runs Saved (Catchers) Catcher Adjusted Earned Runs Saved (Catchers) To calculate all of this, each component of a play is assigned a bucket and a difficulty value. The bucket depends on which aspect of defense is being tested. For example, a right fielder throwing out a runner going first to third would receive credit to this rARM, while a smooth double play by two middle infielders would go into their rGDP buckets. This value is based on the percentage of similar balls in play that were successfully converted to outs. So, if the throw from the right fielder to third base was made into an out in 99% of similar situations (unlikely, but go with me), it would get an expected value of 0.99, while a tough diving stop to start a double play that was made by 1% of shortstops would have a value of 0.01. If the play is successfully made, the player receives (1 - expected value) to the respective bucket. If they botch it, they lose that much value. So a successful routine grounder with an expected success rate of 85% would net a fielder 0.15 plays above average, but flubbing it would leave them with a -0.85. The value of each bucket then gets converted to a run total, based on context and a run expectancy matrix. The final DRS for a given player is the difference between the total value of their plays made and missed in all buckets relevant to their positions and the league average. Most are pretty straightforward, but I wanted to highlight two that sound pretty darn similar: rGFP and rPM. rPM stands for Runs from Plus-Minus, which primarily tracks range and assigns a value to each batted ball based on characteristics like location and historical success rates. rGFP is used in special circumstances where a defensive action contributes or costs value based on playmaking or intellect, rather than sheer ball-chasing. Examples include a first baseman scooping a bad throw or a batter being held to a single instead of a double because of an outfielder’s actions. This also counts against the player for doing things like missing the cutoff man or messing up a double play to get one out instead of two. The numbers are broken down by category on the Fielding Bible website, so (for instance) we can see that Ortiz was much better moving to his left than to his right; got value from his strong arm but struggled on turning double plays; and came out essentially even in defensive misplays and good plays, though that doesn't mean that he made the same number of them. He just had a roughly average ratio between them for a shortstop. We don’t get to see which plays moved the needle the most, though, so a negative DRS may mean that they’re average but regularly struggle with more difficult plays, or it could mean they’re messing up routine plays. Like WAR, DRS attempts to factor in every detailed aspect of fielding a baseball and arrive at a somewhat definitive number, but we tend to get summary judgments from it, rather than play-by-play breakdowns. For more information, feel free to check Fielding Bible’s FAQ on DRS. Outs Above Average (OAA) Outs Above Average was one of Statcast’s ways of gauging a player’s defense. It came out shortly after the system was introduced league-wide in 2015. Like DRS, it’s calculated slightly differently depending on which position you’re assessing. In the outfield, each ball in play is assigned a catch probability value based on the distance an outfielder has to cover, the direction he must travel, and the time he has to get to his destination. Like DRS, the fielder receives credit for each play made equal to (1 - catch probability) and loses value equivalent to the catch probability for failing to make the play. The infield is similar, but uses a more complex formula to handle the additional defensive intricacies. It considers distance covered and time, but it also accounts for the distance from the fielder at the “intercept point” (position after getting to the ball) to the base the runner is heading for. On force plays, it also factors in the sprint speed of the hitter. The biggest difference between OAA and DRS is that the former almost solely measures range, while the latter uses range as one of several ingredients in the recipe. This allows OAA to be calculated without video review, as the calculation is purely number-based. Furthermore, OAA is context-neutral, as it’s purely outs, not runs. This means a play made with the bases empty and one with the bases loaded counts the same. This partially explains why some players have such a disparity between their OAA and DRS figures. One good example is Bobby Witt Jr., who had 24 OAA and just 3 DRS in 2025, a disparity of 21. He and Zach Neto were the only two players I found to have a disparity this significant between the two metrics last season. Witt had a fairly high number of Defensive Misplays and Errors (33, which was eight more than Ortiz), but rated very well with his arm and was great going to his right, which made up for some weaknesses on balls up the middle. That pattern (good arm, better right than left, a few more mistakes than would be ideal) maps neatly to DRS; OAA just viewed him as making more plays above average than DRS's system estimated. Given what we now know about DRS and OAA, we could state that a play that would negatively impact DRS more than OAA could look something like: A mistake made in a higher run expectancy situation (e.g., runners in scoring position) A fair hit that was fielded in a way that allowed a runner to advance further than he should’ve A double play that resulted in just one out Based on this criteria, one example could be this play against the Athletics, where a soft flip to second baseman Jonathan India recorded an out but a better throw could’ve allowed the Royals to pick up an additional out. This play may fall into the higher run expectancy situation category, because a late spinning throw by Witt results in a run scored (and a game lost). Ah, but one other issue is that OAA and DRS are not calculated on the same scale. You can hear it in their names, right? One is runs saved; the other is outs added, or hits saved. For instance, Witt's 3 DRS came on 6 Plays Saved; there's a remaining conversion to be made. Each play made saves part of a hit, and thereby saves a fraction of a run. The OAA model's cousin makes that conversion from outs added to runs saved, to put Statcast and Sports Info Solutions's metrics on the same footing. Fielding Run Value (FRV) FRV is Statcast’s answer to DRS. It's largely based on OAA, which is why most players who have high OAA figures will also have high FRV figures, even if they score poorly in DRS. It also bakes in throwing; framing and blocking for catchers; and other subtle skills. FRV converts underlying metrics into runs, but it shouldn’t tell you a story that’s different from OAA. Because many fans don't understand that it's the final form of OAA (and because of its hellaciously awkward name), FRV is cited less often than either of the other two. Whereas OAA is easy to find (it shows up on every player’s Savant summary), and whereas DRS is the original advanced defensive metric, it's hard to immediately grasp the utility of FRV. Nonetheless, to properly compare two players, look either at their PART Plays Saved (on the Fielding Bible site) and their OAA, or at their DRS and their FRV. Offensive metrics have always been far easier to assess than defensive ones. Even with a head start, though, there’s disagreement over which metrics truly describe how good a hitter is. Things have now been refined enough where for many, using OPS or wRC+ is usually sufficient to get your point across, but things are not so simple for defensive numbers. OPS+ and wRC+ never diverge significantly, but that’s because they more or less measure the same thing and are made up of very similar inputs. On the other hand, DRS and OAA/FRV do some things materially differently. Subjectively, DRS makes the most sense to me as a solid measure of cumulative defensive production. That doesn’t mean that OAA and FRV are wrong; they just make some different assumptions and incorporate human help to a lesser degree. There’s only so much we can unpack without getting access to more granular data on individual plays, but at the very least, we can now translate numbers to meaning. Choose your fighter according to your new, improved understanding about these numbers and what forms them. View full article

Image courtesy of © Benny Sieu-Imagn Images In just over five weeks, pitchers and catchers will report, signaling the start of spring training. By then, organizations will begin to finalize their Opening Day rosters, and fans should have a pretty good idea as to how competitive their favorite team will be in the upcoming year. For many teams, the biggest moves have already been made. A flurry of activity happened at or around the Winter Meetings, and organizations have already committed to over $1 billion in free-agent contracts. The Blue Jays have been the most aggressive in locking down talent, notably signing Dylan Cease ($210 million, 7 years), Kazuma Okamoto ($60 million, 4 years), and Cody Ponce ($30 million, 3 years). Most other teams have made at least one big free agent acquisition or trade, but the Brewers have remained comparatively quiet. The only free agent Milwaukee has signed is Akil Baddoo, and the only trade they’ve made thus far sent Isaac Collins and Nick Mears to the Royals in exchange for Angel Zerpa. Neither move is expected to move the needle, which begs the question: What are they waiting for? It’s important to remember that this is how Milwaukee has operated in the offseason for quite some time now. The Brewers have never been huge fans of pursuing big-name free agents, who are often the first to get pulled off the board. They’re quite expensive, and the sheer amount of bidders for any given player often drives prices past the financial comfort zone of the front office. Many of the largest contracts in franchise history were extensions for players like Christian Yelich and Ryan Braun, making Lorenzo Cain’s $80 million contract signed in 2018 the largest free-agent deal Milwaukee has ever inked. Instead of simply throwing money at their problems, the Brewers love to find undervalued assets and bid low on them, relying on their outstanding internal player development and taking low-risk bets on players that others have already glossed over. In order to do this, deals are often struck late when the negotiating leverage shifts away from the player and towards any club willing to give them a chance. A few recent notable examples of late free agent signings include: Jose Quintana: Signed on March 5, 2025 Brandon Woodruff: Signed on February 21, 2024 Rhys Hoskins: Signed on January 26, 2024 Wade Miley: Signed on January 9, 2023 None of these four players was highly sought-after, and each came with an asterisk. For Woodruff and Hoskins, it was injury-related. It was understood that Woodruff would miss the entire 2024 season and part of the 2025 season, while Hoskins had just missed the entire 2023 season after tearing his ACL in spring training. For Miley and Quintana, it was age. Both starting pitchers were 36 years old when they signed their deals and seemed to be in the twilight of their big-league careers. These players were effective but only if you looked past the unappealing circumstances on the surface and were willing to take a chance (Hoskins may be the only exception, but hey, you can’t be right 100% of the time, that’s not fair for the other teams). Another factor that’s likely contributing to the Brewers’ sluggish pace of roster revamping is that their needs don't align well with what they’re willing to pay. There aren’t any major holes in the current roster and, barring a trade of someone like Freddy Peralta, all of the biggest contributors to the team’s success in 2025 will be along for the ride in 2026. However, if there were one aspect that could use some love, it’d be finding power in the lineup. In 2025, they ranked deceptively high in slugging percentage because their .258 batting average placed third in MLB, but they ranked 22nd in home runs (166) and 25th in ISO (.145). If Andrew Vaughn somehow manages to maintain his 141 OPS+ over the course of a full season, it may not be a problem, but precedent would suggest that outcome is unlikely. But these days, power doesn’t come cheap. Kyle Schwarber, an archetypal three-true-outcome player, returned to the Phillies for $150 million over five years. Pete Alonso signed a similar contract with the Orioles for $155 million over five years. There aren’t many slugging free agents left, and those that are available, like Kyle Tucker, are absolutely out of the Brewers’ price range. It’s a similar story with starting pitching. Milwaukee has a considerable number of young arms in the rotation. Still, if they want to pursue a veteran arm to back up Peralta, it would cost a considerable amount, either in cash or prospects. This seems like a big reason why they’ll look to retain Peralta this year, especially since he’ll be paid just $8 million to be the team’s ace. And so, their patience is understandable given their strategy. They’ll continue to wait until the marquee names are snatched up at a premium or full price, paving the way for the not great but still good players to be slowly and surely marked down with each passing week. Even if they don’t do anything, their roster remains solid, and their young core will only continue to improve. The one caveat to all this is that the other teams in the division aren’t quite so passive. The Cardinals have already made a handful of trades (albeit to enter an apparent rebuild), and the Cubs have made quite a few small moves to reinforce their bullpen. The most surprising organization has been the Pirates, who, aside from being interested in players like Schwarber, Josh Naylor, and Okamoto, picked up Ryan O'Hearn and Gregory Soto in free agency before also acquiring Brandon Lowe in a three-team trade. None of these moves is necessarily enough for the Brewers to fear for their position atop the NL Central yet, but at the same time, they can’t be totally ignored. Still, the front office tends to march to the beat of its own drum, regardless of what its closest rivals are up to. Realistically, the organization is likely biding its time and waiting to get what it needs at the right price. It may not happen soon, but something will happen eventually. Probably. View full article

:)

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Part 1: #21-25 Part 2: #16-20 15. Joey Ortiz, SS 2026 Season Age: 27 Controlled through: 2029 Jason’s Rank: 19 | Michael’s Rank: 10 | Steve’s Rank: 20 Although Ortiz wasn’t quite able to fill the shoes of Willy Adames as the Brewers’ starting shortstop, he still has considerable potential as a player. As you recall, he came over to Milwaukee along with DL Hall from Baltimore in exchange for Corbin Burnes and carried high expectations as Baltimore’s eighth-ranked prospect in 2023. His rookie year lived up to the hype, posting 3.2 fWAR across 142 games while playing third base. Unfortunately, the sophomore slump was absolutely real for Ortiz. Depending on which defensive metric you look at, he was either outstanding (12 OAA, 10 FRV) or slightly below average (-2 DRS). His offensive production was less debatable with his 67 wRC+, the third-lowest mark of qualified MLB players. It would be surprising if his offensive struggles became a long-term issue, but it’d absolutely be a question mark for any teams that would consider acquiring him. He’s young, has plenty of team control left, and is capable of playing great defense, but the uncertainty surrounding his bat prevents him from being more valuable than some of the other young talents in Milwaukee’s system. 14. Chad Patrick, RHP 2026 Season Age: 27 Controlled through: 2031 Jason’s Rank: 13 | Michael’s Rank: 14 | Steve’s Rank: 14 Patrick may have exceeded your expectations in his rookie year. He was the return package from the Athletics in exchange for Abraham Toro, and his 2025 numbers alone might have been enough to classify that deal as a resounding success. He pitched to a 3.53 ERA with a 3.53 FIP over 119 ⅔ innings and placed seventh in NL ROY voting. He found immense success using a variety of fastballs but struggled to be as effective with his breaking or offspeed offerings. However, Stuff+ does grade his slider and changeup very highly. In fact, he had the highest Stuff+ (105) of any pitcher on the team with more than 100 innings. This may be surprising as his fastball velocity is average, but with tricky shapes and movement, he’s able to get by just fine. He’d be a strong addition to the rotations of most teams, but because of his inexperience, he may not be as compelling a frontline starter as some other arms on the Brewers’ pitching staff. At the very least, he should see an elevated role with the team in 2026, where he could continue to increase his player stock. 13. Abner Uribe, RHP 2026 Season Age: 25 Controlled through: 2030 Jason’s Rank: 7 | Michael’s Rank: 19 | Steve’s Rank: 12 Over the past few years, whispers have spoken of top-secret human experiments being conducted in Milwaukee to produce elite catching and pitching talent. This has been used to explain the sudden and unexpected turnarounds for defensively deficient catchers and down-on-their-luck pitchers. I can’t personally speak to the existence of such lab but it’s getting harder to deny that if nothing else, the Brewers sure know how to make a closer. Trevor Megill, Devin Williams, Josh Hader, heck, even Corey Knebel had a 1.78 ERA and 39 saves in 2017. It’s a suspiciously long run of high-leverage dominance from the bullpen, and Abner Uribe is the lab’s most recent product. After a shaky 2024 marred by injury and poor on-field antics, he locked back in by replicating his rookie year numbers over a larger sample size of 75 ⅓ innings. His peripherals are absolutely off the charts. The only Statcast metrics in which he doesn’t rank in the top decile of qualified pitchers are chase rate (28.3%), walk rate (9.1%), and extension (6.4). He only accumulated a few saves, but he primarily pitched in high leverage, and the Brewers are clearly grooming him to eventually take the ball in the ninth inning. He might need a little more time before he’s ready to join the current inner circle of elite closers, but he’d be worth quite a bit to many teams around MLB today. It also helps that he has one of the best save celebrations around. 12. Christian Yelich, OF/DH 2026 Season Age: 34 Controlled through: 2028 Jason’s Rank: N/A | Michael’s Rank: 8 | Steve’s Rank: 4 He’s far from being the MVP finalist he was in the late 2010s, but Yelich has been consistent over the past four years. He continues to be one of the more productive bats on the team, and 2025 seems like he was able to carry over some of the success he had in 2024 before being sidelined by injury. The most encouraging sign from this past season was his increase in power. His slugging percentage of .452 is the highest mark since 2019, albeit not by much. What’s more exciting is the 29 home runs he hit in 2025, the first time he’s crossed the 20-homer mark since 2019. Despite this small but important career resurgence, Yelich’s position as a trade asset is complicated by his age and remaining value on his contract. According to Cot’s Contracts, he’s still owed ~$72 million over the next three years, which is a hefty sum for any player, let alone one that is clearly past his prime. Nonetheless, he probably has a few more productive seasons left in him. 11. Trevor Megill, RHP 2026 Season Age: 32 Controlled through: 2027 Jason’s Rank: 9 | Michael’s Rank: 18 | Steve’s Rank: 10 It’s not easy being 6’8", or so I’ve heard. Megill makes it work somehow, and as a guy who regularly throws more than 100 mph with a hammer knuckle curve, it probably works to his advantage. After two rough years with the Cubs and Twins, Megill was acquired for a player to be named later and cash in April 2023. It took some time to figure it out, but after Devin Williams sustained an injury in 2024 and left for the Yankees in 2025, he stepped into the closer role, where he has done a great job. Unlike the younger pitching assets Milwaukee seems to have an excess of, Megill already has four years of service time, which means he has fewer years of team control but also has a good amount of big-league innings under his belt. Additionally, he was paid just under $2 million in 2025, a very team-friendly price for what they got out of him. He’ll earn more as he heads into his second year of arbitration, but he’ll still come cheaper than the other closer options of his caliber. Teams wanting a high-leverage arm out of the box could look at a Trevor Megill as a plug-and-play option that may not need the same development resources as someone less tenured. He may not be a totally baked cake at this point, but he knows what he’s capable of and what he needs to do to get there. View full article

i feel i should come clean as it is christmas eve but i am not in fact related to jonah tong although our ancestry likely shares a common ancestor somewhere.

I don't think the Mets are interested in Megill since they've already committed ~$41 million to Devin Williams over the next three years. Don't let his gruesome ERA from 2025 fool you, his 2.68 FIP is still good and on par with his 2023 season. As for Brandon Sproat and my cousin Jonah Tong, the Mets are already down bad for starting pitching and for two guys that have tons of team control and upside left, they're probably not willing to trade them away for one year of Peralta. I may be biased because I sit across from him at Lunar New Year dinner but Tong especially has a lot to offer and is one of the more valuable young guys in that system. To quote the article, I’m quite bad at putting together mock trades but that would be my initial assumption.

rumor has it matt arnold executed this deal purely so this comment could be made on brewerfanatic.com

also 36 years old now but he was quite a dashing fella at 31 years old.

Perhaps superstar is a bit much, but it's undeniable that Brice Turang has been one of the best second basemen in baseball over the past two years. In 2025, he posted a 124 wRC+ and accumulated 4.4 fWAR, both marks placing him fourth amongst all second basemen. Although his defensive prowess took a step back last season, it has only been a year since he was the National League's Platinum Glove award winner. Turang joins a growing list of exceptional baseball talent and was part of the latest batch of players to officially join the team, along with Kyle Schwarber, Gunnar Henderson, and Will Smith. The roster and depth chart are far from complete, but there's a solid chance that Turang ends up as the starting second baseman for all, if not most, of the tournament. He could split time with Nico Hoerner if he ends up participating as well, but Brewers fans can expect to see plenty of Turang on the international stage regardless. It's a well-deserved honor for the 26-year-old and also begs the question, what other Brewers will be participating in the World Baseball Classic? Freddy Peralta hasn't officially announced his commitment, but has expressed a strong desire to represent the Dominican Republic. Neither William Contreras nor Jackson Chourio played for Venezuela in 2023, but they could be key parts of their lineup in 2026. Sal Frelick competed for Italy but hasn't confirmed his return to the team. One of the biggest struggles for teams in the past has been assembling a quality pitching staff, as the best arms are typically still ramping up when the tournament starts in early March. So far, Paul Skenes is the only pitcher who has decided to play for Team USA, and depending on the willingness of other top names like Tarik Skubal and Garrett Crochet to join him, the Brewers could send a few of their own. Quinn Priester and Jacob Misiorowski would be the top two candidates, but Chad Patrick or Tobias Myers could provide some solid value as well. View full rumor

hell yeah numbers baby

Image courtesy of © Mark Hoffman/Milwaukee Journal Sentinel / USA TODAY NETWORK via Imagn Images Because I’m a proud Zoomer and enjoy doomscrolling, I spend a good amount of time on the “For You” section of my Twitter feed. It’s primarily AI shilling and rabid opinions on sports, but like a bag of jelly beans, every so often, something good shows up in the middle of the gooey multi-colored mess. Recently, it was this tweet by Eno Sarris, a writer for The Athletic: Of course, as a casual fan, this came as something of a surprise. I knew that ERA was far from the only number needed to tell the story of a pitcher's performance, but the idea of disregarding it completely was foreign to me. Describing it as the “batting average of pitching” seemed like a step too far, but this offseason, I’ve noticed more evidence to back up Sarris’s claims. To me, the biggest indicator that ERA has fallen by the wayside as a useful statistic is the way that teams have spent money on pitchers so far this offseason. Here are the five largest pitching free-agent contracts that have been signed so far, and the ERAs for those players last season. Player # of Years Total Contract Value 2025 ERA Dylan Cease 7 $210 million 4.55 Devin Williams 3 $51 million 4.79 Cody Ponce 3 $30 million 1.89 (KBO) Ryan Helsley 2 $28 million 4.50 Emilio Pagan 2 $20 million 2.88 It is admittedly early in the offseason, but there is a clear pattern here. Regardless of where the total values of these contracts end up relative to their peers, many of these are sizable financial commitments. A $30 million AAV for seven years is nothing to sneeze at, and an AAV of $17 million over three years for a reliever with an ERA close to 5.00 is mind-boggling. But things start to come into focus when we look at more advanced stats like FIP, K/BB, and Skill-interactive Earned Run Average (SIERA). Player FIP K/BB SIERA Dylan Cease 3.56 3.03 3.58 Devin Williams 2.68 3.60 2.67 Cody Ponce (KBO) 2.15 6.15 N/A Ryan Helsley 4.14 2.52 3.68 Emilio Pagan 3.72 3.68 3.18 2025 MLB Average 4.16 2.64 4.06 For the most part, this select group of five pitchers looks far more impressive when comparing their advanced metrics to the league average. (Cody Ponce is an obvious exception, but the difficulty of translating his numbers in the Korean Baseball Organization to the American majors only underscores that teams are paying for something other than those surface-level stats.) Dylan Cease and Devin Williams, in particular, become far more appealing when ignoring their lackluster ERAs. It’s also why these two players have drastically different WAR figures based on where you look. Cease has an rWAR of just 1.1, but an fWAR of 3.4, while Williams has an rWAR of -0.3 and an fWAR of 1.4. Those disparities stem from the fact that pitching rWAR is based on runs allowed, while fWAR is based on FIP. Using a collection of advanced metrics paints a far more complete picture of a pitcher’s abilities because, like the slew of hitting metrics we now use instead of batting average to evaluate a hitter, a single number can only tell one part of the story—and in the case of ERA, as with batting average, it's a small and sometimes misleading fragment. Many supporters of ERA claim that its strength is that it tells you what happened, while FIP is a black box of confusing underlying numbers that are more predictive than descriptive. To me, this is more often the result of a misunderstanding of what FIP represents than anything else, because anyone familiar with the formula would notice that it, too, is descriptive. It’s calculated with actual numbers. Tom Tango has a good article discussing ERA's ability to predict itself in the short and medium term, and a significant contributing factor that limits its effectiveness is random variation from sequencing. Giving up a single hit each inning for five innings would result in a far lower ERA than giving up five hits in a single inning, followed by four perfect frames. By solely considering factors under the pitcher’s control, FIP helps remove a lot of noise from defensive miscues, and even the subjectivity of what is considered an earned run. SIERA takes this to the next level, factoring in batted-ball events without the outcome (e.g., hit or out). Instead, this ugly formula simply weighs ground balls, fly balls, and pop-ups to arrive at a number that’s similar to FIP, but with more positive bias toward pitchers who can induce soft contact. Strikeout-to-walk ratio is pretty straightforward, but some might be curious as to why the percentages aren’t separated. That’s because they do work together. A pitcher with a 40% strikeout rate seems far less effective if he also had a 15% walk rate. A pitcher with a 25% strikeout rate seems average, but could be elevated to elite with a 5% walk rate. Ultimately, strikeouts and walks seek to measure a pitcher’s ability to command the strike zone. Each individual metric still holds merit, but none carries enough context to serve as a high-level indicator without the other. How does this affect the Brewers? As many of you already know, Milwaukee is one of the more analytically-minded big-league teams, and this shift in perspective has been a part of their strategy for a while now. It’s the reason why certain arms like Nick Mears and Trevor Megill seemed to take massive steps forward after arriving in Milwaukee. Mears had a 5.56 ERA but a 2.61 FIP with the Rockies before he was traded to the Brewers. In his final season with the Twins, Megill had a 4.80 ERA with a 3.29 FIP. Still, this is just one layer of the onion of pitcher evaluation. What makes Milwaukee great is that they also know how to dig into the deeper layers, and can identify whether a pitcher like Quinn Priester or Grant Anderson is on the cusp of greatness even if their advanced metrics still don’t make it obvious. Few teams center their evaluations even on FIP or similar metrics, these days. Instead, they have proprietary ways to measure and weigh pitch quality, biomechanical indicators, and opportunities for improvement via development. If the Brewers look to acquire more pitching depth this offseason (or even if they decide to elevate some of their internal options to bigger roles), keep an eye out for arms that are more appealing under the hood. Milwaukee’s front office has a demonstrated history of finding undervalued assets and maximizing their upside, so if and when they end up making a move, try to look a little deeper than the ERA—and give the old “Advanced” section on FanGraphs a quick peek. View full article

Image courtesy of © Benny Sieu-Imagn Images In case you somehow missed it, MLB is officially instituting the long-awaited Automated Ball Strike System, or ABS, in 2026. Fans have had the chance to see the technology at work for years in the minor leagues, but they’ve only seen it sparingly in big league games. It was used in select spring training games and the All-Star game, but there wasn’t enough data to really think about how it’d affect the catcher role. Because of the limited information, the consensus seems to be that the new system will disproportionately hurt catchers like Patrick Bailey, who have gotten a lot of value out of pitch framing, while allowing worse framers to make up for their mistakes with challenges. However, the truth is likely more complex. Davy Andrews, a FanGraphs writer and former Brewer Fanatic contributor, recently wrote a piece reflecting on the upcoming system, and a key takeaway was that people tend to forget that pitch framing is just as much about stealing strikes as it is about keeping strikes. He noted that the best pitch framers in the league earn strikes on ~90% of shadow zone pitches in the zone, while getting called strikes on just ~20% of pitches outside the zone. The challenge system should allow a catcher with a perfect eye to get 100% of fairly earned called strikes, which could be more valuable than the few stolen strikes taken away from batter challenges. This is especially apparent when noting that catchers tend to have much higher overturn rates than batters so far. So how does William Contreras fit into all of this? Well, he was one of the best at framing pitches in 2023, accumulating +9 Catcher Framing Runs (5th in MLB). Since then, he has gradually declined in his productivity, posting +3 framing runs in 2024 and just +1 this past year. He’s still a much better defender than he was with the Braves, but could this new system be what he needs to turn things around behind the dish? A peek at his Savant page shows that his weakest framing zone was towards the left-handed batter’s box. In this shadow zone, his strike percentage of 57.9% was considerably lower than the MLB average of 64.3% and he accumulated -3 framing runs in this zone. It’s difficult to say exactly why he struggled so much with pitches on his right-handed side, but reviewing a few clips of missed calls shows something is happening. Even when setting up his glove in the right location, he tends to instinctively pull his hand down and to his left before catching the pitch, framing it in the opposite direction and losing out on strikes. While not quite as egregious, he faces a similar issue when catching pitches on the upper rail. In each of these examples, Contreras’s reaction makes it seem like he’s still expecting a late strike call because of how confident he is that the pitch landed in the zone. Now, the strike zone on television can admittedly be misleading, but there is enough evidence to suggest that Contreras often has a hard time keeping his pitcher’s strikes in the zone where they belong. A lot of this regression is due to the noise in his setup before the pitch. If we go back and look at the pitches he received in the same zones in 2023, the overall motion is far smoother, which lends itself to stealing and confirming more strikes. However, while that is undoubtedly something for Contreras to work on in the offseason, he still clearly has a good understanding of the zone. With the robo-zone, he can compensate for framing mistakes by correcting history with a timely challenge or two without sacrificing much framing upside. To get a more definitive answer on whether this will help or hurt his defensive efforts, we’ll have to wait until MLB rolls out its challenge probability and value numbers. Even without exact facts and figures, the new ABS system still seems to give William Contreras all the tools he needs to pump up his defensive value in 2026. View full article

That said, if Drew Rasmussen and J.P. Feyereisen were able to stay healthy, they would've been gross for the Rays. Feyereisen: 1.48 ERA, 3.21 FIP over 61 innings for Tampa Rasmussen: 2.73 ERA, 3.20 FIP over 460.2 innings for Tampa

trading with tampa

Image courtesy of © Michael McLoone-Imagn Images Since the departure of Luis Urías in 2023, third base has been a bit of a revolving door for the Brewers. Brian Anderson and Joey Ortiz served as the main starters in 2023 and 2024, respectively, and other names like Andruw Monasterio, Owen Miller, Oliver Dunn, and even Mike Brosseau served as understudies. After some success converting a lifelong middle infielder (Ortiz) to a third baseman, the Brewers decided to try again with Caleb Durbin in 2025, and the results were mostly positive. Durbin posted a 105 wRC+ across 506 plate appearances and had 5 Defensive Runs Saved at the position, giving him a total of 2.6 fWAR for the season. However, despite his admirable efforts, he could use some backup. His production at the plate steadily slipped as the regular season progressed, and the most telling sign that fatigue was starting to set in was his decrease in bat speed. This, along with other weaknesses in his game, indicate that the Brewers may need to rely on some of their other depth pieces a little more in 2026. In second place for time spent at third base in 2025 was Anthony Seigler. Seigler was a call-up whom many doubted, especially as he continued to receive playing time despite posting a 50 wRC+. Realistically, he proved his ability to put up quality at-bats and actually did certain things very well. In addition to playing solid defense, he had a walk rate of 11% and an elite chase rate of just 18%. Expected stats may lead you to believe he got unlucky, and in a sample of just 73 plate appearances (many of which came in pinch-hit situations), it’s difficult to make any definite conclusions. If the team continues to place their trust in him and his approach, he could see an elevated role in 2026 with more opportunities against right-handed pitching. Andruw Monasterio spent most of his playing time covering for an injured Ortiz at shortstop or riding the pine, but found himself playing third base on a few occasions. He continues to be a reliable utility infielder and could cover the position as a platoon option. He had an .837 OPS against left-handed pitchers in 2025 and has performed better against southpaws across his career. Interestingly, Isaac Collins is also listed on the Brewers depth chart under third base, but he has played just 1 ⅓ innings at the position, so it’s safe to say that he’ll remain in the outfield for the foreseeable future. So what are the Brewers still missing? The most glaring gap is power. Typically, third basemen are characterized by having great arms, good defensive abilities (without the same mobility as a shortstop), and some decent pop. In fact, Durbin and Ernie Clement were the only players within the top 10 third basemen by fWAR who had slugging percentages under .430. Now, it’s important to acknowledge that the game has become modern enough to do away with the shackles of positional archetypes. Otherwise, Durbin shouldn’t even be playing in the majors, given his 5-foot-7 frame. However, Milwaukee is already in dire need of some thump in the lineup. Christian Yelich (29) and Jackson Chourio (21) were the only players to eclipse the 20-home run mark, and the Brewers were 22nd in total home runs (166). They got by with their own brand of fast-paced hustle baseball, but in the postseason, it seems like the odds dig the long ball. Given this need, what are the internal and external options? Within the farm system, the Brewers’ top third base prospects were all in Double A. Brock Wilken and Luke Adams had strong showings with the Biloxi Shuckers, while Mike Boeve—who only played first base, anyway—struggled quite a bit. All three have work to do before they’re big league-ready, and don’t seem like they’d be worth roster spots barring an injury emergency. Externally, there are a handful of options that each come with different financial expectations and risk. It’s safe to say that Alex Bregman and Munetaka Murakami, both of whom are expected to cost north of $100 million this winter, are in the “if only” category. Kazuma Okamoto is on the older side and is projected to sign a deal in the realm of $68 million over four years, which is still on the pricier side, especially for someone with no MLB experience. This leaves Eugenio Suárez, who (after a brutal second-half slump that extended into the postseason) would seem like an overpay even for $55 million over three years. Miguel Andujar is an affordable possibility that showed some promise last year. Across 341 plate appearances with the Athletics and Reds, he slugged .470 with 17 doubles and 10 homers. He’d be a defensive liability, especially when compared to Durbin and Seigler, but his bat could make him useful in certain situations. Even if Milwaukee stays the course with what they have at third base in 2026, it’ll still be a position of strength. It’s not a critical issue that must be patched as soon as possible, but it does present an opportunity to improve on the margins—something the organization loves to do. Don’t expect the landscape of the role to change significantly heading into next season, but do keep an eye out for potential sleeper acquisitions making their way to Milwaukee. View full article