No, I don't think you get what I'm saying at all, and I'll take responsibility for that. My reply to you was flippant, so I should expect a flippant and superficial response in turn, so allow me to elaborate. Nowhere in my reply did I defend Counsell, nor did I in any way state that he is infallible and above reproach--that would be a foolish position to take. It is quite obvious that his decision regarding relievers in yesterday's game did not work, and I think all of us as Brewers fans would at least agree on that.
But here's the rub: we can all see when the results are good or bad, however, those results are only the public-facing tail end of a long chain of processes that are largely or entirely hidden from our view. So what we often do as fans (and I include myself in this category as much as you or anyone else) is extrapolate backwards from result to an evaluation of process.
Leaving aside the issue of bad processes sometimes leading to good results and vice-versa, let's get into the real problem we face, which is that we as fans do not see the process. We watch the games, look at box scores and stats, and get on here and enjoy armchair managing, which is all good fun (at least, we all like to argue so much I assume it is fun for us, but maybe I shouldnt assume).
However, you and I don't talk to the players every day and get a read on their mindset, energy, confidence, or body language. For instance, how does each player in the bullpen react to their usage: do they prefer defined roles, or a "fireman" approach? I have no idea, but I'm willing to bet Counsell does.
We don't have an army of analysts and statisticians poring over datapoints that put each of our players and their opponsents under the rigorous microscope of cutting edge data analytics. How do Elvis Peguero's arm slot, arsenal, and spin rates play against the batted ball profiles and swing paths of Joe, Delay, Bae, Reynolds, and Hayes? I have no clue, but I bet someone in the organization does, and I can imagine that he or she is feeding Counsell actionable intelligence on bullpen decisions.
The truth is, though, I have no idea what Counsell's or any other manager's decision-making process really looks like. The popular, but by no means universally accepted, benchmark is 10,000 hours of experience as championed by Malcolm Gladwell. Forgive me for another assumption, but I suspect neither you or anyone else on here has logged that kind of time, and I know I haven't logged even hour #1. This is why I took umbrage with your characterization of the situation as a "SIMPLE" decision for a manager to make, and cited the Dunning-Kruger effect in response. Dunning and Kruger's study suggests a common logical fallacy, which is that once we start to know something about a topic, we naturally tend to overestimate our overall understanding of that topic.
In light of this, when someone is in a position that is elite and selective enough that only a few hundred people in the world are probably capable of filling that role at any given moment, and this person makes a choice that I don't understand or I would have done differently, I have two ways I can try to explain this. On the one hand, I could assume the expert blew it with a bad process and I would have a better decision-making process. This is theoretically possible, but highly unlikely, as suggested by the Dunning-Kruger effect. Alternatively, I could try to puzzle out the process that person actually used to make their choice, and all the information and variables that informed or affected that choice. This sounds like a far more interesting conversation to have, to me at least, though a two-day old IGT is almost certainly not the place to have it.
So, here's where I'm at: I know that the bullpen call didn't work. I have no idea what the process was like that led to that choice or how it compares to other managers' processes. And, most apropos to your post, while Counsell's process may very well have been flawed, I'm reasonably certain that the decision was far more complicated than it looks on TV.