Jason Wang

i feel i should come clean as it is christmas eve but i am not in fact related to jonah tong although our ancestry likely shares a common ancestor somewhere.

I don't think the Mets are interested in Megill since they've already committed ~$41 million to Devin Williams over the next three years. Don't let his gruesome ERA from 2025 fool you, his 2.68 FIP is still good and on par with his 2023 season. As for Brandon Sproat and my cousin Jonah Tong, the Mets are already down bad for starting pitching and for two guys that have tons of team control and upside left, they're probably not willing to trade them away for one year of Peralta. I may be biased because I sit across from him at Lunar New Year dinner but Tong especially has a lot to offer and is one of the more valuable young guys in that system. To quote the article, I’m quite bad at putting together mock trades but that would be my initial assumption.

rumor has it matt arnold executed this deal purely so this comment could be made on brewerfanatic.com

also 36 years old now but he was quite a dashing fella at 31 years old.

Perhaps superstar is a bit much, but it's undeniable that Brice Turang has been one of the best second basemen in baseball over the past two years. In 2025, he posted a 124 wRC+ and accumulated 4.4 fWAR, both marks placing him fourth amongst all second basemen. Although his defensive prowess took a step back last season, it has only been a year since he was the National League's Platinum Glove award winner. Turang joins a growing list of exceptional baseball talent and was part of the latest batch of players to officially join the team, along with Kyle Schwarber, Gunnar Henderson, and Will Smith. The roster and depth chart are far from complete, but there's a solid chance that Turang ends up as the starting second baseman for all, if not most, of the tournament. He could split time with Nico Hoerner if he ends up participating as well, but Brewers fans can expect to see plenty of Turang on the international stage regardless. It's a well-deserved honor for the 26-year-old and also begs the question, what other Brewers will be participating in the World Baseball Classic? Freddy Peralta hasn't officially announced his commitment, but has expressed a strong desire to represent the Dominican Republic. Neither William Contreras nor Jackson Chourio played for Venezuela in 2023, but they could be key parts of their lineup in 2026. Sal Frelick competed for Italy but hasn't confirmed his return to the team. One of the biggest struggles for teams in the past has been assembling a quality pitching staff, as the best arms are typically still ramping up when the tournament starts in early March. So far, Paul Skenes is the only pitcher who has decided to play for Team USA, and depending on the willingness of other top names like Tarik Skubal and Garrett Crochet to join him, the Brewers could send a few of their own. Quinn Priester and Jacob Misiorowski would be the top two candidates, but Chad Patrick or Tobias Myers could provide some solid value as well. View full rumor

hell yeah numbers baby

Image courtesy of © Mark Hoffman/Milwaukee Journal Sentinel / USA TODAY NETWORK via Imagn Images Because I’m a proud Zoomer and enjoy doomscrolling, I spend a good amount of time on the “For You” section of my Twitter feed. It’s primarily AI shilling and rabid opinions on sports, but like a bag of jelly beans, every so often, something good shows up in the middle of the gooey multi-colored mess. Recently, it was this tweet by Eno Sarris, a writer for The Athletic: Of course, as a casual fan, this came as something of a surprise. I knew that ERA was far from the only number needed to tell the story of a pitcher's performance, but the idea of disregarding it completely was foreign to me. Describing it as the “batting average of pitching” seemed like a step too far, but this offseason, I’ve noticed more evidence to back up Sarris’s claims. To me, the biggest indicator that ERA has fallen by the wayside as a useful statistic is the way that teams have spent money on pitchers so far this offseason. Here are the five largest pitching free-agent contracts that have been signed so far, and the ERAs for those players last season. Player # of Years Total Contract Value 2025 ERA Dylan Cease 7 $210 million 4.55 Devin Williams 3 $51 million 4.79 Cody Ponce 3 $30 million 1.89 (KBO) Ryan Helsley 2 $28 million 4.50 Emilio Pagan 2 $20 million 2.88 It is admittedly early in the offseason, but there is a clear pattern here. Regardless of where the total values of these contracts end up relative to their peers, many of these are sizable financial commitments. A $30 million AAV for seven years is nothing to sneeze at, and an AAV of $17 million over three years for a reliever with an ERA close to 5.00 is mind-boggling. But things start to come into focus when we look at more advanced stats like FIP, K/BB, and Skill-interactive Earned Run Average (SIERA). Player FIP K/BB SIERA Dylan Cease 3.56 3.03 3.58 Devin Williams 2.68 3.60 2.67 Cody Ponce (KBO) 2.15 6.15 N/A Ryan Helsley 4.14 2.52 3.68 Emilio Pagan 3.72 3.68 3.18 2025 MLB Average 4.16 2.64 4.06 For the most part, this select group of five pitchers looks far more impressive when comparing their advanced metrics to the league average. (Cody Ponce is an obvious exception, but the difficulty of translating his numbers in the Korean Baseball Organization to the American majors only underscores that teams are paying for something other than those surface-level stats.) Dylan Cease and Devin Williams, in particular, become far more appealing when ignoring their lackluster ERAs. It’s also why these two players have drastically different WAR figures based on where you look. Cease has an rWAR of just 1.1, but an fWAR of 3.4, while Williams has an rWAR of -0.3 and an fWAR of 1.4. Those disparities stem from the fact that pitching rWAR is based on runs allowed, while fWAR is based on FIP. Using a collection of advanced metrics paints a far more complete picture of a pitcher’s abilities because, like the slew of hitting metrics we now use instead of batting average to evaluate a hitter, a single number can only tell one part of the story—and in the case of ERA, as with batting average, it's a small and sometimes misleading fragment. Many supporters of ERA claim that its strength is that it tells you what happened, while FIP is a black box of confusing underlying numbers that are more predictive than descriptive. To me, this is more often the result of a misunderstanding of what FIP represents than anything else, because anyone familiar with the formula would notice that it, too, is descriptive. It’s calculated with actual numbers. Tom Tango has a good article discussing ERA's ability to predict itself in the short and medium term, and a significant contributing factor that limits its effectiveness is random variation from sequencing. Giving up a single hit each inning for five innings would result in a far lower ERA than giving up five hits in a single inning, followed by four perfect frames. By solely considering factors under the pitcher’s control, FIP helps remove a lot of noise from defensive miscues, and even the subjectivity of what is considered an earned run. SIERA takes this to the next level, factoring in batted-ball events without the outcome (e.g., hit or out). Instead, this ugly formula simply weighs ground balls, fly balls, and pop-ups to arrive at a number that’s similar to FIP, but with more positive bias toward pitchers who can induce soft contact. Strikeout-to-walk ratio is pretty straightforward, but some might be curious as to why the percentages aren’t separated. That’s because they do work together. A pitcher with a 40% strikeout rate seems far less effective if he also had a 15% walk rate. A pitcher with a 25% strikeout rate seems average, but could be elevated to elite with a 5% walk rate. Ultimately, strikeouts and walks seek to measure a pitcher’s ability to command the strike zone. Each individual metric still holds merit, but none carries enough context to serve as a high-level indicator without the other. How does this affect the Brewers? As many of you already know, Milwaukee is one of the more analytically-minded big-league teams, and this shift in perspective has been a part of their strategy for a while now. It’s the reason why certain arms like Nick Mears and Trevor Megill seemed to take massive steps forward after arriving in Milwaukee. Mears had a 5.56 ERA but a 2.61 FIP with the Rockies before he was traded to the Brewers. In his final season with the Twins, Megill had a 4.80 ERA with a 3.29 FIP. Still, this is just one layer of the onion of pitcher evaluation. What makes Milwaukee great is that they also know how to dig into the deeper layers, and can identify whether a pitcher like Quinn Priester or Grant Anderson is on the cusp of greatness even if their advanced metrics still don’t make it obvious. Few teams center their evaluations even on FIP or similar metrics, these days. Instead, they have proprietary ways to measure and weigh pitch quality, biomechanical indicators, and opportunities for improvement via development. If the Brewers look to acquire more pitching depth this offseason (or even if they decide to elevate some of their internal options to bigger roles), keep an eye out for arms that are more appealing under the hood. Milwaukee’s front office has a demonstrated history of finding undervalued assets and maximizing their upside, so if and when they end up making a move, try to look a little deeper than the ERA—and give the old “Advanced” section on FanGraphs a quick peek. View full article

Image courtesy of © Benny Sieu-Imagn Images In case you somehow missed it, MLB is officially instituting the long-awaited Automated Ball Strike System, or ABS, in 2026. Fans have had the chance to see the technology at work for years in the minor leagues, but they’ve only seen it sparingly in big league games. It was used in select spring training games and the All-Star game, but there wasn’t enough data to really think about how it’d affect the catcher role. Because of the limited information, the consensus seems to be that the new system will disproportionately hurt catchers like Patrick Bailey, who have gotten a lot of value out of pitch framing, while allowing worse framers to make up for their mistakes with challenges. However, the truth is likely more complex. Davy Andrews, a FanGraphs writer and former Brewer Fanatic contributor, recently wrote a piece reflecting on the upcoming system, and a key takeaway was that people tend to forget that pitch framing is just as much about stealing strikes as it is about keeping strikes. He noted that the best pitch framers in the league earn strikes on ~90% of shadow zone pitches in the zone, while getting called strikes on just ~20% of pitches outside the zone. The challenge system should allow a catcher with a perfect eye to get 100% of fairly earned called strikes, which could be more valuable than the few stolen strikes taken away from batter challenges. This is especially apparent when noting that catchers tend to have much higher overturn rates than batters so far. So how does William Contreras fit into all of this? Well, he was one of the best at framing pitches in 2023, accumulating +9 Catcher Framing Runs (5th in MLB). Since then, he has gradually declined in his productivity, posting +3 framing runs in 2024 and just +1 this past year. He’s still a much better defender than he was with the Braves, but could this new system be what he needs to turn things around behind the dish? A peek at his Savant page shows that his weakest framing zone was towards the left-handed batter’s box. In this shadow zone, his strike percentage of 57.9% was considerably lower than the MLB average of 64.3% and he accumulated -3 framing runs in this zone. It’s difficult to say exactly why he struggled so much with pitches on his right-handed side, but reviewing a few clips of missed calls shows something is happening. Even when setting up his glove in the right location, he tends to instinctively pull his hand down and to his left before catching the pitch, framing it in the opposite direction and losing out on strikes. While not quite as egregious, he faces a similar issue when catching pitches on the upper rail. In each of these examples, Contreras’s reaction makes it seem like he’s still expecting a late strike call because of how confident he is that the pitch landed in the zone. Now, the strike zone on television can admittedly be misleading, but there is enough evidence to suggest that Contreras often has a hard time keeping his pitcher’s strikes in the zone where they belong. A lot of this regression is due to the noise in his setup before the pitch. If we go back and look at the pitches he received in the same zones in 2023, the overall motion is far smoother, which lends itself to stealing and confirming more strikes. However, while that is undoubtedly something for Contreras to work on in the offseason, he still clearly has a good understanding of the zone. With the robo-zone, he can compensate for framing mistakes by correcting history with a timely challenge or two without sacrificing much framing upside. To get a more definitive answer on whether this will help or hurt his defensive efforts, we’ll have to wait until MLB rolls out its challenge probability and value numbers. Even without exact facts and figures, the new ABS system still seems to give William Contreras all the tools he needs to pump up his defensive value in 2026. View full article

That said, if Drew Rasmussen and J.P. Feyereisen were able to stay healthy, they would've been gross for the Rays. Feyereisen: 1.48 ERA, 3.21 FIP over 61 innings for Tampa Rasmussen: 2.73 ERA, 3.20 FIP over 460.2 innings for Tampa

trading with tampa

Image courtesy of © Michael McLoone-Imagn Images Since the departure of Luis Urías in 2023, third base has been a bit of a revolving door for the Brewers. Brian Anderson and Joey Ortiz served as the main starters in 2023 and 2024, respectively, and other names like Andruw Monasterio, Owen Miller, Oliver Dunn, and even Mike Brosseau served as understudies. After some success converting a lifelong middle infielder (Ortiz) to a third baseman, the Brewers decided to try again with Caleb Durbin in 2025, and the results were mostly positive. Durbin posted a 105 wRC+ across 506 plate appearances and had 5 Defensive Runs Saved at the position, giving him a total of 2.6 fWAR for the season. However, despite his admirable efforts, he could use some backup. His production at the plate steadily slipped as the regular season progressed, and the most telling sign that fatigue was starting to set in was his decrease in bat speed. This, along with other weaknesses in his game, indicate that the Brewers may need to rely on some of their other depth pieces a little more in 2026. In second place for time spent at third base in 2025 was Anthony Seigler. Seigler was a call-up whom many doubted, especially as he continued to receive playing time despite posting a 50 wRC+. Realistically, he proved his ability to put up quality at-bats and actually did certain things very well. In addition to playing solid defense, he had a walk rate of 11% and an elite chase rate of just 18%. Expected stats may lead you to believe he got unlucky, and in a sample of just 73 plate appearances (many of which came in pinch-hit situations), it’s difficult to make any definite conclusions. If the team continues to place their trust in him and his approach, he could see an elevated role in 2026 with more opportunities against right-handed pitching. Andruw Monasterio spent most of his playing time covering for an injured Ortiz at shortstop or riding the pine, but found himself playing third base on a few occasions. He continues to be a reliable utility infielder and could cover the position as a platoon option. He had an .837 OPS against left-handed pitchers in 2025 and has performed better against southpaws across his career. Interestingly, Isaac Collins is also listed on the Brewers depth chart under third base, but he has played just 1 ⅓ innings at the position, so it’s safe to say that he’ll remain in the outfield for the foreseeable future. So what are the Brewers still missing? The most glaring gap is power. Typically, third basemen are characterized by having great arms, good defensive abilities (without the same mobility as a shortstop), and some decent pop. In fact, Durbin and Ernie Clement were the only players within the top 10 third basemen by fWAR who had slugging percentages under .430. Now, it’s important to acknowledge that the game has become modern enough to do away with the shackles of positional archetypes. Otherwise, Durbin shouldn’t even be playing in the majors, given his 5-foot-7 frame. However, Milwaukee is already in dire need of some thump in the lineup. Christian Yelich (29) and Jackson Chourio (21) were the only players to eclipse the 20-home run mark, and the Brewers were 22nd in total home runs (166). They got by with their own brand of fast-paced hustle baseball, but in the postseason, it seems like the odds dig the long ball. Given this need, what are the internal and external options? Within the farm system, the Brewers’ top third base prospects were all in Double A. Brock Wilken and Luke Adams had strong showings with the Biloxi Shuckers, while Mike Boeve—who only played first base, anyway—struggled quite a bit. All three have work to do before they’re big league-ready, and don’t seem like they’d be worth roster spots barring an injury emergency. Externally, there are a handful of options that each come with different financial expectations and risk. It’s safe to say that Alex Bregman and Munetaka Murakami, both of whom are expected to cost north of $100 million this winter, are in the “if only” category. Kazuma Okamoto is on the older side and is projected to sign a deal in the realm of $68 million over four years, which is still on the pricier side, especially for someone with no MLB experience. This leaves Eugenio Suárez, who (after a brutal second-half slump that extended into the postseason) would seem like an overpay even for $55 million over three years. Miguel Andujar is an affordable possibility that showed some promise last year. Across 341 plate appearances with the Athletics and Reds, he slugged .470 with 17 doubles and 10 homers. He’d be a defensive liability, especially when compared to Durbin and Seigler, but his bat could make him useful in certain situations. Even if Milwaukee stays the course with what they have at third base in 2026, it’ll still be a position of strength. It’s not a critical issue that must be patched as soon as possible, but it does present an opportunity to improve on the margins—something the organization loves to do. Don’t expect the landscape of the role to change significantly heading into next season, but do keep an eye out for potential sleeper acquisitions making their way to Milwaukee. View full article

Image courtesy of © Jeff Hanisch-Imagn Images It has already been a busy offseason for the Brewers. After they recently declined options on William Contreras, Rhys Hoskins, and Jose Quintana, Brandon Woodruff declined his half of a $20 million mutual option, opting for a $10 million buyout and free agency. Not yet ready to let go (or at least not for free), though, Milwaukee decided to make a $22.025-million qualifying offer. Their desire to retain him is understandable. He has been on the team since 2017, longer than anyone else currently on the roster, and has been incredible over that span, pitching to a 3.10 ERA over his eight seasons. Recurring injuries threatened to derail his career, but despite a long layoff and seeing a meaningful decrease in fastball velocity upon his return this year, he still managed to make 12 starts and post a 3.20 ERA. His tangible pitching abilities aside, without him, Milwaukee has a severe shortage of veteran arms. Assuming no other additions to the rotation are made, Freddy Peralta is the only starter with more than 50 career games under his belt. The Brewers’ young pitching core undoubtedly has a bright future, with budding stars like Jacob Misiorowski and Quinn Priester, but Woodruff's experience and savvy are ingredients otherwise missing from the stew. This particular qualifying offer case is more nuanced than most. There’s a reason that, since this system was created in 2012, only 14 players have accepted qualifying offers. Because they represent opposite ends of the bargaining table, it’s rare that both players and organizations can agree upon a fixed value so easily. It’s the same reason mutual options are often declined, and why arbitration requires a neutral third party to be effective. Most of the time, a team won't extend a qualifying offer unless a player is worth markedly more than its value. Most of the time, a player won't accept such a deal once it's offered, because it's only for one year and their earning power is likely higher than that. In Woodruff’s case, if he had remained fully healthy for the past few years, he’d absolutely be in the running for a robust free-agent contract that would comfortably exceed the value of the one-year qualifying offer. But because his ability to stay on the field is so uncertain, taking the qualifying offer adds a guaranteed outcome to his future. For the Brewers, the risk behind the move is similar. They already accounted for injury risk when they signed him to a back-loaded two-year deal in 2024, acknowledging he would be recovering until some time in 2025 but betting on a strong return in the second half of the contract. In hindsight, 12 regular-season and zero postseason starts is hardly worth $17.5 million, but nonetheless, Milwaukee is ready to roll the dice again. After all, while his right lat strain sidelined him for the first two rounds of the playoffs, he’s projected to be fully healthy by Opening Day in 2026. If Woodruff declines the qualifying offer, the Brewers would receive a compensatory draft pick if he finds a way to maximize his earnings elsewhere. Should Woodruff get more than $50 million in guarantees from a new team, Milwaukee would collect a pick after the first round. If he signs with another team but for less than $50 million, they'll get a pick just before the start of the third round. Either way, for a team always looking to accumulate as much draft capital as possible, that would be a boost. If he accepts, Woodruff will be paid handsomely for at least the next year and has a chance to positively impact his stock heading into 2027. The Brewers, remember, are already due to pay him $10 million in 2026 (half in January and half in July), as the buyout on the mutual option Woodruff turned down. Another $22 million would hit their budget pretty hard, so even if he accepts the offer, he might become a trade candidate. Woodruff would have to approve any deal, in that circumstance, but he might be able to make more money by accepting the deal and signing an extension with a new team of his choosing than by heading into the market with the QO around his neck. Certainly, if he does accept the offer, the Brewers will look to move whichever of he and Peralta yields more value in return—be that in the form of young talent or added financial flexibility. Either way, this circumstance should give the front office some value to work with. Like many free agents who inevitably leave for bigger contracts and new horizons, Woodruff is by no means a must-have piece for next year’s roster—but he sure would make a dandy asset. View full article

Ehhh, I guess it depends on how you define "very different." Jansen, Hoskins, and Quintana are minor losses, but Woodruff is a free agent (although perhaps it's not as different since injuries have limited his playing time over the past few years). The core pieces will stick around and they'll be some moves on the margins but you're right, I don't think Milwaukee will lose any crucial pieces (unless Peralta gets traded).

Signing Rhys Hoskins was a big deal for the Brewers back in 2024. Milwaukee is typically very conservative in the free-agent market, but several circumstances made it possible. First, they had a desperate need for a first baseman after another unproductive season from Rowdy Tellez. Second, Hoskins had missed all of 2023 due to an ACL tear he suffered in spring training, so while he may have ordinarily been seeking a longer-term deal, the rest of the league needed to see what he could do after such a long layoff and serious injury. This paved the way for an affordable two-year deal worth $34 million, with an $18 million mutual option afterward. Mutual options are rarely ever exercised, but, unsurprisingly, the Brewers were quick to decline their end of the bargain. Hoskins was lukewarm at best, posting a 102 OPS+ over 845 plate appearances and accumulating just 0.7 total rWAR with the team. It was a considerable step back from his production in Philadelphia and, when combined with recurring stints on the injured list, necessitated other options at first base, such as Jake Bauers. One of the players brought in this year to fill a gap left by Hoskins was the prodigious Andrew Vaughn, who the Brewers have under team control for a few more years. He played exceptionally well and is likely slated to be a significant part of the team's future at the position. Still, Milwaukee could be in the market for more depth at first base, especially since we've yet to see a full season of work from Andrew Vaughn, and whether his resurgence was the result of actual mechanical adjustments or just smoke and mirrors. Nonetheless, history suggests that Hoskins won't be worth the money he's owed, and it's probably better to use the roster spot and extra money elsewhere. Hoskins is one of three Brewers with mutual options that have been declined, and it seems like Milwaukee will have a very different roster heading into next year. View full rumor

It's a primary reason why defensive ability is so hard to measure. Stats like OAA and DRS seem to measure the same thing but have very different formulas and quite frequently lead to different results. A few examples of guys with major discrepancies: Bobby Witt Jr. - (24 OAA, 3 DRS) Masyn Winn - (21 OAA, 2 DRS) Steven Kwan - (22 DRS, 5 OAA) Zach Neto - (13 DRS, -7 OAA) Without the underlying data made public, it's pretty impossible to backsolve and figure out what plays Ortiz was actually punished for in DRS that he wasn't in OAA. I've tried to figure it out myself but without knowing the "fielding value" assigned to each batted ball instance and all the other stuff the wizards at MLB use to calculate everything, all I can do is report the listed numbers 😔 I should clarify that while a slight implication may have been made that the Brewers were worse defensively this year, I deliberately tried to avoid saying that the players (Chourio, Ortiz, and Collins) were bad defenders and just wanted to note that they did not grade well when it came to DRS. Your frustrations are noted and I commiserate!

not enough, that kid is washed I have NEVER seen him make a play in the infield or outfield. defensive liability.